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ABSTRACT 
Early in the nineteenth century British India was com-
pelled to give attention to her North-West Frontier. Fear 
of invasion, prompted first by Napoleon, forced the British 
to search for a defensible frontier in advance of the exist-
ing position. 
At first the defensive policy was to establish the 
neighbouring states, particularly Persia and Afghanistan, 
as buffers. But by the late 1830's, Russian intrigue in 
these countries convinced the British that actual control 
of Afghanistan was vital to Indian security. 
Afghan War ensued. 
Thus the First 
Following the war, Sind and the Punjab were annexed as 
partial realization of the desire for a defensible frontier, 
bringing the British into contact with the mountains of the 
North-West and the mountain tribes. The reaction to the war, 
combined with the administrative problems of the new provinces, 
caused some, particularly John Lawrence, to regard the Indus 
as the best defensible frontier. Others saw a better defen-
sive line at the foot of the mountains, or beyond, on the 
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Kabul-Kandahar line, with Herat as an advance post. 
With the advance to the mountains, the Pathan and 
Baluch tribesmen came into the context of Imperial policy, 
since they had to be pacified to ensure unobstructed British 
access to the mountain passes. Even if British defense were 
to rest on the Indus, the tribes had to be brought to friendly 
terms, in the hope that they would not join an invader. 
With the consolidation of the new provinces, and renewed 
Russian activity in Central Asia after 1860, the tendence 
was once again to seek security for India by an advance into 
Afghanistan. Thus the policy of the 1870's was similar to 
that of the 1830's; the Second Afghan War was the result of 
the search for a defensible frontier, as the first had been. 
Thus the theme of the thesis is the search for a defensible 
frontier for India, 1800-1880. 
PREFACE 
In pursuing a study of the North-West Frontier of India, 
one is very soon impressed with the vast body of literature 
which has been written and accumulated on the subject. A 
second impression occurs that there is an ever-present, but 
not always apparent, theme running through it--that the Brit-
ish were constantly aware of the necessity of finding a 
frontier that could easily be defended in case of invasion. 
It has been my attempt to develop this theme of the 
search for a defensible frontier. Having but limited access 
to primary source material and original documents, my effort 
has been almost totally restricted to an analysis of secondary 
sources. Some were works of contemporary to the period under 
examination, others having been written with the advantage 
of a century of retrospect. 
This particular theme, of a search for a defensible fron-
tier, has been developed by historians like A. J. Norris 
and D. P. Singhal, but their works cover only a relatively 
short time span. No one has attempted to cover the period 
from the first awareness of the frontier problem up to the 
second attempt, eighty years later, to establish the fron-
tier on the Afghan Plateau. Therefore, I have attempted, 
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as far as my resources and ability would permit, to develop 
this theme covering this particular period. 
I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to 
Dr. Leslie Harris, certainly for his assistance and construc-
tive criticism in the preparation of this thesis, but more 
particularly for his having introduced me to this most in-
triguing facet of Indian history. 
Thanks certainly has to be expressed to the staff of 
Memorial University Library for their constant assistance 
and service. I appreciate now that librarians are more than 
mere custodians of the printed word. 
A very special debt of gratitude has to be expressed 
to Miss Sheila MacLeod, who so cheerfully and so capably 
transformed a mass of handwritten material into the finished 
product. 
To my wife, I express my awareness of and appreciation 
for, her understanding and patience. There was always en-
couragement; if scholarship is lacking, I have only myself 
to blame. 
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Chapter I 
EMERGENCE OF A FRONTIER PROBLEM 
1800-1840 
British India's contact with the tribes of the North-
West Frontier and her relations with Afghanistan throughout 
the nineteenth century were the product of two separate forces 
at work, one serving to emphasize the other. It is highly 
probable that normal British expansion, even without the 
Russian threat, eventually would have brought British India 
into contact with Afghanistan. Napoleon first, Russia later, 
brought a sense of urgency to the situation and accelerated 
the process of expansion and involvement. 
British expansion was motivated by several influences, 
including, imperialistic acquisitiveness, the urge to dominate, 
the repercussions of strife in Europe, the greed of great trad-
ing companies hungry for dividends, and the policies of 
ambitious men scarcely restrained by authority whose control 
was rendered nugatory by distance.! 
There were other influences, perhaps more vital, often 
involving the "white man's burden." In 1688 the President and 
Council of Surat stated the cause of British obligation to the 
1. Fraser-Tytler, W. 
University Press, 1953, p. 
K., Afghanistan, London, Oxford 
75. 
page=p 
people of the sub-continent when they declared, 
There are many eminent persons that have 
declared themselves very desirous to live among 
us with their families might they be secure.l 
Thus, while people found security within the English 
2 
fold, the English found themselves with an obligation forced 
upon them which is not normally a characteristic of a trad-
ing company, that is, the obligation to protect the native 
peoples that came within the British territories. Uninten-
tionally, customers became subjects. 
However the most vital influence in British expansion 
was the necessity of procuring a defensible border. One 
method was to expand spheres of influence into protectorates 
and surround acquisitions with a belt of native states. 
The Rajput states and Oude were maintained as 
a buffer, Sind and Punjab warded off contact with 
Baluchistan and Afghanistan while the Sutlej states 
warded off contact with the Punjab.2 
Thus, 
Lord Wellesley's annexations were inspired by a desire 
to find a defensible border, as P. E. Roberts claims when 
he remarks that, 
Wellesley . . turned his attention to his north-
ern frontier. He held that the buffer state of 
Oudh formed but a weak defence of the north-western 
boundary of Bengal.3 
1. Foster, English Factories in India 1668-69, as 
quoted in Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 75. 
2. Curzon, G. N., Frontiers, Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1907, p. 79. 
3. Roberts, P. E., History of British India, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 248. 
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Moreover, as the Mogul Empire declined with the eighteenth 
century, historical experience warned of the possibility of 
a fresh wave of conquerors emerging from the vast area west 
of the Hindu Kush. Indeed, two such waves were forthcoming, 
the first under Nadir Shah in 1749 and the second under Ahmad 
Shah in 1761 . 
Meanwhile~ the English, the only stable political and 
military power in India, found expansion to the north and 
vJest actually forced upon them; a phenomenon which Sir Henry 
Rawlinson . for example ,., saw as '' another illustration of the 
old doctrine that ,./ when civilization and barbarism carne in 
contact , the latter must inevitably give way. ' 1 
The British, in India~ followed this common pattern. 
In 1798 the Bengal Presidency had been expanded westward to 
include Benares and Allahabad. By 1805 further territorial 
acquisitions had advanced their north-western territories 
almost to the River Sutlej, touching the territories of the 
Cis-Sutlej Sikhs. During Lord Minto ' s Governor Generalship 
(1807-1813) Ranjit Singh agreed to abstain from all inter-
ference in the affairs of the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs who had 
placed themselves under British protection. 2 Thus, 
l. Rawlinson, H. C., Memorandum on Central Asia, 
printed in Philips, C. H., Select Documents on the History of 
India and Pakistan, Vol.IV. London, Oxford University Press, 
1962 p. 442. 
2. Davies! c . C . , An Historical Atlas of the Indian 
Peninsula, London ! Oxford University Press, 1958, maps 26, 
28, p. 56, 58. 
As they [the British] moved they reached out 
beyond their boundaries, seeking to safeguard the 
territories they had conquered by probing into the 
secrets and the policies of those which lay ahead.l 
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The opening years of the nineteenth century found the 
British frontier advanced to the River Sutlej with the farth-
est outpost at Ludhiana. The normal pressure for advance 
and the desire for a defensible front~er had reached a logi-
cal stopping point, a river frontier with a strong friendly 
chieftain on the other side. 
But though there were forces which constantly corn-
pelled the British forward there were also forces in the 
opposite direction. For the mountains of the North-West were 
reached contrary to the wishes of the Directors of the East 
India Company. The Governors-General, under whose direction 
the frontiers advanced, were pledged to non-annexation and 
non-intervention. While Pitts' India Act of 1784 had stated 
that !! schemes of conquest were repugnant to the wish, honour 
and policy of the nation •= this declaration was followed by 
Wellesley's and Dalhousie's annexations. In spite of the 
pledge of non-annexation they apparently were aware that 
Any great power that fails adequately to 
protect its frontier ceases to be great ; any empire 
that neglects this important duty of self preserva-
tion is eventually overthrown.2 
l. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 77. 
2. Davies, C. c., The Problem of the North West 
Frontier, London, Oxford University Press, 1932, p. 2. 
But it is true that 
at this time and for long afterwards the British 
had no conception of the strategic problems which 
were immediately confronting them in their advance 
to the north-west and the strategic connections of 
Afghanistan with the security of India had not yet 
crossed the horizon of their consciousness.l 
When, eventually, they were drawn into the orbit of 
Central Asian affairs the precipitating agent was another 
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European power, It was Napoleon who first brought the North-
West into practical Anglo-Indian politics; " such men as he 
have a dangerous gift of shattering complacency, as often by 
the mere fantasy and audacity of their ambitions as by any 
sense in them. '" 2 
Before Napoleon ' s advent on the Asian scene the Valley 
of the Indus held little attraction for the East India Com-
pany. But the growing power of France in Europe and the 
daring of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt kindled speculation 
as to the possibility of a French invasion of India. French 
intrigues in Persia likewise stimulated British sensitivity 
in regard to the sub-continent, for 
Some French agents under the feigned character 
of botanists had visited Teheran before Bonaparte 
invaded Egypt, and wished Aga Mohamed Khan, the then 
ruler of Persia, to seize Bussorah and Bagdad. 
1. Fraser-Tytler~ op. cit., p. 79. 
2. Morison, J. L., " From Alexander Burnes to Frederick 
Roberts ," Raleigh Lecture , printed in Proceedings of British 
Academy , Vol. 22 , 1936 , p. 178. 
They also endeavoured to stimulate the Shah to 
assist Tippoo Sultan against the British.l 
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Since Napoleon had made no secret of his ambitions to 
lead an army across Asia Minor to India, the authorities in 
England and India became convinced of the imminence of the 
French menace and directed all their diplomatic, commercial, 
and military efforts in the countries to the west and north-
west of India towards the repulse of these anticipated 
threats. Even 
Napoleon's repulse outside Acre, the destruction 
of his fleet by Nelson and the obvious logistical 
irnpractibility of marching a signigicant force 
through the arid and hostile lands of south west 
Asia did not diminish the determination of the 
Company's office~s to shore up their military and 
diplomatic defences 'in India.2 
Involvement in the Indus Valley and the closing of Sind 
was of prime importance to any defensive strategy, for Sind 
might well play an important role in the calculations of 
several potential aggressors. For not only were the French 
feared but also a threatened combination of the Marathas, with 
Tipu Sultan of Mysore, the Arnirs of Sind, and possibly the 
French. Furthermore, Zarnin Shah, the Arnir of Afghanistan, 
was thought to be contemplating an invasion of India through 
Sind, perhaps also with French assistance. 
1. Kaye, J. W., History of the War in Afghanistan, 
London, R. Bentley, 1857, Vol. 1, p. 44. 
2. Huttenback, R. A., British Relations With Sind, 
Berkley, University of California Press, 1962, p. 1. 
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Consequently, as early as 1794 Jonathan Duncan, the Gov-
ernor of Bombay, sent a merchant to the court of Mir Fatehali 
Khan to try to set the stage for the reopening of amicable re-
lations between Sind and British India. The agent succeeded 
in his attempt and the establishment of a factory was pro-
posed, ' not so much with a view to commercial as to political 
advantages. 11 1 
In March 1800, Nathan Crow was sent to be the company's 
agent in Sind. In a report he listed six advantages inherent 
in any British establishment in Sind: it would divert and 
worry Zarnin Shah and make him more tractable ; it would ensure 
help if an attack on Afghanistan became necessary; it would 
provide a base for the fermentation of revolution against 
Kabul if this were considered necessary or desirable ; it 
would preclude the entry of the French , Afghans or Marathas 
into Sind ; it would provide an excellent base from which to 
. 2 
spy on Afghan1stan. 
Actually none of these advantages carne to be realized, for 
the Sindians forced the factory to be closed and Crow to leave. 
Meanwhile, 
with the inception of the Consulate and the renewal 
of the campaign against Austria, Napoleon became so 
preoccupied with affairs in Europe that even 
l. Huttenback , R. A., " The French Threat to India and 
British Relations with Sind ," English Historical Review, 
Vol. 76, 1961 , p. 591. 
2. I. 0. R. Horne and Miscellaneous, V 333 , Crow to 
Duncan, May 1880, quoted in Huttenback, " The French Threat 
to India , " op. cit., p. 592. 
alarmist British statesmen were soon convinced 
that the French threat to India had at least tem-
porarily waned, thus the affairs of Sind became 
unimportant to the British interest. 1 
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The response to the French threat had not been confined 
to activities in Sind. In fact, Wellesley approached Persia 
for assistance in guarding the north-western approaches to 
India. He instructed Medhi Ali Khan, a naturalized Persian, 
who was acting as the resident of the Company at Bushire 
to take measures for inducing the Court of Persia 
to keep Zamin Shah in perpetual check (so as to 
preclude him from returning to India) but without 
any decided act of hostility . 2 
Thus in 1801 a treaty was sign ed with Fath Ali Shah of 
Persia whereby Afghans and French were to be prevented from 
attacking India. As for the Afghans, the Shah undertook "to 
lay waste and desolate the Afghan dominions and to employ every 
exertion to ruin and humble the above mentioned nation,"3 while 
the British Government agreed to furnish the Persian army with 
warlike stores. 
Lord Minto went to India in 1807 believing in the policy 
of non-intervention,4 but was able to check, only temporarily, 
the forward policy inaugurated by Wellesley. For, though 
1. Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, op. cit., p. 4. 
2. Sykes, P. A., History of Afghanistan, London, 
McMillan and Company, 1940, V of 1, p. 378. 
3. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 76. 
4. Roberts, op. cit., p. 266. 
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the Peace of Arniens had, for a short time, contracted the 
danger of a French invasion, its disintegration reawakened 
British apprehensions as to possible French aspirations both 
toward India and the lands to the west of the Hindu Kush. As 
the prospect of the French arounsing anti-British feelings 
in the North-West was re-awakened, Minto became disposed to 
the policy of establishing outposts to detect possible French 
manoeuvres. He wrote: · 
I do not allude at present to any expedition 
of any actual invasion of the British territories 
in India by a French army; but many considerations 
denote conclusively the extension of the enemies 
views to this country.l 
The signing of the Treaty of Tilsit is generally re-
garded as being an important event in the history of frontier 
diplomacy. Indeed, J. L. Morison suggests that " we may take 
the history of our frontier to begin after 1807. " 2 
Certainly the complications created by the signing of 
the treaty were typical of phenomena that would re-occur dur-
ing the nineteenth century; for as C. C. Davies remarked 
retrospectively in 1932, 
to a large extent our Afghan policy has been regu-
lated by the pressure of the political barometer 
in Europe, for friction between England and Russia 
in Europe have nearly alway~ been followed by com-
plications in Central Asia. 
1. Elliot, Gilbert, Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, 
quoted in Huttenback, " The French Threat to India~ op. cit., p. 
593. 
2. Morison, op. cit. 
3. Davies, c. C., The Problem o£ the North West Frontier, 
op. cit., p. 154. 
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However, the effect of the Treaty of Tilsit has been some-
what overestimated, and in its Indian frame of reference can 
only be viewed in relationship with another treaty made two 
months earlier between France and Persia which was allowed to 
lapse after the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit. The implica-
tions of Tilsit were not immediately felt in Persia; but the 
Treaty of Finkenstein, which provided for a Franco Persian 
alliance, activated a British response which is sometimes 
associated with Tilsit. 
While the actual signing of the Treaty of Finkenstein took 
place only two months before the signing of Tilsit the chain of 
events which led to its signing began at least two years pre-
viously, for "in 1805 the Shah addressed a letter to Napoleon 
seeking the aid of the great western conqueror to stem the 
tide of Russian encroachment."l 
While the first French agent appeared in Persia in 1805 
the entente began to take shape in 1806, as 
Monsieur Joubert was received with marked 
attention and respect . . the king was prepared 
to listen to any proposal, so that his new allies 
undertook to co-operate against his Russian enemies. 
He would join in an invasion of Hindostan, or in 
concert with the French, amputate an2 given limb 
from the body of the Turkish empire. 
1. Kaye, op. cit., p. 44. 
2. Ibid, p. 49. 
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In 1807 the Finkenstein treaty was signed, the Shah agreed, 
"if the French have any intention of invading Khorasan the king 
will appoint an army to go down by the road of Kabul and Kan-
dahar."! Thus the treaty clearly proved his readiness on paper 
to invade India. 
Since Persia had entered an alliance with France to get 
assistance against Russian aggression, it was the English policy 
to approach Persia with the same enticement, therefore: 
The court of St. James had proposed to assist 
Persia by mediating with St. Petersburg, and Mr. 
Hartford Jones was deputed to Teheran to negotiate 
with the ministers of the Shah. It was originally 
intended that he should proceed to Persia, taking 
the Russian capital in his route; but the pacifi-
cation of Tilsit caused a departure from this 
design, and Sir Hartford Jones sailed for Bombay 
with the mission on board one of His Majesty's 
ships.2 
Hence the Jones mission, and likewise the Malcolm mission, 
must have been planned before Tilsit, and thus were a response 
to Finkenstein. 
Whereas the Malcolm mission failed because the impact of 
Tilsit and its meaning for Persia were not yet felt in Teheran 
and the Persians still had faith in the Franco Persian alliance, 
the Jones mission was successful because it coincided with 
the Persian realization of her position. 
Malcolm left his successor to reap the harvest of 
altered circumstances for when Jones arrived in Teheran 
1. Sykes, op. cit., p. 379. 
2. Kaye, op. cit., p. 55. 
t he 'chapter of accidents' had worked mightily in 
his favour. The reign of Gallic influence was at 
an end. Our enemies had overreached themselves, 
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and been caught in their own toils. Before Napoleon 
and the Tsar had thrown themselves into each others 
arms at Tilsit, it had been the policy of the French 
to persuade the Persian court that the aggressive 
designs of Russia could be successfully counter-
acted only by a power at enmity with that state; 
and now he and the emperor were 'invariablement 
unit pour la paix comme pour laguerre. •l 
Furthermore, the Persians felt that their interests had 
been sacrificed at Tilsit because one of the enticements of 
Finkenstein had been the return of Georgia to Persia with 
Russian benevolence. But after Tilsit "Fath Ali was naturally 
deeply chagrined by the Convention since it contained no 
reference to the return to Persia of Georgia."2 
Furthermore, the Seton and Smith missions to Sind were 
also in response to the Treaty of Finkenstein for the Gar-
danne mission to Teheran in 1807 had also been intriguing 
with the Amirs of Sind. Before the signing of the Treaty of 
Tilsit, native intelligence reported that envoys from Sind 
had arrived in Persia and rumours reported imminence of a 
French foothold in Sind. 3 
Minto's reaction was to open relations immediately with 
Sind and have an agent appointed to 
determine the extent of the Franco Sind influence 
and counteract it. Also he should attempt to 
l. Ibid, p. 6 2. 
2. Sykes, op. cit., p. 379. 
3. 
p. 594. 
Huttenback, "The French Threat to India," op. cit., 
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determine the extent of the Franco Persian influence 
in the countries north of Sind and should do his ut-
most to re-establish British influence in the Sind 
court, the agent should also investigate the feasi-
bility of an army's marching from India to Persia.l 
To re-establish relations Captain David Seton was sent 
to Sind as an envoy. Seton proposed a treaty, favourable to 
Sind , but in keeping with his mission to re-establish rela-
tions with Sind, and to undermine Persian and French influence 
at all costs. However, this treaty was abrogated by Minto 
and a second treaty was proposed by Nicholas Hankey Smith 
which was accepted. (August, 1809) Ultimately this treaty 
was accepted for the same reason as the Jones treaty with 
Persia, because of the changed circumstances following Tilsit. 
While Morison points out that the Tilsit plan aroused 
the Government in British India, it was actually French rather 
than Russian aggression which was the bogy originally. This 
view is supported by c. c. Davies who points out that it was 
not the Treaty of Tilsit but French intrigues in Persia and 
the success of General Gardannes mission to Teheran in 1807 
that alarmed Lord Minto. However , the success of Minto's 
counterstrok e, Malcolm's mission to the court of the Shah 
and that of Elphinstone to the camp of Shah Shuja at Pesha-
war was made easier of attainment because Napoleon had 
sacrificed Persian interests at Tilsit. 
l. Minto in Council to Duncan, March 14, 1808, as 
quoted in Huttenback, " The French Threat to India, " op. cit., 
p . 59 5 . 
Paradoxically, therefore, 
the alliance between the two great continental 
powers which seemed to threaten the destruction 
of the British Empire in the East , was a source 
of security to the latter.l 
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Precisely which treaty, Tilsit or Finkenstein waked the 
British response is not really terribly important. But what 
is significant is that the response to a potential threat 
against Indian security was an attempt to establish buffers 
along all exposed frontiers, thus Elphinstone to Afghanistan, 
Metcalfe to Ranjit Singh at Lahore, and Seton and Smith to 
Sind. Kaye presents the case clearly when he wrote, 
It now became our policy whilst endeavouring 
to re-establish our influence in Persia to prepare 
ourselves for its hostility, and to employ Afghan-
istan and Sindh as barriers against encroachments 
from the west; and at the same time to increase 
our security by enlisting against the French and 
Persian confederacy the friendly offices of the 
Sikhs.2 
It would appear that the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Tilsit compounded already existing fears and raised the spectre 
of a combined Franco Russian move on India through Persia. 
The combined impact of the two treaties is given by Huttenback 
as the reason for the home authorities becoming thoroughly 
alarmed and ordering the Governor General to take measures to 
prevent a hostile army from cro s sing the Indus and to cultivate 
l. Kaye, op. cit., p. 53. 
2. Ibid, p. 53. 
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to the utmost of your powers the favourable opinion 
and co-operation not only of all states and countries 
to the eastward of the Indus but also of the Afghan 
government and even of the Tartar tribes to the 
eastward of the Caspian.l 
However, Napoleon soon became involved in dynastic in-
trigues and unable to free himself from the "Sepoy General " 
in the Iberian Peninsula; thus he posed no further threat to 
India. The Secret Committee considered this situation a reason, 
of the most forcible nature for proceeding without 
unnecessary delay to reduce our military expenses 
within the narrowest bounds that may be consistent 
with the publick interests and security.2 
When the repercussions of Finkenstein and Tilsit had 
ended , the French threat vanished and the British focused their 
attention on Russia which had come to be the major threat to 
India , rather than France or Persia. Actually, Russian aspira-
tions towards India had existed long before Tilsit and 
Napoleon. 
Popular belief held that Russia's intentions towards India 
went as far back as the days of Peter the Great and that the 
plan for Russian encroachment towards India was set forth in 
his will. But it is generally accepted that this will of 
Peter the Great was fabricated. As Eugene Schuyler explains, 
The forgery of the will of Peter the Great 
was due to the desire of Napoleon to frighten 
1. I. 0. R. Boards Secret Drafts, March 2, 1808, as 
quoted in Huttenback, The French Threat to India, op. cit., p. 594. 
2. 
p. 59 9. 
I. 0. R. Boards Secret Drafts, June 29, 1810, ibid, 
Europe, and thus to give him excuses and pretexts 
for entering upon his Moscow campaign . . there 
are strong reasons for believing that the only will 
left by Peter the Great, that naming his wife as 
his successor, was forged by Catherine and Menshikof 
immediately after his death.l 
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This same argument is raised by Laurence Lockhart, who 
also claims that the will is fictitious and that no mention 
of it was made prior to 1812 and that it was 11 mere a pamphlet 
to justify the invasion of Russia by Napoleon. " 2 
By 1860 the authenticity of the will was doubted by 
historians and in 1877 
Tsar Alexander II, when assuring the German 
ambassador, Prince Hohenlohe Schillingfurst, that 
Russia had no designs on India or Constantinople, 
denied the existence of the will.3 
Nevertheless, whether authentic or not, to a limited 
extent it accurately reflects the political aims of Peter the 
Great, for Peter was anxious to establish an overland route 
to India. For, 
It was Medvedyev's mission to Bokhara and 
Balkh in 1644 that first gave the rulers of 
Russia the idea of opening up a trade route to 
India through Central Asia.4 
1. Schuyler, E., Turkistan, New York, Scribner, 1885, 
Vol. II, p. 258. 
2. Lockhart, Laurence, " The Political Testament of 
Peter the Great, " Slavonic Review, Vol. 19, 1936, p. 437. 
3. Ibid, p. 439. 
4. Ibid, p. 440. 
Furthermore, 
There is little doubt that rumours of the 
great wealth of the country south of the Central 
Asian wastes had reached him [Peter] and provoked 
his curiosity, and he dispatched a secret envoy, 
one Simon Malinki, to explore the region which was 
at that time being contested by England and France. 
Malinki started from St. Petersburg in 1694 but he 
never reached his goal . . Defeated in his first 
attempt, Peter strove by other means to gain infor-
mation respecting India . . and on learning that 
in order to reach the coveted land it would be 
necessary first of all to traverse Turkestan and 
subdue its turbulent people, he gave orders for the 
ill-fated expedition of Prince Bekovitch, whose 
assumed victory over the Khivans was to open up 
the way towards the Hindu Kush.l 
Also Peter is quoted as having said, 
Bukhara is the commercial centre of these parts . 
from Astrabad to Balkh and Badakshan is only twelve 
days journey and on that road to India no one can 
interfere with us.2 
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In reviewing the history of Russian invasion proposals 
towards India, Lord Curzon states that an advance toward India 
via Orenburg, Bokhara and Kabul was planned as early as 1791 
by M. de St. Gemi and considered by Empress Catherine. 3 
The second expedition was to be a joint venture designed 
by Emperor Paul and Napoleon (then First Consul) . The plan 
called for a French army of 35,000 to march down the Danube 
1. Krausse, Alexis, Russia in Asia, New York, Henry 
Holt and Co., 1899, p. 149. 
2. Solovyev, Istoria Rossii, Vol. XVIII, p. 48, as 
quoted in Lockhart, op. cit., p. 440. 
3. Curzon, G. N., Russia in Central Asia and The 
Anglo Russian Question, London, Longmans, Green, 1889, p. 167. 
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to the Black Sea to be shipped thence to Taganragan on the 
Sea of Azov where it would then join a Russian force of 
greater strength upon the Volga. They would then be conveyed 
by river to Astrakhan and by sea to Astrabad, then an over-
land march through Persia to Herat, Farrah and Kandahar, 
Apparently the spirit of liberation appealed to Paul, for 
he wrote, 
The sufferings under which the population 
o£ India groans have inspired France and Russia 
with the liveliest interest, and the two govern-
ments have resolved to unite their £orces in order 
to liberate India from the tyrranical and barbarous 
yoke of the English.l 
Apparently Napoleon was not quite as " inspired with the 
liveliest interest '' as Paul, £or 
The Emperor Paul £rom his hatred o£ the English 
and his sympathy with Napoleon did indeed propose 
an expedition to India, but his plan was so wild that 
even Napoleon laughed at it.2 
At any rate, after Napoleon was £arced £rom this plan 
Paul proposed to undertake it alone. In order not to make 
the conquest too much of a burden upon the Government, 3 he 
intended to effect it by means of the Don Cossacks. Address-
ing the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, General Orle£f, who was 
to mobilize at Orenburg, he wrote: 
I am preparing to be beforehand with the 
English, who intend attacking me by land and sea. 
l. Ibid, 
2. Schuyler, op. cit., p. 258. 
3. Ibid, p. 265. 
I propose to attack them in their most vulnerable 
part , where they least expect it. It is three 
months march from Orenburg to Hindostan ; to you 
and your army I confide this expedititon ; assemble 
your men and begin your march to the River Indus 
and the English settlements in India. The troops 
there are light troops like yours ; you will have 
over them the advantage of your artillery. Pre-
pare everything for this campaign ; send your scouts 
to prepare the roads. The enterprise will cover 
you with immortal glory, will secure you my good 
will, will l g ad you with riches, givmg an opening 
to our commerce, and strike the enemy a mortal 
blow. India , to which I send you , is governed by 
a supreme head called the Great Mogul , and a num-
ber of small sovereigns. The English possess 
commercial establishments there, which they have 
acquired by means of money, or conquered by force 
of arms; my object is to ruin these establishments, 
and to put the oppressed sovereigns in the same 
state of dependence on Russia as they are at pre-
sent in towards England. Be sure to remember that 
you are only at war with the English, and the friend 
of all who do not give them help. On your march, 
assure all men with the friends h ip of Russia. The 
expedition is urgent ; the earlier the better.l 
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The diary of Ataman Denisov , one of Orleff's officers 
describes the route of the army and its recall. He wrote : 
The army reached a monastery of the Roskolniki 
on the Irguza River. The monastery lay in an area 
between Russian claims and the a uthority of the 
Central Asian Sultans; but it was on the road to 
Khiva and Bokhara. It was at the monastery that 
word reached the troops of Paul's murder and their 
recall.2 
1. Krausse, op. cit., p. 150. 
2. Cherbotarev, A. P. , " Zapiski Donskago Ataman Denisova, n 
Russkaid Starina, Vol. 20, 1875, as quoted in Shneidman , J. 
Lee , " The Proposed Invasion of India by Russia and France in 
1801, Journal of Indian History, Vol. 48, 1957 , p. 167-175. 
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Then, seven years later came the plan of Tilsit. At 
Tilsit Napoleon suggested joint operations with Russia against 
11 les possessions de la Campagnie des Indies," the French pro-
posing to pass through Constantinople, Asia Minor and Persia. 
In a letter to Alexander I of February 2, 1808, he suggested 
that a force of 50,000 Russian, French, and perhaps a few 
Austrians might bring England to her knees before India was 
actually reached.l 
Thus it was that Russian designs on India had a long 
background. But after the downfall of Napoleon these threats 
seemed to be much more of a reality and consequently influenced 
the whole nature of British relations to the West of the Indus. 
For, as a later historian said: 
If Napoleon and the Czars of Russia had not 
entertained ideas of an invasion of India; if they 
had not intrigued to our detriment both in Persia 
and Afghanistan, if the Black Eagle had never winged 
its flight across the Caucasus in all probability 
our relations with Central Asian states would have 
been purely commercial in character.2 
But British India had started on a policy of treaty making 
and diplomacy which was to plunge her into Central Asian poli-
tics and repeatedly raise the question of where her western 
frontier should lie, Political considerations in the Middle 
1. Herold, J. C., The Age of Napoleon, New York, 
American Heritage Publishing Co., 1963, p. 154. 
2. Davies, C. C., The Problem of the North West Frontier, 
op. cit. , p. 15 4 . 
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East and England's position in India gave an unfortunate 
direction to the new policy p~ovoked by Napoleon, for the 
north-west limit of British possessions lay far within the 
natural Indian frontier. Four independent regions, Punjab, 
Sind, Afghanistan and Persia had come to be regarded as likely 
spheres for hostile influence. 
Elphinstone questioned the wisdom of an advance to Kabul 
because it would mean waiving " the advantage of the strong 
frontier to the westward, presented by the deserts, the rivers 
of the Panjab and the Indus. 11 1 
While Elphinstone questioned the wisdom of an advance, 
Charles Metcalfe, whose treaty with Ranjit Singh, " the master 
of the true frontier, 11 was the most lasting of the anti-
Napoleonic treaties and stabalized British Sikh relations 
till the death of Ranjit Singh, questioned the presence of 
a threat. Metcalfe, 11 Who loathed the twists and turns by 
which his superiors were trying to guard against external 
2 dangers 11 thought Russian aggression an idle fear, and advised, 
I would say that it is best to do nothing, 
until time shall show us what we ought to do, be-
cause there is nothing that we can do in our present 
blind state that would be of any certain benefit 
on the approach of that event.3 
l. Forrest, G. W., Official Writings of Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, London, 1884, p. 27. 
2. Morison, op. cit., p. 183. 
3. Quoted in ibid, p. 183. 
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In 1833 he prophesied that the extension of political re-
lations beyond the Indus would lead to "embarassments and wars, 
expensive and unprofitable at the least, without any ·equivalent 
benefit, if not ruinous and destructive." 1 
While Shah Shuja had concluded a treaty with Elphinstone , 
he lost his throne a few weeks later and 
for the next twenty years the unhappy condition 
into which the Durrani Empire had fallen rendered 
the Afghans powerless for good or evil in the 
affairs of Central Asia.2 
The early years of the nineteenth century witnessed a 
power vacuum in Afghanistan and a chaotic Oxus Valley. For the 
Afghans and the Uzbegs lacked both leadership and the spirit of 
conquest. Thus neither of them posed any threat to India, but 
neither did they represent any defense against a possible 
Russian threat. Thus the vital bastions of India's north-
western defences, Kandahar, Herat, and the Hindu Kush were 
practically unguarded. 
Now that Russia had become the chief bugbear, Persia be-
came the region threatened. This was another aspect of the 
British problem, for Britain could see beyond a weak Afghanis-
tan increasing Russian influence in Persia. 
The Russian menace might have been still far off, but it 
was developing. It came, at first, not from the north, but 
l. Quoted in ibid , p . 183. 
2. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 79. 
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from the Caucasus. The Persians had turned first to France, 
but after Tilsit they had turned to Britain. In 1814 an 
Anglo-P e rsian treaty was signed, pledging Britain to assist 
the Persians if they were attacked by any European power. By 
this time the Russians had made their first move. In 1813 
they had defeated the Persians and by the Treaty of Gulistan 
Russia was established in Georgia and the Caucasus. Russian 
influence in Persia, more than Russian conquests, created a 
perennial Persian question for England and gave Afghanistan a 
new importance for Calcutta and London and introduced a new 
and highly speculative diplomatic game which took all west Central 
Asia for its playing field. 
For Russia and Persia had been at war again in 1828, the 
Treaty of Turkrnanchia consolidated Russian possessions south of 
the Caucasus and set the pattern for the future, since 
The moral ascendancy achieved by these vic-
tories increased Russian influence at Teheran, 
while at the same time it caused the Persians to 
seek by conquest in the east compensation for their 
losses in the west.l 
This could only mean the focus of attention falling on 
Herat, and if Herat were to fall there was only a weak Afghan-
istan to stop a Persian or Russo-Persian advance towards India. 
But the British response was one of grave error. For, 
While British domination at no point impinged on the real 
1. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 81. 
North- West Frontier , in Morison's judgment, 
in place of concrete policies soldiers and poli-
ticians indulged in irresponsible and speculative 
adventures with governments and in countries of 
which they had no accurate understanding . on 
the far side of the Sikh kingdom any forward posi-
tion could only be maintained by efforts and an 
expense beyond the resources of the Indian 
government.l 
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Even though Sind and the dominions of Ranjit Singh were 
between her and the frontier hills and passes, England saw 
a Russian menace on the horizon and recognized that "Afghan-
istan was the Achilles Heel of India~ the glacis of the 
fortress of Hindustan. ' 2 
But the " Great Game 11 had begun, this grandiose epoch in 
frontier policy culminated in the fruitless victory and final 
tragedy of the First Afghan War. 
Two questions concerning this formative phase of policy 
are : the actual motives of Russia in considering an invasion 
of India, and, the actual possibility of such an invasion 
taking place. 
Concerning the first question, while earlier writers 
tended to envisage Russia actually indulging in invasion and 
conquest, contemporary writers tend to see the Russian policy 
as using their position in Central Asia as a means of putting 
1 . Morison , op. cit. , p. 181. 
2. Davies, C. C., The Problem of the North West 
F~ontier, op. cit., p. 153. 
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political pressure upon the Government in London. For example: 
In the last century Russian soldiers no doubt 
dreamed of an attack upon the British Empire in 
India. Empires always have their theorists of ex-
pansion. No doubt, too, Russian statesmen encouraged 
the more outspoken of their "forward school'' to rattle 
their sabres at the doors of the European enemy, as a 
means of putting political pressure upon the Govern-
ment in London. But it is doubtful whether the rulers 
of Russia seriously considered an invasion of India, 
whatever the activities of its wild men in Central 
Asia.l 
Likewise, "The statesman does not discourage the dreams 
of his soldiers, but he need not believe in them.•• 2 
But this interpretation does not alter the fact that in 
the early nineteenth century Russia was currently believed to 
be planning an attack on British India,* and as Ward later 
explained 
The charge was officially repudiated by the 
Russian Government. But the conduct of Russian 
agents in Central Asia was not in accordance with 
the declarations made at Petrograd. As a result 
'Russo-phobia' became a leading element in British 
public opinion. Experts in the Far Eastern problem 
raised the cry of 'India in danger.•3 
Whichever of the two was the actual Russian motive, it 
would not alter the fact of the British response or signifi-
cantly change the reality that either way, India was in danger. 
l. Edwardes, M., Asia in the European Age, New York, 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 177. 
2. Thompson, E. J., Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule 
in India, London, MacMillan, 1935, p. 126. 
*See p. 17-20. 
3. Ward, A. W., Cambridge History of British Foreign 
Policy, Cambridge, University Press, 1922, Vol. II, p. 197. 
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Concerning the second question as to the acutal possi-
bility of invasion, those who tend to dilute the possibility, 
point to the fact of distance, like 
The proximity to our Indian possesions can 
be guaged by the distance between Orenburg, the 
most advanced Russian base, and the nearest English 
post at Ludhiana, over two thousand miles.l 
This argument has two weaknesses, for, in the first place, 
distance does not necessarily mean defence. I£ this were the 
case would Britain have been safer if she were to retreat to 
the East and thereby increase the distance? Actually, it was 
only be decreasing the distance and advancing to a more de-
fensible frontier that India could find security. There was 
certainly excuse for the alarm felt in Britain about Russian 
machinations since she had not reached that barrier of mountains. 
In the second place, the proximity of Russia did not nee-
essarily have to be measured from Orenburg; the alarmists of 
the time would be more inclined to measure the distance from 
Herat, as did Schuyler towards the end of the century. 
The only danger to India lies through Persia. 
Experience has proved that all invasions of India 
have come through Afghanistan, and Afghanistan can 
only be approached by Russia through Persia.2 
l. Edwardes, op. cit., p. 6l. 
2. Schuyler, op. cit., p. 265. 
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For the Russian problem was essentially a double edged 
one; even in the time of Peter the Great the advance of 
Russia was a double pronged advance. For the Russian line 
of advance followed two courses, via Central Asia or via 
Persia, both ultimately meeting at Afghanistan. Thus there 
were two routes for invasion, if Afghanistan were the gate-
way to India, two different paths led to the gate. 
First, the direct route ran southward from the Russian 
headquarters at Orenburg on the upper waters of the Ural 
River. On the map it was easy to trace a passage between the 
Caspian and Aral seas to the valley of the Oxus, occupied by 
the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara. Of these, Bokhara was 
coterminous with Afghanistan. 
In reality this route, a wilderness of sand 
deserts and rocky plateaux, was then impracticable 
for the ordered march of an army. Nevertheless, the 
government of India was in constant fear of a Russian 
advance from this direction, and it carefully watched 
the attitude of the Khanates on the Oxus.l 
The second, the indirect route, which Russia could fol-
low was by way of Persia. Here Russia had the advantage which 
resulted in a long course of successful aggression which gave 
her the predominance in Persian counsels. The strategic ad-
vantage which this gave Russia was that , 
The Russian Territories that are contiguous 
with Persia on the north are continuous either with 
l. Ward, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 201. 
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those of Asiatic Russia or with those of European 
Russia . the forces of Great Britain , if re-
quired for purposes either of menace or attack, 
would require to be conveyed by sea and would be 
separated by a great distance from their base . 
whereas the Russian land approaches upon the north 
are in her own exclusive possession , the maritime 
access of Great Britain on the south is equally l 
open to any other power possessing a naval marine. 
By inciting Persia to push eastwards into Afghanistan, 
Russia was, at the same time, extending her grasp over a 
vantage ground from which to make an attack on British India. 
Consequently, 
If Herat fell to the Persian army it would 
become the seat of a Russian consul , and a centre 
of Russian influence. Herat was at t h at time of 
unquestionable value. Standing in a fertile oasis, 
rich in the materials for military supply, it was 
the starting point of routes to Kabul on the one 
hand and to Kandahar on the other, from both of 
which there run natural lines of invasion into 
India.2 
Thus, Britain had to take whatever steps necessary to 
insure that Herat , or all of Afghanistan, did not fall into 
Russian hands. 
l. The Government of India to the Secretary of State on 
the Relations of Britain With Persia, 2l September, 1899, as 
quoted in Philips, Select Documents, p. 471. 
2. Ward, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 204. 
Chapter II 
THE FIRST FORWARD POLICY 
AND 
THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 
Sir George Eden, Lord Auckland, is generally charged with 
having brought about the first involvement of British India 
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and thereby focusing 
British attention on the region of the Hindu Kush. The events 
which precipitated the first forward policy and thus the first 
disastrous Afghan War are considered to be the result of 
Auckland's policy. However, the general pattern of events 
which caused Auckland to decide on those measures which re-
sulted in the war, had been determined long before Auckland's 
arrival in India. 
Any appraisal or analysis of the first forward policy de-
mands a consideration of events and persons, appearing at first 
sight to be isolated and unrelated, but actually fusing to-
gether to form an interrelated pattern which culminated in the 
First Afghan War. Thus one's focus of attention must include 
at one time all the personalities and the forces at work on 
the whole Central Asian stage. The frame of reference must 
include Persia and Russian intrigues in Persia, as well as 
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Herat and Kandahar and Russian designs on Herat. Further-
more, we must consider whether these designs were regarded 
as ends in themselves or as means to other ends. Shifting 
one's attention eastward the frame of reference must also 
include the Punjab and Sind and then focus on Afghanistan, 
lying between British India and Persia. In the same manner 
the personalities on this very broad stage have to be ap-
praised. While the Amirs of Persia play a supporting role 
in this drama, the leading figures are Dost Mohammed, Ranjit 
Singh, Shah Shuja and even Lord Bentinck, Auckland's prede-
cessor. Certainly Lord Auckland is the central figure but 
particular attention must be paid to those near him and thus 
in a position to influence his decisions-~Macnaughten, Colvin, 
Burnes, and particularly Claude Wade. All these forces and 
personalities influenced the decisions ultimately made by 
Lord Auckland, and which resulted in the first forward policy. 
The logical starting point for an analysis of the causes 
of the First Afghan War is Persia. British influence in 
Persia had been allowed to decline after the Napoleonic Wars, 
while Russian influence increased. 1 The first quarter of the 
nineteenth century saw Russian conquest of northern Persian 
territory and the establishment of Russian influence at the 
l. Greaves, R. L., Persia and the Defence of India, 
London, Athlone Press, 1959, p. 23. 
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court of Tehran. Russo~Persian relations, after a quarter 
century of Russian aggression and encroachment, became al-
most friendly, since 
The Shah realized he could not fight his 
northern neighbour with any chance of success, 
Russia henceforth was able to dominate Persia by 
intrigue rather than costly occupation, and the 
country became in every sense a satellite, a front 
for Russian sorties against the growing power of 
the British in India.l 
Most likely the growth of this Russian influence could 
have been prevented earlier by the British had they fulfilled 
the terms of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814, but Britain's 
unwillingness to help Persia in her wars with Russia led to 
the decline of British influence and prestige. As Sir 
Mortimer Durand said, " The Shah found England no longer under 
alarm for her eastern empire, but a cold ally. " 2 
Lord William Bentinck noted the possible serious conse-
quences for India of this growing Russian influence at Teheran. 
Bentinck was quite aware of the possibilities, if not the like-
lihood, of a Russian threat, not from the north but from 
Persia, and consequently he realized the strategic significance 
of Herat, a fact which was not appreciated by Lord Auckland. 
Bentinck noted in a minute: 
Persia in its distracted state since the death 
of the late king is unequal to any great effort, 
1. Edwardes, M., Asia in the European Age, op. cit., p. 187 . 
2. Durand, Sir H. M., The First Afghan War and Its 
Causes, London, Longmans Green, 1879, p. 12. 
unassisted by Russia, but the co~operation of 
twenty thousand Russians from the Arrus would 
speedily terminate the civil war, and the advance 
of the combined force would give them in the first 
campaign possession of Herat, the key to Kabul. 
It is in the interest of Russia to extend 
and strengthen the Persian Empire, which occupies 
a central position between the double lines of 
operation of the autocrat to the eastward and to 
the westward, and as Persia can never be a rival 
of Russia the augmentation of their strength can 
only increase the offensive.l 
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In the 1830's the Persians began paying attention to 
their eastern borders and particul~rly to Herat. The moti-
vation of this Persian expansion~s explained in slightly 
different ways. Fraser-Tytler suggests that it was a 
response to the Russian gains and a consequence of Persian 
humiliation, thus 
the moral ascendancy achieved by these victories 
increased Russian influence at Tehran while at 
the same time it caused the Persians to seek by 
conquest in the east compensation for their 
losses in the west.2 
From this it would appear that Persia desired Herat and 
would have done so even without Russian suggestion; but on 
the other hand Edwardes sees Persian activity as the result 
of Russian instigation and insistence. As he puts it, 
l. Boulger, D. C., Lord Bentinck, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1892, p. 181. 
2. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 81. 
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" Russia's next move was to jerk her puppet into an attack on 
Herat, ostensibly to rescue the city from Afghan rule, " 1 
Whichever the case it appears that the Persians had 
justification for their designs on Herat, a fact admitted by 
Mr. Ellis, the British envoy to the Shah of Persia, who 
wrote to his government that the Shah had fair 
claim to the sovereignty of Afghanistan as far 
as Ghuznee, and that Kamran's conduct in occupy-
ing part of the Persian province of Seistan had 
given the Shah a full just~fication for commencing 
hostilities against Herat. 
In the early 1830's Herat, the significance of which 
was now becoming apparent to the Russians and the British, 
was occupied by Shah Kamran, son of Mohammed Shah, who had 
ousted his brother Shah Shuja from the throne of Kabul, for 
a while occupying it himself before being ousted to retire 
to the principality of Herat. 
As early as 1832 Prince Abbas Mirza of Persia had pro-
posed a march to take Herat, a proposal disapproved of, at 
that time, by his father, Fateh Ali Shah. However, in 1833 
he did send an army towards Herat under the command of his 
son, Mohammed Mirza. This first expedition was unsuccessful; 
in fact, it never reached its destination since the death of 
Abbas Mirza necessitated its recall. · However, its leader, 
1. Edwardes, op. cit., p. 187. 
2. Forbes, A., The Afgh an Wars, New York, Scribners 
Sons, 1892, p. 2. 
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Mohammed Mirza, was subsequently nominated by his grandfather 
Fateh Ali Shah, as heir in succession to his father, Abbas 
Mirza. 
In 1834 Mohammed Mirza ascended the throne of Persia as 
Mohammed Shah and again considered an expedition on Herat. 
Although he had become Shah partly through the support of the 
British his aggressive designs towards Herat were cause for 
concern and contrary to British hopes, which might be sum-
marized as follows: 
The British Government has never encouraged 
Persia to engage in hostilities with any foreign 
states or to seek foreign conquests, but to seek 
friendly relations with her neighbours • 
The British Government had sought in their inter-
course with Persia the tranquility and the strength 
of that kingdom and they desired its independence 
and its integrity; but while Great Britain wished 
to give security to Persia against foreign enemies, 
and believed that, by pursuing a course calculated 
to lead to that result she was also giving security 
to her own empire in India, she has at all times 
endeavoured to prevent Persia from converting the 
elements of strength which England supplied her for 
purposes of defence into means of aggression 
against any other country.l 
The elevation of Mohammed Mirza to the position of Shah 
caused the British to dispatch an embassy to Persia, headed 
by Henry Ellis, to preserve any remains of British influence 
over the Shah; but 
When the Right Honourable Henry Ellis arrived in 
Persia in 1835 as an embassy of condolence and 
1. " Foreign Office Correspondence Relating to Persia 
and Afghanistan, '1 Quarterly Review, No. 84, 1839, p. 148-149, 
(henceforth cited as F. 0.) 
and congratulations to the young Shah he speedily 
found that Russian influence was dominant at court 
and that the impression of the power of Russia as 
compared with that of England was always to the 
disadvantage of the latter~l 
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This mission of " condolence and congratulation" was 
instructed by Lord Palmerston f! especially to warn the Persian 
government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make 
war against the Afghans. P2 
But by this time the Shah had apparently determined to 
make another attempt to subdue Herat/ a determination encour-
aged by the Russian minister who proposed to accompany the 
mission ~ while Ellis vainly protested to the Shah and pointed 
out to the Persian Government the risk it would incur o£ an-
tagonizing the British Government by prosecuting any schemes 
of conquest in Afghanistan, 3 
Ellis' first dispatch to Palmerston confirmed the Shah's 
intention .. He wrote, 
It is unsatisfactory to know that the Shah 
has very extended schemes of conquest in the di-
rection of Afghanistan -~' and, in common with all 
his subjects~ conceives that the right of sovereignty 
over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now as in the 
reign of the Safavi dynasty.4 
1 . F. O., p. 150. 
2. Palmerston to Ellis, July 25f 1835, quoted in 
Fraser-Tytler . op. cit., p. 83. 
3. F. 0., p. 150. 
4. Ellis to Palmerston, November 13, 1835, quoted in 
Fraser~Tytler, op. cit., p. 83. 
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Ellis' reports to Palmerston during the early months of 
1836 are most significant, for it is in these letters that 
the strongest concern over Afghanistan is expressed and the 
fear that Persia cannot be considered a bastion of Indian de-
fence against Russian encroachment. Thus the Herat situation, 
as assessed by Ellis, was significant in determining the nature 
of Lord Auckland ' s future policy for the defence of India. 
On January 15j 1836~ Ellis wrote to Palmerston: 
I feel quite assured that the British Govern-
ment cannot permit the extension of the Persian 
monarchy in the direction of Afghanistan, with a 
due regard to the tranquility of India; that ex-
tension will ) at once, bring Russian influence 
to the very threshold of our empire~ and as Persia 
will not .; or does not, place herself in a position 
of close alliance with Great Britain our policy 
must be to consider her no longer as an outwork 
for the defence of India~ but as the first parallel 
from whence the attack may be commenced or 
threatened . l 
A month later Ellis again wrote to Palmerston suggesting 
that Herat alone was not the object of Persian schemes but 
only a preliminary to much b r oader plans. He wrote, 
I am convinced that every effort will be 
made by the Shah to obtain possession of Herat , 
and to extend his dominions in the direction of 
Afghanistan, and that~ for this purpose, no oppor-
tunity will be lost for forming connexions with . 
the chief of Cabool and his brothers . . for I 
can conceive no event more likely to unsettle 
the public mind in the north western provinces, 
and to disturb the general tranquility of our 
eastern empire.2 
1 . Ellis to Palmerston, January 15 1836, F.o., p. 151 . 
2. Ellis to Palmerston February 25, 1836, F.O " , p. 151. 
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In July of 1836 Ellis informed Palmerston that in fact 
the Shah had been making efforts towards that end : that is, 
of attempting to make agreements with the Afghans and that 
an envoy from Kandahar had arrived in Tehran to negotiate 
a treaty with the Shah, with the result that 
The Kandahars expatriated on the readiness of all 
Afghanistan : ~ith the exception of Herat 1 to come 
under feudal submission to the Shah, who might, 
like Nadir Shah 1 push his conquests to Delhi.l 
The Russian participation in this scheme was reported 
by Ellis as follows: 
His majesty has been encouraged / and I have 
been recently informed, has been promised positiv e 
assistance in this design by the Russians, who well 
know that the conquest of Herat and Kandahar by the 
Persians is in fact an advantage for them towards 
India.2 
In the summer of 1836 Ellis was replaced by Dr. McNeill 
whose instructions from Palmerston indicated that the Brit-
ish Government had not as yet become convinced that their 
influence in Persia had been completely eclipsed by that of 
the Russians. McNeill's instructions 
specially directed him to prevent Russia from es-
tablishing anything in the nature of a protectorate 
over Persia and also to thwart the ambitious schemes 
l . Ellis to Palmerston , July, 1836, F. 0 . , p. 151. 
2. Ibid. 
which the Persian Government .: at Russia ' s instiga .... 
tion, was hoping to carry out in Afghanistan,l 
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Doctor McNeill later helped to convince doubters about 
the plans of Russia by the publication of his book~ Progress 
and Present Position of Russia in the East. In it he elab-
orated on Russian expansion and the importance of preserving 
Persia ~ s independence and cultivating the friendship of the 
Central Asian States. He justified British interference in 
the affairs of other countries on the grounds that, 
The right of interference in the affairs of 
independent states is founded on this single prin-
ciple, that as self preservation is the first duty, 
so it supercedes all other obligations, The just 
application of the principle requires that danger 
should be shown ) not to the minor interests merely, 
but to the vital interests of the state which 
appeals to it,2 
Up to this point Lord Auckland was unaware of the Ellis-
Palmerston correspondence and practically unaware of the 
whole Persian situation. Although Auckland had been appointed 
in 1835 he did not arrive in Calcutta until March 2, 1836, 
having been en route since October 3, 1835. 
The situation at the time of his appointment was ap-
1 ! Ward, op. cit.~ Vol II, p. 200. 
2. McNeill . John ~ ~ro~ess and Present Position of 
Russia in , the East ,..' Londan, - 1836, as quoted in Norris, J.A. 
The First Afghan War, Cambridge, University Press, 1967, p. 84. 
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problems on the frontier, But unfortunately for him the 
political climate was to undergo a radical change for the 
worse. As Lord Curzon later said: 
A man who is both weak and diffident may 
emerge without discredit from normal situations. 
But in times of stress~ where ordinary rules and 
ordinary men are equally misplaced, these qualities 
become the parents of inevitable disaster.I 
In fact, shortly after Auckland~s assumption of office 
there were signs that the period of tranquility was coming 
to an end, In the early fall of 1836, as matters turned out, 
the Shah of Persia marched on Herat. The expedition had to 
be recalled because of an outbreak of cholera, notwithstand-
ing the Russian envoys complaints to the Shah about the 
postponements and his encouragement of a winter campaign. 2 
The British ambassador at St~ Petersburg, Lord Durham, pro-
tested to the Russian foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, and 
was assured that the Russian official in Persia was acting 
contrary to his instructions. At the same time, on the 
Afghan scene . an active exchange was being carried on. between 
the chiefs of Kabul and Kandahar, and the Shah~ in which the 
Ru ssian minister played an important part, to encourage them 
to concert with Persia in a combined attack for the destruction 
1. Curzon .~' G. R.,. British Government in India, London, 
Cassell and Co~, 1925, Vol . II, p. 198. 
2. 
p. 1520 
Colonel Stoddart to McNeill ,' September ,, 1836, F.O., 
1 of Kabul. Fearing that the Sodowzais might one day be 
restored, the chiefs of Kabul and Kandahar 
exerted all their influence in favour of the 
connexion with Persia • • they advocated the 
advantages of an alliance with Russia also--for 
they were told by the agents of both these govern-
ments that Persia and Russia were one.2 
Indeed the developing situation on the North-West was 
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fraught with many dangers for the Afghans were concerned with 
the situation to the east as well as to the west since, as 
the Quarterly Review explained the situation: 
The increasing power of the Sikhs, the success 
which had hitherto attended their able and warlike 
sovereign,Ranjeet Singh, in all his contests with 
the Afghans, and especially the establishment of 
his authority over Peshawar, and some other places 
on the western bank of the Indus, which were in-
habited by Mohammedan population, had excited at 
once the fears and the religious enthusiasm of the 
chiefs of Cabool and Kandahar. At the same time 
the connexion which was supposed to exist between 
the English and the excited sovereigns of Affghan-
istan, who had found an assylum in the British 
territories--the opinion which prevailed, that 
the government had favoured the unsuccessful at-
tempt which Shah Shoojah had made on a former 
occasion to recover his kingdom--the intimate 
relations of friendship which were known to have 
subsisted for many years between the British Govern-
ment in India and the court of Lahore and--more than 
all the total neglect with which the British 
1. F. 0., p. 155. 
2. F. 0., p. 156. 
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Government had hitherto treated these Afghan chiefs--
had led them to regard England with feelings of 
jealousy rather than of attachment; and had in-
duced them to seek, in alliance with Persia and 
Russia, protection against the dangers with which they 
believed themselves to be threatened from the east. 
The chief of Cabool sent accredited agents al-
most simultaneously to the courts of Tehran and St. 
Petersburg soliciting from both assistance against 
the Sikhs.l 
During the spring of l837 the Shah began reassembling his 
army for a renewed march on Herat while at the same time 
sending envoys to Kabul and Kandahar " charged with presents 
and communications " and rejecting the efforts made by McNeill 
to negotiate between Kamran and himself. On July 23 the Shah 
had his army ready and began his march towards Herat. 
On October l4 Colonel Stoddart, who accompanied the 
Shah, wrote to McNeill: 
Captain Vicovich of the Russian service, an 
aide-de-campe of the general at Orenberg arrived 
here [Nishapur] from Tehran and Resht on the lOth 
instant. He is gone on a mission to Kabul. Horse-
men have been given to pass him to Toorbut, thence 
a change to Khain, then again to Lash, from thence 
to Kandahar.2 
With reference to this communication, McNeill further 
informed Palmerston that, 
Vicovich had everywhere announced that he was 
sent to intimate the arrival at Asterabad of a 
large Russian force, destined to co-operate with 
the Shah's army against Herat.3 
l. F. 0. 1 p. 154. 
2. Stoddart to McNeill, October 14, 1837, F.o., p. 160. 
3. McNeill to Palmerston, October, 1839, F.o., p. 160. 
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Although the large Russian force did not materialize, 
the Persian army was officered and led by Russians, 
if the Shah's attempt on Herat proved successful, 
then Russia would at once become pre-eminent in 
Afghanistan. The submission of Kabul and Kandahar 
would follow as a matter of course, and the Indian 
frontier would be open to the machinations of the 
Tsar's advisers.l 
At this time Auckland thought it necessary to take some 
positive action. He therefore decided to enter into negotia-
tions with Dost Mohammed. For this purpose Alexander Burnes 
was sent to Kabul. 
In 1836 Auckland had already exchanged communications 
with Dost Mohammed who had sent a letter to the new Governor 
General congratulating him on his safe arrival. Significantly, 
the letter included a request for advice on how to get Pesha-
war back from the Sikhs. To this the Governor General replied 
that although he hoped shortly to send a commercial mission 
to Kabul, it was not the practice of the British Government 
2 to take sides in disputes between independent states. 
Auckland's reply is dually significant. It enabled 
Auckland to describe Burnes' mission as the promised commer-
cial mission and it clearly informed Dost Mohammed of the 
degree of help he could expect from Auckland against the Sikhs. 
In this sense it may be said to have encouraged Dost Mohammed 
1. Krausse, op. cit., p. 113. 
2. 
1955, p. 
Dunbar, J., Golden Interlude, London, J. Murray, 
41. 
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to turn towards the Shah and the Russian envoys who might be 
more sympathetic to his aspirations. 
That Burnes' mission was intended as far more than a 
commercial mission is clear from the instructions issued by 
the Secret Committee of the East India Company on June 25, 
1837~ which required Auckland to 
Judge what steps it may be proper and desirable 
to take to watch more closely than has hitherto 
been attempted, the progress of events in Afghan-
istan and to counteract the progress of Russian 
influence in a quarter which from its proximity to 
our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were 
once established, to act injuriously on the system 
of our alliances~ and possibly to interfere with 
the tranquility of our territory.l 
The instructions, demonstrating that Lord Auckland's 
policy was part of the general Whig plan for the containment 
of Russian expansion in Asia continued: 
The mode of dealing with this very important 
question, whether by dispatching a confidential 
agent to Dost Mohammed of Kabul merely to watch 
the progress of events, or to enter into relations 
with this chief~ either of a political or merely 
in the first instance of a commercial character, 
we confide to your discretion, as well as the 
adoption of any other measures that may appear to 
be desirable in order to counteract Russian in-
fluence in that quarter, should you be satisfied 
from the information received from your own agent 
on the frontier, or hereafter from Mr. McNeill, 
that the time has arrived at which it would be 
right for you to interfere decidedly in the 
aff~~rs ot ~~~gb~nistan.2 
l. Edwardes, ?P· cit.~ p. 61. 
2. Ibid II p. 61. 
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Thus the Burnes' mission was converted into one of a 
political nature and thus began Auckland's fatal involve-
ment in Afghan politics. Not the least of his problems was 
the dilemma which he was unable to resolve--that of having 
to decide between Dost Mohammed and Ranjit Singh as an ally. 
For he realized that in the situation as it was developing, 
he would not be able to maintain friendship with both. But, 
"Auckland felt bound by twenty~eight years of alliance and 
by cool considerations of British self interest in India to 
choose the Sikhs. " 1 
Moreover, it was necessary for Auckland to take pre-
cautions not to offend Ranjit Singh since he had been persuaded 
by Auckland not to interfere in Sind. 
Although Burnes was convinced that Auckland should sup-
port Dost Mohammed, it is evident that Auckland was already 
inclined to favour the friendship of Ranjit Singh, for in-
structions to Burnes September 13, 1837, state: 
It must be nearly needless to say that you 
are in a position in which you should regulate your 
conduct marking the firm maintenance of our old 
alliance and friendship with Ranjit Singh as the 
avowed first principle of our duty and policy and 
bringing Dost Mohammed to his senses and to a just 
measure of his most hazardous position.2 
If Burnes personally favoured Dost Mohammed, his early 
CQrresp~n4e~ce could only serve to convince Auckland that his 
1. Norris , op, cit ., p. l3 4. 
2 ~ J o h n Colv i n to Alexan der Burnes,$eptemb e r 1 3, 1837, 
quoted in Fraser-Tytler, op . c it . , p . 93 . 
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"first principle '' was the correct one and actually to increase 
whatever suspicions he might already have had concerning Dost 
Mohammed. For, on 1 5 November l837,Burnes wrote to the Secre-
tary of the Indian Government sending a copy of a letter from 
the Russian envoy, Simonich, to Dost Mohammed, as well as one 
from Hajii Ibrihim, Dost Mohammed's agent at Tehran, which 
stated: 
The Shah directed me to inform you that he 
will shortly send an elchee who, after meeting you, 
will proceed to Ranjit Singh to explain to him, on 
the part of the Shah, that if he (Ranjit Singh) will 
not restore all the Afghan countries to you, the 
Ameer, he must be prepared to receive the Persian 
army. When the Shah takes Herat he has promised to 
send you money and any troops you want. 
The Russian ambassador who is always with the 
Shah has sent you a letter which I enclose. The 
substance of his verbal message to you is, that 
if the Shah does everything you want, so much the 
better, and if not, the Russian Government will 
furnish you, (the Ameer) with everything wanted. 
The object of the Russian elchee, by h i s 
message, is to have a road to the English (India ) 
and for this they are very anxious.l 
The correspondence from Kabul during the last months of 
1837 indicated the presence of Russian and Persian intrigues 
at Kabul and at Kandahar. Vicovitch appeared in Kandahar with 
letters from the Russian minister in Persia, from Count Nessel-
rode and from the Emperor himself. On December 22, 1837, 
1 1. Burnes to Secretary of Indian Government, 15th November 837, Inclosure #2 , Hajee Ibrahim to Dost Mohammed, F. 0., 
p. 164. 
Burnes reported tha Vocovitch was in Kabul and enclosed 
letters of Simonich to Dost Mohammed commenting: 
M. Vicovitch informed Dost Mohammed Khan that 
the Russian government had desired him to state 
his sincere sympathy with the difficulties under 
which he laboured and that it would afford him 
great pleasure to assist him in repelling the 
attacks of Runjeet Singh on his d ominions; that 
it was ready to furnish him with a sum of money 1 for the purpose, and to cont inue the sum annually. 
Certainly these reports were a matter for concern in 
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India. Burnes' i nstr u ctions were to bring Dost Mohammed to 
a speedy decision; either to dismiss the Russian agent or 
else to lay himself open to a charge of breach of faith wi t h 
the British.2 
But to persuade Dost Mohammed to eliminate a potential 
alliance with the Persians or Russians, Auckland would have 
had to offer the one thing he was not able, or not prepared, 
to offer--the restoration of Peshawar to Afghanistan. Indeed, 
Lord Auckland's biographer declares: He [Dost Mohammed] 
would do whatever the British Government desired, if the 
latter would but help him in the matter of Peshawar. " 3 
There could be no question of an alliance with Dost Mohammed 
against the Sikhs. All he could hope for was British 
1. Burnes to Auckland, December 23, 1837, F.o., p. 168. 
2. Secretary of · Government o f India to Burnes, January 
20, 1838, F.O., p. 170. 
3. 
1893, p. 
Trotter, L., Lord Auckland, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
44. 
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influence upon Ranjit Singh to save him from further attacks, 
provided that he first ceased cultivating Persian or Russian 
. 1 
all1ances. 
On April 26, 1838, Captain Burnes left Kabul and reported 
to the Governor General in Simla that the Amir was deep in 
conclave with the Russian agent. At the same time McNeill 
reported to Palmerston that Herat was being beseiged, there-
fore on May 21, 1838, Palmerston wrote to McNeill that: 
You are instructed to proceed at once to the 
Shah and to declare to him explicitly that the 
British Government cannot view with indifference 
his project of conquering Afghanistan, that the 
British Government must look upon this enterprise 
as undertaken in a spirit of hostility towards 
British India, and as being wholly incompatible 
with the spirit and intention of the alliance which 
has been established between Persia and Great 
Britain . . Great Britain must take such steps 
as she may think best calculated to provide for the 
security of the possessions of the British crown.2 
Thereby McNeill, on June 25, 1838, announced the unsuc-
cessful termination of his negotiations at Herat. 
Thus by the summer of 1838 McNeill and Burnes had both 
failed in their efforts; McNeill to prevent a situation from 
developing which would endanger the safety of India, Burnes 
to provide a defence through alliance should the need arise. 
Thus there appeared to be the immediate possibility of 
Persian and Russian domination to the banks of the Indus. 
1. Norris, op. cit., p. 122. 
2. Palmerston to McNeill, May 21, 1838, E. 0., p. 177. 
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The failure of McNeill to stop the Shah at Herat was 
virtually a foregone conclusion since Russian influence had 
overshadowed British influence at the court of Tehran for a 
decade before the ambitious designs of Mohammed Shah threat-
ened the stability of Central Asia. However Burnes had failed 
to establish a second line of defence through Dost Mohammed, 
although he remained convinced that this was the policy Auck-
land should have followed. For Burnes saw in Dost Mohammed 
" the one strong ruler in a blatant land," in whose defence 
he wrote: 
But it remains to be considered why we cannot 
act with Dost Mohammed. He is a man of undoubted 
ability and has at heart high opinions of the Brit-
ish nation; and if half you must do for others were 
done for him, and offers made which he could see 
conducted to his interests, he would abandon Russia 
and Persia tomorrow. It may be said that the oppor-
tunity has been given to him, but I would rather 
discuss this in person with you for I think there 
is much to be said for him. Government have ad-
mitted that at best he had but a choice of 
difficulties and it should not be forgotten that 
we promised nothing, and Persia and Russia held out 
a great deal.l 
The Burnes' mission failed basically because Auckland 
refused to depart from his "first principle" of keeping good 
relations with Ranjit Singh. In this determination the options 
open to him presented very little choice, namely, 
He could allow events to go on, and, if Herat fell, 
risk a potential enemy reaching the very borders of 
India. Or he could assist Dost Mohammed, should 
l. Burnes to McNaughten, June 2, 1838, as quoted in 
Fraser-Tytler, ---op--. cit. , p. 9 9. 
Afghanistan stand in danger of being overrun--and 
risk the Dost turning against the Sikhs, England's 
allies. Or he could follow McNaughten's plan of 
reinstating Shah Shuja, with the aid of Ranjit 
Singh . . The first course pointed to danger 
for India, the second for danger to an ally.l 
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It appears that Auckland was never in strong support of 
a mission to Kabul or of becoming involved in Afghan politics. 
The idea of a commercial agency at Kabul was not popular with 
men of Indian experience. Sir George Tucker, Chairman at 
India House, had condemned it, Sir Charles Metcalfe objected 
to Burnes' schemes and Sir Charles Grant, President of the 
Board of Control, was of the same opinion, but, " in a weak 
2 
moment Lord Auckland yielded to outside pressure. " 
Auckland had reason to be suspicious of Dost Mohammed 
as Burnes' correspondence had indicated, on the other hand 
he knew that Dost Mohammed had just cause to be resentful 
against the British. 
Undoubtedly Auckland was strongly influenced by the 
Bentinck policy of maintaining close alliance with Ranjit Singh 
as a " first principle. " In Bentinck's minute on defence there 
was evidence also for believing that the strength of Dost Moham-
med might have been overe stimated, for he claimed: 
The present state of Afghanistan presents no 
cause of alarm to India. The success that attended 
th~ wr~tched army that S h ah Shuja had under his 
1. Dunbar, J. op. cit., p. 144. 
2. Kaye, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 360. 
feeble guidance offers the best proof of the weakness 
of the Afghan powers.l 
Further evidence of the strength of Dost Mohammed was 
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available by observing the success of his 1834 expedition to 
recapture Peshawar, and his humiliating repulse in the Khyber. 
There is no doubt that Auckland in his final decision 
was influenced to a great degree by the men on the scene, 
having no settled policy of his own, and being by 
this time, far removed from his council, Lord 
Auckland fell under the influence of his two 
secretaries, William McNaughten and John CQlvin . 
both alike bitten by the present Russo-Phobia.2 
Another man who greatly influenced decisions was Captain 
Claude Wade the Governor General's Agent for the Sutlej 
Frontier~ stationed at Ludhiana. The Burnes' correspondence 
from Kabul passed through the hands of Wade before reaching 
McNaughten, and reached the Governor General with Wade's 
comments as we11. 3 Wade was an ardent supporter of Shah 
Shuja and did his best to negate any influence which Burnes' 
correspondence would have on Auckland. Furthermore, Wade 
wrote to McNaughten on January 1, 1838, favouring support of 
Shah Shuja rather than Dost Mohammed: 
I submit my opinions with every deference in 
the wisdom of his lordships decision; but it occurs 
1. Boulger, Lord Bentinck, op. cit., p. 173. 
2. Trotter, Lord Auckland, op. cit., p. 46. 
3. Norris, ep. cit., p. 119 and 139. 
to me that less violence would be done to the 
prejudices of the people, and to the safety and 
well being of our relations with other powers, by 
facilitating the restoration of Shah Shooja than 
by forcing the Affghans to submit to the sovereignty 
of the Ameer.l 
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Thus Auckland, influenced by Wade and McNaughten, supported 
Shah Shuja in an effort to replace Dost Mohammed on the throne 
of Afghanistan, despite the fact that one year earlier, 
[In] April 1837 he [Auckland] had no design of 
obstructing the existing situation in Afghanis.tan, 
proved by his written statement of that date, 'the 
British Government had resolved decidedly to dis-
courage the prosecution by the ex-King, Shah Soojah-
ool, Moolk, so long as he may remain under our 
protection, of further schemes of hostility against 
the chiefs now in power in Cabul and Candahar.2 
But with the changed situation, by mid-1838 it was felt 
necessary to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; 
and it was obvious that the British could not do so advan-
tageously without the support of Ranjit Singh. The geographical 
position of the Punjab determined this, as well as any purely 
military considerations. Since Ranjit Singh had already con-
eluded a treaty with Shah Shuja with the object of replacing 
him on the throne of Kabul, there was for Auckland no other 
course but to become a party to that agreement. 
Even up to this point, it appears that Auckland did not 
fully intend to involve the British army in a war with Afghan-
istan. Rather, he hoped that Shah Shuja would recover his 
1. Wade to McNaughten, January 1, 1838, quoted in Norris, 
op. cit., p. 140. 
2. Forbes, op. cit., p. 10. 
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throne aided by British officers and funds, and with the co-
operation of Ranjit Singh~ It was only at the insistence 
of Mcnaughten, Burnes, and Sir Henry Fane, (the Commander in 
Chief) that a British army became involved. 1 
Durand acknowledges that the policy was not of Auckland's 
making but inspired by those around him, particularly Wade, 
who " had thus the satisfaction of seeing his schemes in favour 
of Shah Shuja in the end completely triumphant~ u 2 
The final Triparite Treaty was negotiated and concluded 
on June 26, 1838, using as a basis the same treaty concluded 
about five years previously between Ranjit Singh and Shah 
Shuja; which ironically had been repudiated by Bentinck. 
Not until December 10, 1838, was the force assembled to 
leave for Kabul with the intention of establishing the de-
fensive line of India on the Kabul Kandahar line. The first 
forward policy had been set in motion and defended by a Whig 
Government and a forward policy school who claimed: 
We hold it to be incontrovertible that the 
military defence of India must be undertaken in 
advance of its own frontier . . when once an 
enemy should have got possession of Afghanistan 
we must be content to defend the line of the Indus 
and to abide the consequences in the interior of 
India ~f the presence of an enemy. 
l. Durand, op. cit., p. 68. 
2. Ibid, p. 64. 
No large army can march to India by any other 
line than the great road through Afghanistan and it 
must pass in the vicinity of Kandahar. This is 
the shortest line on which India can be defended. 
Are we to leave it undefended? The most defensible 
country on the whole road from the Russian frontier 
to the Indus is Afghanistan. Are we to allow it to 
be occupied by the very power which threatens to 
attack us in India? The best undisciplined soldiers 
in Asia are the Afghans. Are we to place them at 
the disposal of Russia , .?1 
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The opponents of the new forward school had little in-
fluence. Elphinstone, Bentinck, Wellesley--all condemned it, 
while 
The Duke of Wellington with prophetic sagacity, 
pronounced that the consequence of once crossing 
the Indus to settle a government in Afghanist~n 
would be a perennial march into that country. 
1. F. o., p. 184. 
2. Forbes, op. cit., p. 13, 
Chapter III 
THE ANNEXATION OF SIND 
Immediately upon the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan, 
the province of Sind was annexed by the British. British 
interference in Sind was a direct consequence of the decision 
to interfere in Afghanistan, for the one necessitated the 
other. Interference in the internal administration of an 
independent state does not necessarily lead to annexation, 
but in this case there were compounding circumstances. British 
failure in the Afghan War necessitated a change in policy and 
a revision of the structure of the defence of India. Failure 
in one area of operation demanded success in the other. 
The conquest and annexation of Sind was a complicated 
historical process which repeated historical analysis has not 
made any less complex. Confusion still exists mainly because 
historians have been overly concerned with what happened in 
Sind rather than with the question of why things happened. 
The events, the "what," have been carefully documented and 
researched; indeed, a day-to-day, hour-by-hour description 
of events is available. All the action has been thoroughly 
described--but less attention has been paid to the motivation. 
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The geographical nature and position of Sind first deter-
mined its importance in the history of India long before the 
British became involved~ but it became a factor in British con-
siderations because of two particular geographical facts. Firstly, 
because of its position east of the mountains, it was a logical 
stopping point for British growth and therefore figured promin-
ently in any considerations of the " natural " defensible borders 
of India. But secondly, Sind was vital because of the Indus, 
and the Indus had to be considered not only because of its role 
as a "natural " defensible barrier to invasion; but more particu-
larly because of its influence on potential commerce and communi-
cation. Possibly~ had there never been a Russian threat or a 
war in Afghanistan, the British might still have annexed Sind to 
control the Indus, and thereby control trade into the upper north-
west and beyond. 
On the other hand control of Sind and the Indus implied con-
trol of the Bolan Pass, which was seldom considered in commercial 
terms , Peculiarly, possession of Sind was vital even if Indian 
defences were based on either the theory of the forward school 
or on the Indus school. If the forward school held sway, then 
Sind was necessary because it gave access to the Bolan and the 
Kabul~Kandahar line. But if defence were to be based on the 
Indus theory, Sind was still important because the Indus ran 
thr ough Sind and any invading force entering India through the 
Bolan could be met in Sind. 
But before considering the British in Sind, brief mention 
must be made of Sind before the British, particularly its role 
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in the history of invasions of India. Sind, like the North-
western passes was also a gateway to India. It is situated 
astride some of the major approaches to India and has been 
a much frequented invasion route. For 
it was insulated by its mountains and deserts and 
its climate but it had known invasions and his-
torically had been more of a passageway than a 
block to invaders. In the third millinnium B. C. 
the Harappa civilization had been over-run. 
Alexander the Great passed through Sind as well 
as the Moslems in the eighth century. In 1026 
Mahmud of Ghazi took Sind. In the sixteenth 
century the Baluchis moved into Sind from the 
hills west of the Indus, these were later con-
quered by the Nadir Shah.l 
Thus Sind, like the upper North-West had to be considered 
in the content of the defence of India. As such Sind was an 
object of British concern during the Napoleonic threat; but 
the decline of this threat reduced its apparent importance. 
Nevertheless, it was never completely forgotten, for in 
Cutch, British and Sindian ambitions clashed. Treaties in 
1 81 6 and 1819 had made Cutch pratically a British dependency 
which "laid the foundations of a forward policy along the 
Indus." 2 
The treaties consequently set the British against r aiding 
tribes from the domains of the Amirs of Hyderabad. In fact, 
1. Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, op, cit., 
p. viii. 
2. Norris, op, cit. p. 17. 
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Mountstuart Elphinstone, then Governor of Bombay, threatened 
to wage war on Sind because of these raids. However, Governor 
General Lord Moira, condemned the proposal because it would 
be contrary to the policy of non-annexation. 
"War with Sind [he declared] would involve us in disputes, 
jealousies, enmities, intrigues, negotiations, wars and incal-
culable embarrassments in the countries beyond the Indus."l 
It is noteworthy that in this situation, like countless 
others, the man closest to the scene and best informed on a 
local level encouraged aggression while the more remote res-
ponsibility, with possibly a greater sense of perspective, was 
reluctant to become involved in hostilities. 
Lord Moira felt that the British should consolidate power 
within their present sphere, although he was prepared to admit 
that the future might force expansion in self-defence. Thus 
war was avoided and a treaty was singed on November 9, 1820, 
providing for eternal friendship and the exchange of vakils. 
Roberts claims that this treaty was a restatement of the 1809 
treaty to exclude the "tribe of the French." However, the 
motive was probably not so much to exclude foreign political 
intrigue as to exclude foreign mercenaries such as had been 
employed by Ranjit Singh. Thus the hopes were not merely to 
insure Sindian friendship but to guarantee Sindian weakness 
in the future. 
1. Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, p. 16. 
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After the signing of this treaty hostilities in Cutch dis-
appeared, although the British were to refer to them on several 
occasions during negotiations with the Arnirs of Sind. 
In the late 1820's Sind again carne into British considera-
tion; but the principal motivation seems to have been commercial 
rather than political~ although annexation was predicted. In 
1827 Dr. James Burnes, brother to the famous Alexander, wrote 
A Narrative of a Visit to the Court of the .Arneers of Sinde in 
which he accepted the fact that annexation might be forthcorn-
ing and assessed the potentialities of the Indus and Sind. 
He wrote: 
it is scarcely possible to conceive a 
more easy, or as far as the people are generally 
concerned, a more willing conquest, were our vic-
torious arms turned in that direction • • Were 
such an event to happen, as happen in all probabil-
ity it will, from causes as uncontrollable as those 
which have led to the already mighty extension of 
our Empire, there is no district which would better 
repay the fostering care of a mild and enlightened 
management than Sinde . . Then the River Indus 
might once more become the channel of communica-
tions and wealth, between the interior of Asia and 
the Peninsula of India, and the Sind herself . 
would rise renewed to claim a due importance in 
the scale of nations, and to profit by her bene-
fits which nature has bestowed on her • • • A 
single glance at the Indus will show the easy 
passage to the very heart of their [the Arnirs] 
dominions, which the river offers to a maritime 
power.l 
l. Burnes, Dr. James, Narrative of a Visit to the Court 
of the Arneers of Sinde, Government of Bombay, 1829, as 
quoted in Norr~s, op. cit., p. 44. 
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Obviously, Ellenborough, at this time President of the 
Board of Controlr was impressed with the illusion of British 
trade on the Indus, for he wrote : 
No British flag has ever floated upon the waters of 
this river, Please God it shall, and in triumph, 
to the source of all its tributary streams.l 
Although the degree to which the navigation of the Indus 
was practical and possible was a debatable point, at least 
some were optimistic. For instance, Lieutenant Postans wrote, 
There can be no doubt that time is alone required 
to gain practical experience, and ultimately the 
attainment of all our objects in this great river. 2 
It would appear that even before the Herat problem that 
Ellenborough did invisage a British controlled North-West in-
eluding Sind and the whole of the Punjab. The annexation of 
Sind some · fifteen years later was a partial realization of this 
vision. Furthermore, even at this early date Ellenborough held 
certain ideas that became~the cornerstone of his policy when 
he eventually became Governor General. In the first place he 
was intrigued with the possibility of British possession of 
the Indus system as we have just seen. 
Furthermore, he was aware of and concerned with a Russian 
threat. Although one of his biographers, A. H. Imlah, suggests thai 
l. Lord Ellenborough, A Political Diary, quoted in Imlah, 
A. H., Lord Ellenborough, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1939, p. 38. 
2. Postans, T., Personal Observations on Sindh, London, 
Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, 1843, p. 42. 
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"Ellenborough did not fear Russia in the exaggerated manner of 
many of his contemporaries, '' 1 Huttenback tells us that not 
only did Ellenborough admit to fearing the Russians he was 
also of the opinion that the proper place to face them was 
not in Afghanistan but on the Indus. For Ellenborough wrote 
" The directors are much afraid of the Russians, so am I . 
I feel confident we shall have to fight the Russians on the 
Indus. 11 2 
Thus it was with more than commercial thoughts that 
Alexander Burnes was sent in 1830 to survey the Indus under 
the guise of delivering a present of English horses to Ranjit 
Singh from William IV. He was able to proceed on this mission 
because Sir Henry Pottinger, then Resident in Cutch, threatened 
the Amirs that if they hindered Burnes the question of the 
raids into Cutch from Sind would be re-opened. 
Following the completion of the mission Lord William 
Bentinck, the Governor General wrote: 
The result of Burnes mission has satisfied me that 
the importance of the River Indus in a political 
point of view not less than as a route of commerce 
has not been overrated.3 
1. Imlah, op. cit. , p. 85. 
2. Lord Ellenborough, A Political Diary, quoted in 
Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, p. 18. 
3. Bengal Government. to Clare (Governor of Bombay) , 
October 22, 1R31, quoted in Huttenback, British Relations 
With Sind, p. 22. 
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Therefore Burnes' mission was followed up in 1832, by a 
mission to the courts of Upper and Lower Sind under Pottinger. 
This time the lever used against the Amirs was the threat of 
Ranjit Singh on their northern border. Treaties were ultim-
ately signed on April 4, 1832, with the Amirs of Khairpur 
and on April 20 with the Amirs of Hyderabad. These were 
purely commercial treaties however, since the terms gave the 
British no political advantage. Although the British were 
restricted, at l~ast the door to the Sind was open to them for 
"the treaty threw open the Indus and their [Amirs] country to 
the merchants of Hindustan." 1 The passage of military stores 
was banned and no armed vessels were to enter the river; nor 
were English merchants allowed to settle in the country. 
Preceding these articles was one which bound the two contracting 
powers never to look with the eyes of covetousness on each 
other's possessions. 2 
Initial trade efforts proved to be discouraging and soon 
the British demanded changes in the toll structure governing 
river navigation and the establishment of a British residency 
in Sind, ostensibly for commercial purposes. Nur Mahomed, 
obviously suspicious of British intentions, refused. In 
1. Lambrick, H. T., Sir Charles Napier and Sind, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1952, p. 13. 
2. 
Ranjit, 
Khera, P. N., British Policy Towards Sind , Dehli, 
1963, appendixes VI and VII, pp. 117, 118 
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response to this situation Pottinger wrote, in language rather 
strong for motives that were purely commercial, " We must change 
our requests to demands and support these demands by increasing 
our force in Kutch and blocading the ports of Sinde till every-
thing we wish is fully acceded to. " 1 
Bentinck expressed a similar sentiment when he informed 
the Secret Committee that " We should be compelled to adopt 
measures of coercion as might be necessary to insure their 
compliance. " 2 
It is significant that about this time Shah Shuja, with 
Bentinck's blessing, was making his bid to recover the throne 
of Afghanistan. Certainly a British resident in Sind would 
not impede this venture. However this ambition was not real-
ized for a treaty was signed in 1834 to readjust and reconsider 
the question of tolls, still no resident was permitted. 
In the 1830's Ranjit Singh gave the British further reason 
for concern over Sind. Despite the fact that a close alliance 
with Ranjit Singh was a cornerstone of British India's defence 
policy, his power had to be carefully controlled for his part 
in the alliance was maintained out of respect for British 
strength. A Sikh kingdom too powerful might be a potentially 
dangerous friend. An independent Sind, with its independence 
1. Pottinger to McNaughten, August 10, 1834, quoted in 
Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, p. 28. 
2. 
Ibid, p. 
Bentinck to Secret Committee, March 5, 
28. 
1835, quoted in 
guaranteed and its policy controlled by a British Resident 
would be an effective buffer in the North-West against Sikh 
expansion as well as against threats from other directions. 
In 1831 Ranjit Singh had proposed to Bentinck the parti-
tion of Sind between himself and the Company, a proposition 
which Bentinck refused. 1 Consequently in 1835 Sikh armies 
moved against the Mazaris, an Upper Sindian tribe, and de-
manded from the Amirs tribute formerly paid to Kabul. 
This situation at first caused the British deep concern, 
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but it was one which they quickly turned to their own advantage 
for they were able at the same stroke to contain Ranjit Singh 
and obtain a foothold in Sind. Conveniently for the British, 
the Amirs asked for British aid in this situation. The British 
were eager to offer their assistance, but on these terms: 
if the Sind emirs wish [sic] to be protected from 
the Sikhs they must draw closer to the British . 
The price of permanent protection against the Sikhs, 
without an alliance, was the acceptance of a British 
garrison in Sind, and not only in Sind but in the 
capital itself ; the price of protection in this crisis 
only, without future commitment, was the acceptance of 
a British resident.2 
Furthermore, Pottinger was empowered to receive overtures 
from the Amirs for complete dependence of Sind on the British. 
Throughout these and subsequent negotiations the British pre-
ferred to deal with the Arnirs of Sind independently of each 
l. Roberts, op. cit., p. 325. 
2. Norris, op. cit., p. 94. 
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other, rather than collectively, applying the principle of 
divide and rule. Any effort on the part of the Sikhs to con-
trol Sind would upset the balance of power and thereby destroy 
the buffer system on which the defence of India rested. 
Ellenborough stated on March 7, 1835,: 
It is our political interest that the Indus and its 
tributary streams s hould not belong to one state. 
The division of power on the Indus between the 
Scindians, the Affghans , and the Sikhs is probably 
the arrangement most calculated to secure us 
against hostile use of that river . 1 
If this division of power could not be guaranteed without 
actual British control over Sind then a policy of annexation 
would naturally follow. 
At one point in this incident between Ranjit Singh and 
t h e Amirs, the British were concerned that the participants 
might come to an understanding by themselves without British 
auspices. Macnaughten thereupon wrote to Pottinger stating 
that the Amirs be informed that whatever benefits came of the 
negotiations, the Amirs could only thank British influence ; 
and if they ignored a British alliance, then Britain would 
refrain on any future occasion to secure their independence. 
Fortunately for the British, negotiations between the 
Amirs and Ranjit Singh collapsed and the British pressed again 
for a residency. On April 23, 1838, the Amirs finally agreed 
1. Secret Committee to Governor General, March 7, 1835, 
as quoted in Norris , op. cit., p. 71. 
to a treaty allowing a British resident at Hyderabad, but no 
British army in Sind. Also the British agreed to adjust the 
differences between the Arnirs and Ranjit Singh. 1 
After the signing of this treaty, events in Afghanistan 
forced the British to consider Sind of prime military and 
political significance; and any commercial considerations 
faded further into the background. The signing of the Tri-
partite Treaty and the decision to send a British force into 
Afghanistan was the first major turning point in the signifi-
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cance of Sind. For now the most important determinant of policy 
was the fear of a Russian invasion through the North-West. 
In the summer of 1837 when it became apparent that the 
Afghans were contemplating an alliance with Persia to achieve 
their aims against the Sikhs, it was suggested that, if nego-
~ 
tiations with Dost Mohammed were unsuccessful, the British 
would work with the Sikhs and Sindians against the Afghans. 
When the Tripartite Treaty was signed the right of transit 
through Sind was necessary to approach the Bolan Pass. 
Now Auckland " clearly needed a pretext for exacting a 
new treaty from the Arnirs, " 2 and was compelled to make new 
arrangements with Sind, and " he chose to see an opportunity 
l. Khera, op. cit., Appendix VII, p. ll8. 
2 ,. Huttenback, British Relations· With Sind, p. 46. 
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to secure the protectorate he had wanted in 1836. 11 1 Thus 
Sind took on a new importance and British policy took on a 
new character. 
In August, 1838, Auckland was given his pretext for 
Pottinger wrote to Macnaughten that the Amirs of Sind were 
negotiating with Persia. 2 Auckland therefore demanded cessa-
tion of Sindian intrigue with Persia ; British control of 
Sind's foreign relations ; a tribute of 3 l/2 lakhs of rupees 
towards the cost of a permanent British military force in 
Sind ; and co- operation in the movement of troops and supplies. 
Auckland further instructed Pottinger : 
At the same time it would be uncandid to conceal 
from their Highnesses that his Lordship expects 
from them, as sincere friends and near neighbours, 
some ostensible display in their present exigency, 
of their attachments to British interests and some 
concession on their part to the responsible wishes 
of the British Government.3 
The tone of British policy towards Sind at this point 
almost indicates that the annexation of Sind was the accepted 
policy and the primary reason for the Afghan War. After 
Auckland was informed of the Amirs exchanging notes with 
l. Imlah, op. cit., p. 125. 
2. Pottinger to Governor General, August 13, 1838, 
Correspondence Relative to Sinde, 1838-1843 ; Presented to 
both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1843, 
No. 10, p. 10. (Henceforth cited as Cd.) 
3. Macnaughten to Resident in Sind , July 26, 1838 , 
Cd. , No. 8, p. 6. 
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Persia, he stated: '' This justifies any course which we may 
think it expedient to adopt towards them. "l 
Also, on July 26, 1838, Macnaughten wrote to the Resident 
in Sind : 
If the amirs have entered into any negotiations 
with the Shah of Persia it would be considered 
as hostile to British interests. If they have 
the resident is authorized to bring a force 
from Bombay.2 
In reply the Resident informed the Governor General that 
when he knew that the Arnirs were considering treating with 
the Shah he would tell them distinctly " that the day they 
connect themselves with any other power will be the last of 
their independent authority. " 3 
Shortly after the Arnirs were warned " that if a gun, or 
4 
even a matchlock, were fired, they should lose their country. ll 
The demands now being made were in open violation of the 
1832 treaty, but, in Roberts' judgment: 
The Indian Government appears to have held 
that they could legally amend a treaty by the 
1. Governor General to Resident in Sind, September 6, 
1838 , Cd., p. 15. 
2. Macnaughten to Resident in Sind, July 26, 1838, 
Cd. , No. 8, p. 6. 
3. Resident in Sind to the Secretary with the Governor 
General, August 13, 1838, Cd., No. 10, p. 10. 
4, Resident in Sind to the Secretary with the Governor 
General, February 13, 1839, Cd. No. 151, p. 149. 
formal announcement to the weaker party that they 
intended to violate one of its provisions, there-
fore the Amirs were informed that while the 
present exigency exists the article of the treaty 
prohibiting the use of the Indus for conveyence 
of military stores must necessarily be suspended. 1 
Initially the Amirs refused the passage of Shah Shuja 
through Sind. Therefore Auckland wrote : 
The treachery of the Ameers is fully estab-
lished by a variety of concurrent circumstances, 
of their having written a slavish areeza to the 
Shah of Persia . . by the treatment openly 
shown to a self-styled Persian Prince at Hydera-
bad and their insulting letter to Shah Shoojah 
ool Moolk coupled with the distinct announcement 
regarding opposition to the Shah.2 
At first the Amirs prepared to resist the British by 
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gathering tribesmen together, but the sight of British troops 
3 from Bombay and Bengal convinced the Amirs to give in. In 
the meantime the British had taken Karachi when Admiral 
Frederick Maitland "mistook" a salute for an attack and 
captured the town. 
1. Roberts, op. cit., p. 326. 
2. Auckland to Pottinger, December 31, 1838, 
in Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, p. 47. 
" slavish areeza 11 referred to J.S, Nur Mohammed Khan 
of Persia, found in Cd., No. 11, p. 12. 
as quoted 
Note: 
to Shah 
3. Troops requested by Pottinger to prevent resistance 
to Shah Shuja, Pottinger to Governor General, August 25, 1838, 
Cd • , No • 12 , p . 12 • 
In March of 1839 a treaty was accepted which gave the 
British everything they demanded except outright possession 
of Sind. For all practical purposes it was annexation. Soon 
after a similar treaty was signed with Mir Rustarn of Khairpur 
giving a second British residency. 1 
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On March 13, 1839, Auckland wrote to the Secret Committee 
explaining the new status of Sind, the treaties having placed 
it formally under British protection. There was no indication 
that the occupation was temporary. In fact Auckland stated 
in 1840 that the horne government was in agreement with him 
regarding the new status as perrnanent, 2 notwithstanding the 
Secret Committee criticizing Auckland for having " extended 
the limits of the Indian Ernpire. " 3 Thus the Secret Committee 
recognized these 1839 treaties as annexation in practice if 
not in fact. 
Towards the end of Auckland's administration the Resident 
at Hyderabad urged the policy which Ellenborough later carried 
out : 
if we are ever again obliged to exert our strength 
in Scind~ it must be carried to subjugating the 
country. 
1. Khera, op. cit., Appendixes XI, XII, p. 124, 125. 
2. Dodwell, H. H., (Ed.), Cambridge History of India, 
Cambridge, University Press, 1937, Vol. V, p. 531. 
3. Secret Committee to Lord Auckland, July 8, 1839, quoted 
in Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, p. 57. 
4. The Resident in Sind to the Secretary with the 
Governor General, February 13, 1839, Cd., No. 151, p. 149. 
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Although Auckland feared outright seizure, he did occupy 
Karachi, Sukkur, Tatta and Rohri. 
which he left to his successor. 
This was the situation 
During the war Sind was the base of operations, both 
during the initial invasion and the " reconquest. " Events 
along the Sind frontier emphasized the need to command the 
passes and control the hill tribes if the defensive line 
of India were to be pushed beyond the mountains. 
Roberts tells us that the Amirs faithfully kept their 
agreements and " the fearful disasters that fell upon our 
army did not tempt them to any acts of hostilities. " l This 
needs investigation. It is true that in Lower Sind, where 
James Outram replaced Pottinger as Resident in 1840, relations 
were satisfactory. Lambrick feels that this was because of 
the influence of Outram who kept the Hyderabad chiefs passive 
when British prestige was badly shaken by disasters in 
Baluchistan. But in Upper Sind the Amirs did not keep their 
agreements quite so faithfully. 
The hill tribes of Baluchistan made it difficult to ship 
supplies, by harassing the convoys on the way to the Bolan. 
1. Roberts, op. cit., p. 327. 
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particularly troublesome were the Dombiki and Jakhrani tribes 
of the Kachhi Plain who likewise attacked the convoys. These 
tribesmen took shelter in the hills occupied by the Bugti and 
Marri tribes. A Major Billamore was sent with a small force 
to punish them and established a garrison in the Marri country, 
only to be beseiged· and annhiliated by the Marris. A relief 
force was repulsed at the Nqffusk Pass. 
Also, above the Bolan Pass the Kakkar tribe attacked 
Quetta and the Brahuis of Kelat rose against a pretender 
installed by the British. Kelat was lost and insurrection 
spread to the Kachhi Plain. 1 Although the situation was re-
stored temporarily at the end of the year the uprisings were 
omens for the future. 
Postans in Observations of Sind considers this uprising 
in Kelat as a decisive turning point in Sind-British relations 
because it focused attention on the tribal problem of 
Baluchistan.2 
Furthermore Outram had reason to question the faithfulness 
of the Amirs; and he wrote reports about intrigues and treachery 
on the part of the Amirs,3 which must have been influential 
to the policy making of the new Governor General. 
1. Lambrick, "~~~ ~t. , p. 4 5. 
2. 
3. Political Agent in Sind to Governor General, May 31, 
1842, Cd. No. 338, p. 320. 
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The actual annexation of Sind is generally credited to 
Lord Ellenborough and the remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to his policy. However, he accomplished only in name 
what his predecessor had accomplished in fact, for Lord 
Auckland's treaties with Sind and the show of British force 
in achieving these treaties reduced Sind to a tributary of 
British India. Ellenborough merely made the annexation com-
plete and legal. 
Two important factors must be considered concerning 
Ellenborough's policy; first the situation in Afghanistan on 
his arrival and therefore the urgency to act quickly, and 
secondly the personality of Sir Charles Napier, his agent in 
Sind, who was ideally suited to a situation which necessitated 
speedy action. His facility to act with speed was not impeded 
by the weight of his knowledge and understanding of things 
Indian. 
Ellenborough arrived in India in the dark days following 
the destruction of the British army at Kabul. It was his 
first consideration to turn the tide of disaster and restore 
the morale and prestige of the British army. This factor of 
morale and prestige cannot be overestimated in British affairs 
in India; and as such was a salient feature of Ellenborough's 
policy, both towards Afghanistan and Sind. 
Ellenborough never wavered from his earlier feelings 
that the British should not be involved in Afghanistan and 
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that the defence of India should rest upon the Indus. The 
disasters in Afghanistan only strengthened this conviction 
and made annexation of Sind attractive, particularly since 
it already had been practically achieved. 
While Palmerston, Hobhouse, and Auckland felt they must 
checkmate the Russians in Afghanistan rather than await them 
on the Sutlej and Indus, Ellenborough felt this would imperil, 
rather than improve, British security in Indial and was 
"content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to 
its Empire. " 2 
Here we see the continuing argument, whether India's de-
fensible frontier should be on the River Indus or the Afghan 
Plateau. Ellenborough's policy was to withdraw permanently 
from Afghanistan. Recent events had only confirmed his belief 
that a policy of intervention was wrong. 
It would be erroneous to suppose [he declared] 
that a forward position in Upper Afghanistan would 
have the effect of controlling the people of the 
trans-Indus states.3 
But first, before withdrawal, it was important for 
British prestige to convert the disaster at Kabul into a 
merely temporary setback. To facilitate this, Ellenborough 
l. Imlah, op. cit. , p. 8 5. 
2. Huttenback, British Relations With Sind, p. 68. 
3. Lord Ellenborough to Sir Jasper Nicolls (Commander 
in Chief), March, l842, quoted in Imlah, op. cit., p. 92. 
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gave General Nott the option of returning from Kandahar via 
Kabul and Ghazni joining General Pollock at Kabul and continuing 
the withdrawal via Jellalabad and Peshawar. However this action 
necessitated certain considerations for Sind since it meant 
that the least fit of General Nott's army would withdraw through 
Sind. It was probable that their apparent weakened condition 
would have confirmed in the minds of the Amirs of Sind the im-
pression of British weakness which in turn might inspire them 
to hostilities with the British. As Postans explained in a 
memorandum May 5, 1842: 
The progress of our measures in re-establishing 
our supremacy in Afghanistan has been narrowly 
watched by our enemies in Sinde and Beloochistan; 
and there can be no doubt from general report and 
distinct evidence, that a very general revolt 
against our influence and authority would have 
resulted from any serious reverse or disaster above 
the passes.l 
The retreat is a significant event in the affairs of 
Sind since it coincided with the arrival of Sir Charles Napier 
in Sind. Huttenback claims that Napier's arrival was coin-
cident with British victory in Afghanistan and was thus as 
unnecessary as annexation. But, actually, the Amirs were not 
convinced of British victory. In any case, "victory" for 
Ellenborough necessitated a change in policy which meant that 
Sind was to be one of the fruits of victory since it would 
No. 
1. Postans, Memorandum, May s, 
338, p. 322. 
1842, Cd., Inc. 4 in 
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restore British prestige and give the British a defensible 
frontier on the Indus. 
Thus in August of 1842 Napier was given full command in 
Sind with Outram to assist him. There is no evidence that he 
was s e nt to speed up annexation. Rather, as a military man 
he would supervise transit of troops returning from Kandahar. 
The presence of a British force would prevent any hostile acts 
which were a possibility since certain Afghan chiefs had 
written to the Amirs of Upper Sind " reminding [them] that 
they were the tributaries of the Afghan Government and that 
now was the time to act. " l 
Much of the controversy concerning Napier and Sind centers 
about the fact that Napier was eventually given "carte blanche," 
and the political agencies closed. Ellenborough most likely 
proceeded on this course to prevent in Sind what had happened 
in Afghanistan and on this issue he was acting on the advice 
of the Duke of Wellington, whose influence on the whole North-
West question is not ~o be underestimated. 
To ensure that measures in Afghanistan should be guided 
by military rather than political considerations Ellenborough 
issued an order subordinating all the political agents in 
Afghanistan to the military command. He was aware that the 
reverses in Kabul had been greatly aggravated, if not caused, 
1. Minute b y S i r Geo rge Arthur (Govern or of Bombay), 
September 2 , 1842 , Cd. , No. 362 , p . 352. 
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by the supremacy of political counsels there. Wellington, 
and Wellesley too, had cautioned him to avoid this "first fatal 
error, the employment of Civil Clerks on High Military Commands." 1 
Furthermore, to place matters in a military rather than a 
political context Ellenborough was undoubtedly influenced by a 
letter from Wellesley, dated July 4, 1842: 
If the British power of active military move-
ment should decline, war of the most terrific nature 
accompanied by confusion and anarchy must insue. 
The peace of India is maintained by the military 
strength of the British power.2 
Certainly Ellenborough could only decide to take firm 
measures in Sind. Furthermore, at a time when it was vitally 
important to maintain British prestige it was therefore vital 
that reverses in Afghanistan should not be followed by similar 
disgrace in Sind. For, again, Wellington had warned 
Ellenborough 
that grave consequences among the Muslim population 
in India and throughout Asia might be expected to 
follow the reverses at the hands of the Muhammadans 
of Afghanistan.3 
Would firm control of Sind control the Muslim population of 
India as he had hoped the incident of the Somnah Gates would 
ensure the loyal~y of the Hindu population of India? 
1. Wellington to Ellenborough, March 30, 1842, quoted 
in Imlah, op. cit., p. 95. 
2. 
Ibid, p. 
3. 
Ibid, p. 
Wellesley to Ellenborough, July 4, 1842, quoted in 
95. 
Wellington to Ellenborough, March 30, 1842, quoted in 
95. 
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Furthermore, the eventual " victory " in Afghanistan did 
not lessen the importance of Sind but greatly increased it. 
For, as Ellenborough stated in a proclamation in the year 1842, 
Sind must have been of prime importance for future policy. 
The rivers of the Punjab and the Indus and 
the mountain passes and the barbarous tribes of 
Afghanistan will be placed between the British 
army and an enemy approaching from the West, if 
indeed such an enemy there can be, and no longer 
between the army and its supplies. 
The enormous expenditure required for the 
support of a large force, in a false military 
position, at a distance from its own frontier 
and resources, will no longer arrest every meas-
ure for the improvement of the country and of the 
people. 
The combined army of England and India, superior 
in equipment, in discipline, in valour, and in the 
officers by whom it is commanded, by any force 
which can be opposed to it in Asia, will stand in 
unassailable strength upon its own soil, and for-
ever, under the blessing of providence preserve the 
glorious empire it has won in security and honour . 
Thus '' back to the Indus 12 was the policy and this neces-
1 
sitated the control of Sind, if indeed, policy depended on the 
rivers of the Punjab and the Indus. Sind was at that time a 
stronger position than the Punjab for Ranjit Singh had died, 
and problems from this quarter would only be a matter of time. 
Whereas only a few years previous policy had hinged on Punjab 
as the warden of Indian defence, now it was becoming apparent 
that Sind would be the base from which to control the affairs 
of Punjab. 
1. Proclamation by Lord Ellenborough, October 1, 1842, 
quoted in Imlah, op. cit., p. 108-109. 
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Therefore, in the spring of 1842 it was apparent to 
Ellenborough that new arrangements had to be made with the 
A.mirs of Sind, to facilitate the "means of rendering our 
power on the Indus invulnerable."l Thus existing treaties 
had to be modified. Justification was found in the incident 
of the Amirs' intrigues against the British. Although Roberts 
claims that the evidence against the Amirs was unsatisfactory 
and that British policy in regards to Sind could not be justi-
fied on moral grounds,2 expediency demanded that a case for 
annexation be found or manufactured.3 
Thus, on October 25, 1842, Napier submitted to Ellenbor-
ough evidence reviewing breaches of faith on the part of the 
Amirs.4 Perhaps the most serious was one from Mir Rustam to 
Lahore urging alliance against the British.5 
On another occasion Mir Rustam had addressed his chiefs: 
See the English have been turned out of 
Afghanistan and have eaten dirt, have been 
killed so far on their return to India. Their 
1. Agent in Sind to Governor General, May 8, 1842, Cd., 
No. 331, p. 316 .. 
2. Roberts, op. cit., p. 329. 
3. Innes, A. D., A Short History of the British in India, 
London, Methuen and Co., 1902, p. 137. 
4. Sir Charles Napier to Governor General, October 25, 
1842, Cd., No. 379, p. 362. 
5. 
p. 370. 
Mir Rustam to Sher Sing, Cd., Inc. No. 5 in No. 379, 
force is large, and if they will but leave Sind I 
will meet all their demands for money. If on the 
contrary they do not leave Sukur and Sind we must 
fight them.l 
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It is obvious that the Amirs would be reluctant to accept 
the presence of British troops maintained by their tribute 
money ; and equally obvious that definite possession of Sind, 
as Wellington believed, would give greater military security. 
Thereupon Napier announced to the Amirs that the charges 
made against them had been substantiated and that he was 
authorized to revise the treaty of 183 9 , Under the proposed 
new treaties the British were to have outright possession of 
Karachi, Tatta, Sukkur, Rohri, and Bukkur ; vital areas in both 
. 1 d '1' 2 a commercla an ml ltary sense. 
This cession of territory would be made in place of the 
three lakh tribute formerly collected to maintain the British 
force in Sind. Also the Amirs were to provide fuel for British 
steamers navigating the Indus; and thirdly, the Amirs were to 
cease to exercise the privilege of coining money. Significantly, 
This last provision was looked upon as a complete 
surrender of their national rights and it is probable 
enough that from this time onward they only prolonged 
negotiations with a view to taking up arms at a fav-
ourable time.3 
1. Napier to Ellenborough, November 30 1 1842, intelligence 
enclosure from Major Clibborn, Cd., No. 425, p. 463. 
2. Secretary to Governor General to Political Agent in 
Sind, May 22, 1842, Cd., No. 334, p. 318. 
3. Roberts, op. cit., p. 328. 
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Before the Amirs accepted the treaty, Napier confiscated 
the territory in question ; and acted as if Sind had passed 
under his jurisdiction, feeling that Britain should, or would, 
eventually annex Sind. 
I conceive [he stated] that such a state of 
political relations could not last and the more 
powerful government would, at no very distant 
period, swallow up the weaker. If this reason-
ing be correct wouldlit not be better to come to 
the results at once? 
The Amirs were hesitant about accepting the new treaties 
and appeared to be making preparations for war. Matters were 
further complicated by Napier's interference in the question 
of the hereditary leadership of Upper Sind. Napier trans-
£erred the leadership from Mir Rustam, who had been accused 
of intriguing against the British, to Ali Murad, ~ho would 
probably not ally with Lower Sind against the British. In 
this in incident, was Napier acting on the divide and rule 
principle or deliberately provoking the Amirs into a war by 
interfering in their traditional affairs? The outcome of this 
incident was Napier's attack on the fortress of Iman Garh, 
although the Amirs had made no hostile moves towards the Brit-
ish ; and the process of annexation had commenced. 
Napier justified the annexation on the imperialistic 
philosophy that it was Britain's mission to bring the blessings 
l. Observations by Sir Charles Napier on the occupation 
of Sind, October l7, l842, quoted in Huttenback, British 
Relations With Sind, p. 76. 
of civilization to backward people, even if they had to be 
~ thrashed '1 into seeing the blessings, for he stated: 
Barbaric chiefs must be bullied or they think 
you are afraid ; they do not understand benevolence 
or magnanimity • I do not want to draw trigger 
against the Arnirs . . but if we show a wish to 
avoid doing so they will be at us and must be 
thrashed into sense.l 
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The actual process of annexation followed from the razing 
of Iman Garb to the victory at Miani a few months later, and 
the eventual expulsion of the Arnirs. However, these events 
do not concern us here, only the reason why. 
In a geographic sense Sind was vital to the British 
whether the defense of India rested on the Indus or on a line 
beyond the mountains. This factor. Auckland realized and thus 
he was interested in Sind even before the decision to push into 
Afghanistan. But the defeats at Kabul determined that the 
defensive policy would be " back to the Indus 11 and Sind had to 
be annexed as a cornerstone of this policy. 
The annexation was a logical outcome of the expense and 
agony of conducting a war beyond the mountains. However, the 
war experience also illustrated that the tribes of Sind and 
Baluchistan in the strategic area of the passes leading into 
Sind would have to be considered in a policy of defence based 
on the Indus and Sind. 
1. Quoted in Napier, Sir W., The Life and Opinions of 
General Sir Charles James Napier, as quoted in Lambrick, ~ 
cit., p. 68. 
Chapter IV 
THE BRITISH CONQUEST OF THE PUNJAB 
All causes that were not the cause of Rome 
were destined to be lost. The central power, 
once dominant, could only grow and all the out-
side forces could only shatter themselves against 
Rome as enemies or augment the strength of Rome 
as vassals.l 
These few words accurately describe the relationship of 
the Punjab and British India during the period from 1809 and 
the signing of the Treaty of Amritsar up to the eventual 
annexation of the Punjab by British India in 1849. 
The annexation of the Punjab was a consequence of British 
expansion up to the Sutlej and a natural sequel to the First 
Afghan War and the annexation of Sind. This is not to say that 
the annexation was part of a master plan prepared by the British 
Government in India long before the actual event. However, it 
was realized by many, even as early as Lord Bentinck's time, 
that conflict with the Sikhs would eventually take place. 
Bentinck himself was aware that British Sikh friendship 
depended upon the relationship with Ranjit Singh and that after 
his death relations with the Punjab would take a different 
direction. 
1. 
1960 , p. 
Sinha, N. K., Ranjit Singh, Calcutta, A. Muckherjee, 
192. 
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It is true that Ranjit Singh was the " sheet anchor of 
British policy" 1 and it is one of the exceptions of British 
rule in India that this cornerstone of policy lasted as long 
as it did. However it is important to realize that the years 
of alliance with Ranjit Singh were not years of perfect harmony 
and ideal foreign relations. Throughout the period in fact, there 
were definitely currents of conflict and cross purposes which 
became apparent only after the death of Ranjit Singh. The years 
of Ranjit Singh's domination were not only a temporary post-
ponement of eventual war but a prelude to it. For in fact, the 
conflict which emerged during these years provides a partial 
explanation for the British conquest of the Sikh realms. More-
over, the course of events of these years gave the Sikhs 
justification for believing that the British would ultimately 
covet their kingdom. 
The illusion of British Sikh friendship during these years 
1809- 1839 has been too often oversimplified, for the motiva-
tion behind their relationship was in fact, fear. For, " his 
[Ranjit Singh's] policy towards the English was inspired by 
dread of their power and not the result of genuine trust or 
goodwill. " 2 
1. Sykes, op. cit. 
2. Chopra, G. L., The Panjab as a Sovereign State, 
Hoshiarpur, Vedic Research Institute, 19o0, p. 48. 
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The British, for their part, feari n g Russian designs on 
India, felt it to be desirable to give the world an impression 
that there was complete unanimity between the British Govern-
ment and the Lahore Durbar.l 
The Treaty of Amritsar, generally thought of as marking 
the beginning of British-Sikh friendship, actually pointed to-
wards eventual conflict, for it restricted the Sikh commonwealth 
and confined Ranjit Singh's activities to the west side of the 
Sutlej. This act frustrated Sikh nationalism2 and 
The English alliance begun by depriving Ranjit 
Singh of one of the most cherished objects of his 
life, the idea of being the sole ruler of all the 
Sikhs. 3 
Thus from the Sikh point of view the eventual British-Sikh 
Wars were a clash between Sikh nationalism and British 
imperialism. 
Certainly Ranjit Singh was a valuable ally to the British, 
for his strength in the Punjab was a buffer against any in-
vasion of India from the West. Ranjit Singh had been the first 
Indian in a thousand years to stem the tides of invasion from 
across the North West Frontier, persuading Sikhs and Muslims to 
become instruments of an expansionist policy which eventually 
1 . Sinha , op . cit. , p . 81 . 
2. Singh, Khushwant, Ranjit Singh, Maharaja of the 
Punjab, London, Allen and Un1vin, 1962, p. 8. 
3 . Sinha, op. cit . , p . 71 . 
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brought Kashmiris and Pathans under his subjugat.ion. Signi-
ficantly, "he [Ranjit Singh] had secured possession of the 
most important posts beyond the Indus."l 
By l823 the entire Valley of Peshawar was at the mercy 
of the Sikhs. Although there was no regular occupation, an 
army was occasionally sent to collect tribute. Actual annexa-
tion took place in l834, while in l835 and l836 Hari Singh 
had built a fortress on the site of Bala Hissar and occupied 
the fort of Jamrud at the mouth of the Khyber. This corner 
of his empire was obviously singularly important to the 
British in India. 
However, vital as was the friendship of Ranjit Singh, the 
relationship between the two powers produced serious tensions. 
The fact of the British imposing limits on Punjab expansion, 
the conflict of interests in Sind, and the British decision to 
intervene in Afghanistan all combined to drive a wedge in the 
entente and arouse Sikh antagonism towards the British. 
Although the Afghan War and British activity in Sind are 
closely related, it was first of all British interference in 
Sind which caused the first strain on the relationship.2 Sind 
was vitally important to Ranjit Singh since it could open 
l. Chopra, op. cit., p. 22. 
2. Sethi, R. R., The Mighty and Shrewd Maharaja, Delhi, 
S. Chand, l960, p. l24. 
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communication with other countries free from British control. 
Furthermore, Sind was a natural extension of the Punjab for 
they both constituted a geographical entity separated from 
other parts by rivers, mountains, sea and desert. 
Ranjit Singh urged his right of free action in Sind and 
attempted to maintain a claim on Shikarpur, the gateway to 
Khorasan, vitally important to Indus trade and that of Central 
Asia. Furthermore, through Shikarpur lay a route to Afghan-
istan and Baluchistan.l 
Open conflict was avoided in this first crisis basically 
because of the already mentioned factor of fear. 
Had he [Ranjit Singh] felt strong enough he 
might have attempted to check by force of arms 
what he considered to be the unjustifiable inter-
ference of the English in his designs against 
Sindh.2 
Furthermore, the fact that the British established them-
selves in Sind before Ranjit Singh could establish a definite 
relationship with the Amirs of Sind gave the British the ad-
vantage for: "Sind would have been invaded [by Ranjit Singh] 
had not Pottingers negotiation for their protection deterred 
Ranjit Singh."3 
By l836 Lord Auckland had become deeply concerned about 
the conduct of Ranjit Singh and looked upon the British Sikh 
l. Sinha, op. cit. , p. 8. 
2. Chopra, op. cit., p. 48. 
3. Sinha, op. cit., p. l22. 
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alliance not without apprehension. His correspondence with 
Metcalfe and Eobhouse indicates this and mentions that the 
conduct of Ranjit Singh seemed to be becoming less friendly 
towards the English.l 
If the first "crisis" or straining of the relationship 
was caused by a conflict of interest over Sind, the second 
carne about through the Tripartite Treaty and the First Afghan 
War, as Edwardes claims when he declares that "The illusions 
of LOrd Auckland and the fear of Russia had drawn blood and 
sown the seeds of the Sikh wars."2 
Although the signing of the Tripartite Treaty is generally 
accepted as the high water mark of the British Sikh entente, 
it actually came at a low point in Ranjit Singh's disposition 
towards the British. Less than a year previously to the 
signing of the treaty, Wade, the Political Agent in Ludhiana, 
referred to the change in the tone and temper of the Lahore 
ruler, pointing out that his sense of deference to the British 
GoverP~.ent which had been the chief source of mutual confi-
dence and harmony was gone.3 Indeed, 
in the last three years of his reign he showed 
a marked disposition towards pursuing an 
l. Chopra, op. cit., p. 49. 
2. 
1958, p. 
Edwardes, M., The Necessary Hell, London, Cassell, 
83. 
3. Sinha, op. cit., p. 89. 
independent line of action, irrespective of 
English interests and good-will,l 
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supported in this attitude by his minister Raja Dihan Singh.2 
Why then did Ranjit Singh sign the treaty? The secre-
tary to the Governor General believed that he did so because 
he feared British might, and he maintained that: 
the dread in which he stands of our power may be 
accepted as a sure pledge that he will never 
suffer himself to oppose the views and wishes of 
the government so long as we admit him to a par-
ticipation of them as a friend.3 
But it is more likely that Ranjit Singh became a partner 
to the treaty simply because he had nothing to lose, as long 
as his own participation was limited. If the British were to 
achieve a victory in Afghanistan he at least was a partner in 
the victory and if the British were defeated he would be free 
of the restrictions of the alliance. Thus, "perhaps he cheered 
his vexed spirit with the hope that the English would yet be 
baffled."4 
Even before the signing of the treaty there were some 
who were convinced that the British would eventually have to 
become involved in the Punjab, perhaps to the extent of outright 
1. Chopra, op. cit., p. 49. 
2. Ibid, p. 49. 
3. Secretary to Governor General of India, as quoted 
in Sinha, op. cit., p. 82. 
4. Cunningham, J. D., A History of the Sikhs, Delhi, 
s. Chand, 1955, p. 22. 
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annexation. In 1837, while Auckland was on his tour of the 
Upper Provinces'· he and his commander-in-chief discussed the 
best way of conquering the Punjab.l Although these discussions 
were dismissed as being purely academic, it would seem that they 
were academic only in the sense that no definite time was 
affixed to the execution of the exercise. Lord Auckland's 
nephew and military secretary scarcely concealed his enthusi-
asm for the reality of such speculation in his journal. In 
May, 1838, he wrote: 
One course to pursue on Ranjit Singh's death 
would be the instant occupation of the Punjab by 
an overwhelming force and the establishment of our 
North-West frontier on the Indus.2 
His enthusiasm, plus his inexperience, perhaps influenced 
his powers of observation, for his appraisal of Ranjit Singh's 
army contrasts sharply with most opinions, almost as if he 
felt it had been overestimated.3 However, his observations 
were made on the parade square and not on the battlefield. 
During the period of the war with the Afghans, rela-
tions between the Sikhs and the British were further strained, 
for 
From the moment when British forces began. to 
use the Panjab as an avenue of approach to Khaiber 
1. Thompson, E., The Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe, 
Lonuon, Faber and Faber, 1937, p. 326. 
2: Journal of William Osbourne, as quoted in Sinha, 
op, cit. , p. 8 8. 
3. Edwardes, The Necessary Hell, op. cit., p. 104. 
Pass and Kabul there were increasing difficulties 
with the goverr~ent and people of that country.l 
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Logically British reverses at Kabul only tended to temper 
sikh suspicions with contempt.2 
In 1839 Ranjit Singh died, and the British had to recon-
sider the role of the Punjab as a buffer state contributing 
to the defence of India. Apparently the Sikhs feared British 
movements even at the hour of his death, for we are told that: 
On the night of his death precautions were 
taken against civil disturbances and incursions 
from abroad, ammunition was distributed and boats 
were kept on the western side of the Sutlej.3 
Ranjit Singh's death ended the thirty year stalemate with 
the British, which I have attempted to point out was marked 
by undercurrents of tension which would have to break out into 
conflict now that there was a power vacuum in the Punjab and 
a gap in India's defensive arrangements. War was bound to 
come, that it had not may be explained by a motive more noable 
than simple fear: 
Perhaps with the solicitude inherent in all 
builders he [Ranjit Singh] feared to expose the 
kingdom he had created to the risks of war and 
chose instead the policy of yielding.4 
1. Imlah, op. cit., p. 158. 
2. Ibid, p. 159. 
3. Singh, Ranjit Singh, op. cit., p. 22. 
4. Sinha, op. cit., p. 91. 
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The new situation in the Punjab, plus the reverses in 
Kabul, caused the British immediate concern. Briefly the situ-
ation was described thusly, 
The regiments were mutinous and almost out 
of control and the whole area in chaos. The 
English had been massacred at Kabul, General Sale 
was incarcerated in Jelalabad; in January a Sepoy 
battalion mutinied at Peshawar. Everything was 
ripe for a serious affair.l 
It was this apprehension of "a serious affair" that led 
the British to withdraw from Afghanistan. It was the situation 
in the Punjab as well as the reverses in Afghanistan that 
caused Lord Ellenborough to speedily terminate the war with 
whatever facade of honour that could be mustered in a short 
time. 
As well as terminating the war, Ellenborough laid the 
foundations for the future policy towards the Punjab. It was 
Ellenborough who crystallized earlier speculation about the 
Punjab and the academic discussions about its conquest into 
a reality. Two principles governed the foreign policy during 
the years 1842-1849, the first to secure the strategical ex-
tension of the North-West Frontier and the second, a principle 
of moderation on the part of the home authorities but a madera-
tion which did not lead them to cancel any advances rnade.2 
l. Edwardes, The Necessary Hell, op. cit., p. 85. 
2. Ward, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 210. 
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To the authorities in India the first principle took prece-
dent over the second. 
Ellenborough was a Russophobe and viewed the Punjab as 
a part of the natural and logical defences of British India. 
While we are told by Hardinge, writing in 1891, that " the 
Government of India was determined to respect the treaty of 
1809 and to avoid all interference with the dissentions of the 
1 Durbar, " a later historian sees the situation more clearly. 
for 
the English, who had anticipated the chaos that 
would follow the death of Ranjit Singh began to 
move troops up to the frontier and to meddle in 
the internal affairs of the Durbar.2 
Obviously plans were conditioned by affairs in Afghanistan 
as the Durbar's authority weakened, the British 
began to mature their plans of moving in. Their 
involvement in Afghanistan precluded for some time 
direct intervention in the punjab. But as soon as 
affairs in Afghanistan wer1 settled they resumed 
their expansionist policy. 
To careful observers it appeared probable that the Punjab, 
far from remaining the sure and steady friend of the Govern-
ment of India, 11 Was li.kely at no distant date to rush into war 
against it .. " 4 For the Sikhs were taking precautionary measures 
1. Hardinge, C. S., Viscount Hardinge, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press , 1891, p. 72. 
2. Singh, Khushwant, A History of the Sikhs, Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, op. cit., Vol. 
II, p. 1. 
3. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 7. 
4. Ward, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 210. 
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to prevent the British from taking advantage of their weakness 
and also to remove the limitations which the British had 
placed on their expansion, a fact which in itself antagonized 
the British and helped convince them of Sikh hostility. The 
sikhs began to extend their frontier towards Tibet 
by striking out North and Eastward the Punjab 
could establish a common frontier with Nepal and 
guard itself against the possibility of British 
encirclement. When the Dogras had penetrated 
Tibet the British demanded that the Durbar give 
up its new conquests.l 
Ellenborough was not inclined to rush immediately into 
the Punjab for he instructed Richmond, his envoy and agent, to 
adhere to the policy of friendship towards the Punjab. How-
ever, this advice was not meant to be the basis of permanent 
relations, since 
he [Ellenborough] considered that the presence of 
the Sikhs as a strong and friendly nation between 
the Indus and the Sutlej was most beneficial, how-
ever, defensive measures must not be neglected and 
information that would be of use in war must be 
collected.2 
Ellenborough's annexation of Sind in 1843 undoubtedly 
caused the Sikhs to be concerned that the same future was in 
store for them. Nevertheless, Ellenborough's action in Sind 
and Gawalior did close up one of the weak points on the 
1. Sinha, History of the Sikhs, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 24. 
2. Broadfoot, W., Career of Major George Broadfoot, 
London, John Murray, 1888, p. 225. 
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North West Frontier and put the British in a stronger position 
not only in regard to Central Asia but in regard to Punjab, 
since 
Sind carried the British border to the mountains while 
Gawalior secured the rear and the communications of 
the British army in case of a war with the Sikhs.l 
Ellenborough had feared that affairs in Gawalior might be 
an incentive for the Sikhs to attack for he wrote late in 1843: 
It would have been unpardonable were we not to 
take every possible precaution against such an event ; 
and no precaution appears to be more necessary, than 
that of rendering our rear, and our communications, 
secure by the establishment of friendly government 
at Gawalior.2 
Having secured Sind and Gawalior, obviously Ellenborough 
was in a much stronger position to consider his policy towards 
the Punjab in the light of his personal ambition. It appears 
that anarchy in the Punjab was entirely to his liking and would 
provide the justification for his extreme forward policy. In 
April, 1844, he wrote admitting his secret desires to his 
brother-in-law, Hardinge: 
You see what has happened at Lahore. There can 
be no doubt that out of the state of things in the 
Panjab will arise an invasion of our protected terri-
tory. All things tend to it. 
I had rather any necessity for our moving should 
be put off for a year and a half from this time. If 
it could be, I should have an army with which I could 
march to the Dardanelles. In four months I shall have 
275,000 men in arms. 
1. Ward, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 212. 
2. Quoted in Imlah, op. cit., p. 158. 
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I think I could cross the Sutlej with rather 
more than 33,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry, and in 
all 162 guns. But as I have told Sir George Arthur 
I want 40,000 men, and one, and that one a General. 
The last I have not got-.--
Does not this excite your ambition? It would 
be an operation of two years, which would require 
the most dextrous political management as well as 
military, but which well managed should give us the 
Panjab, Cashmere, and Peshawar, that is, everything 
within the mountains; and it should be terminated, 
in order to secure the whole, by the assumption of 
the Imperial title by the Queen • 
I think you will at once see that, supposing 
this operation of two years is successfully com-
pleted, we have under our foot, whenever the state 
of Europe will permit us to take it, that country 
which has ever been the ultimate object of my 
desires, but of which I hardly dare to whisper the 
name--Egypt.l 
About the same time Ellenborough was in correspondence 
with Peel, attempting to convince him of the desirability of 
occupying the Punjab as it was part of the natural boundary 
of the British Empire in India. Furthermore, additional justi-
fication for such action was found in the possibility of the 
Punjab situation influencing the Sepoys to rebellion. Ellen-
borough expressed these ideas in a letter to Peel, dated 
July 22, 1844: 
The Panjab is within India, and everything 
within the summits of the mountains which form the 
north and west boundary of the Valley of the Indus 
must be on terms of real friendship with us, or 
dependent upon us, or occupied by us. We cannot 
1. Ellenborough to Hardinge, April, 1844, as quoted in 
Parker, C. S., Sir Robert Peel, London, J. Murray, 1891, 
Vol. III, p. 29. 
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admit an open or concealed enemy within our camp. 
Beyond these limits we cannot advance without weaken-
ing ourselves, even if we hold all the country in 
our rear. The monstrous error of Lord Auckland was 
that of advancing beyond these limits without having 
secured all within them. 
I have s aid, and I repeat it, that I should pre-
fer the Panjab as it was under the friendly government 
of Ranjit Singh to having it in our own hands. But 
we cannot tolerate in the Panjab a state hostilely 
disposed; still less can we endure there the perni-
cious example of a mutinous army extorting higher pay 
and donations from the nominal head of the government 
by threats of violence. Such an example is more dan-
gerous to us than the presence of a powerful enemy 
upon our frontier; for we depend altogether upon the 
fidelity and obedience of the native army, which 
such an example long continued would shake and ul-
timately perhaps subvert.l 
Actually this particular -letter was received by Peel after 
Ellenborough's recall. But during the short administration 
of Lord Ellenborough, the likelihood of British occupation 
of the Punjab passed from the realm of speculation to near 
inevitability. 
In 1844 Hardinge succeeded Ellenborough as Governor Gen-
eral. He saw eighteen months of peaceful rule till December, 
1845, when the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. Ellenborough had fore-
seen a Sikh war and the Directors had finally recognized this 
fact, and appointed Hardinge because of his reputation in the 
Peninsular Wars, giving him the same commission of Captain 
General and Commander-in-Chief that had been given to 
Wellesley in 1800, enabling him to command personally troops 
1. Ellenborough to Peel, July 22, 1844, as quoted in 
Parker, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 258. 
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in India. 1 
The crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs was the signal 
for war. But what inspired the Sikhs to cross? Prior to the 
crossing, the British had been waiting and watching the anarchy 
in the Punjab, possibly waiting for someone of the calibre of 
Ranjit Singh to emerge; but more likely waiting to prove that 
there was not going to be another Ranjit Singh. 
Apparently the British were only waiting for an opportunity 
to annex for when the Lahore Durbar asked for a British force 
at Lahore, which might have established tranquility, the British 
declined. 2 
Furthermore, Khushwant Singh charges that the British not 
only watched the anarchy in the Panjab but also contributed to 
it, citing as evidence their supporting Sher Singh then only 
standing by and watching his assassination by Ajit Singh 
Sandhawalia when Sher Singh proved to be incapable. 3 
wrote 
Commenting on these incidents the British Friend of India 
we have no proof that Company instigated all 
the King-killing which have been perpetuated in 
Punjab . . we m~st say we smell a rat.4 
1. Curzon, British Government in India, op. cit., Vol. 
II, p. 201. 
2. Hardinge, op. cit., p. 73. 
3. Singh, A History of the Sikhs, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 17. 
4. Friend of India, December, 1843, as quoted in Chhabra, 
G. S., The Advanced History of the Panjab, Ludhiana, Parkash 
Brothers, 1962, p. 230. 
98 
After this assassination Dulip Singh became Maharaja, 
with Hiri Singh as his minister, who directed the animosity 
of the army towards the British, since, 
he foresaw that the time must come when he could 
no longer raise money to satisfy the rapacity of 
the army and believed that his chance of safety 
then was to incite the soldiers against the 
British.l 
The British further provoked the Sikhs by their decision 
concerning the treasure of Raja Suchet Singh and their re-
jection of the Durbar's request for the restoration of the 
village of Moran and free passage to their possessions across 
the Sutlej. 
In december of 1844 Hira Singh was murdered in another 
wave of violence in the Punjab. Khushwant Singh claims that 
at this point Hardinge became thoroughly convinced that the 
Sikhs were incapable of maintaining a stable government and 
began to deliberately weaken the Sikhs by strengthening the 
Dogras in the hills and fortifying the frontier with a view 
to annexing the Punjab at an appropriate time wanting only 
a justifiable reason.2 
All the while the Khalsa army was becoming more hostile 
to the Durbar and the British-aKhalsa army too strong, 
1. Broadfoot, op. cit., p. 220. 
2. Singh, A History of the Sikhs, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 32. 
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with too little to do, looking for plunder and war. A 
situation 
encouraged by British ineptitude in the Afghan War. 
No money in the treasury, no pay for the army, while 
across the Sutlej town after town lay waiting to be 
sacked.l 
On December 3, 1845, the British severed diplomatic rela-
tions with the Durbar; and the next day the Rani ordered the 
army to march to the Sutlej. On December 13 the crossing was 
made. Although we are told that "the movement was not con-
tested since at ~hat time and place we were to some extent 
unprepared,"2 actually Hardinge had made elaborate prepara-
tions and increased the military strength on the Sutlej 
frontier.3 
If the Sikhs were guilty of unprovoked aggression, then 
the British were fighting a defensive war; but if the Sikhs 
had been provoked and crossed the Sutlej in an act of self 
defence, then the war was a calculated move on the part of 
the British to justify some type of control over the Punjab. 
Viewing British relations with the Punjab since the beginning 
of the century and the search for a defensible frontier, this 
writer is convinced that the British desired the Punjab, and 
to that end welcomed and encouraged the First Sikh War. 
l. Cork, B. J., Rider on a Grey Horse, London, Cassell 
and Co., 1958, p. 19. 
2. Roberts, op. cit., p. 334. 
3. Hardinge, op. cit., p. 77-78. 
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Definitely there was a conspiracy between the British 
and the Sikh Council of State. Since a victory for the Khalsa 
army over the British would make the army stronger still , there 
was therefore need of a compromise. Thus there was an agree-
ment between Lal Singh, Tej Singh , and the British that no 
further attempts would be made to hold back the Sikh forces ; 
however every effort would be made to insure that the Khalsa 
would lose battles. Thus in due course when the British 
gained a final victory, her servants could look forward with 
f .d . 1 con 1 ence to appropr1ate rewards. 
Hardinge's major concern over the Sikh's crossin g the 
Sutlej was to wonder "will the people of England consider this 
as an actual invasion of o u r frontier and a justification of 
2 
war? 11 
At the end of the fifty-four day war , in February of 1846, 
Hardinge was forced to act on the wishes of the Home Government , 
which objected to the extension of British territory. After a 
decade of costly conflict involving wars in Afghanistan, Sind 
and Punjab, and the annexation of Sind and Gawalior, the British 
public would not tolerate another annexation. However, 
Hardinge himself was completely convinced that annexation 
1. Cork , op. cit. , p. 19. 
2. Lord Hardinge's remark to Robert Cust, December 18, 
1845 , referred to in Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol. II, 
p. 46. 
was justified. At the war's end, in Roberts' estimation 
• the Sikhs by their absolutely unprovoked 
violation of British territory could have looked 
for little else than the complete loss of their 
independence.l 
101 
Hardinge stopped short of annexation, not only because of 
the wishes of the home authorities, but because at that time 
he was not strong enough to occupy the Punjab, for Singh 
claims: 
Hardinge had already made up his mind about 
the future of the Sikh kingdom. He knew that there 
were still too many Khalsa soldiers scattered about 
in the country to permit annexation, so he contented 
himself with terms which would facilitate a take-
over at a more appropriate time.2 
Under the terms of the Treaty of Lahore, Lahore was to be 
occupied by British troops for one year, which could facilitate 
a takeover at a more appropriate time. The British contingent 
at Lahore was in fact the thin edge of the wedge of annexation. 
While Charles Napier agreed that annexation at that time was 
impossible, 3 Hardinge did admit that 
the presence of British troops at Lahore would 
greatly facilitate the annexation of the whole 
province whenever such an extremity might become 
necessary.4 
1. Roberts, op. cit., p. 338. 
2. Singh, A History of the Sikhs, O:f2. cit., Vol. 
3. Hardinge, op. cit., p. 121. 
4. Quoted in Ibid, p. 133. 
II, p. 35. 
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Hardinge's settlement with the Punjab was calculated 
to weaken the Punjab as a potential enemy but preserve it, 
temporarily, as a buffer against attacks from the west. 
Precisely, 
he [Hardinge] still keeps between British India and 
the mountain hordes of Central Asia, a power strong 
enough to restrain the latter should they aim at 
permanent conquests in the plain, yet has so far 
weakened it by the severence of the new principality 
[Kashmir] assigned to Gulab Singh, that we trust 
all risk of a rupture with us, for many a day to 
come at least, is averted.l 
The Treaty of Lahore established Henry Lawrence as 
Resident at Lahore and Lal Singh, as a reward for his part 
during the war, was appointed first minister. Peter Lumsden 
predicted: 
Lal Singh's life is not worth two hours pur-
chase after the withdrawal from Lahore which we are 
bound to do in October. Should this withdrawal 
take place the unfortunate Punjab will have once 
more to witness those fearful scenes of murder and 
confusion for which the Sikh Court has of late been 
so remarkable and we shall assuredly have to return 
and annex the country • • I am quite convinced 
that before six months we shall either have a per-
manent resident at Lahore or the whole country under 
our rule.2 
However, the treaty with Lahore was praised by Peel for 
its "dignified forbearance and moderation." But within a 
matter of weeks this dignified moderation became a much 
1. 'bispatches of Viscount Hardinge~ Quarterly Review, 
No. 78, 1846, p. 215. 
2. Lumsden, P. s. and Elsmie, G. R., Lumsden of the 
Guides, London, John Murray, 1899, p. 23. 
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firmer line and Hardinge carne much closer to actual annexa-
tion, when, in October 1846, there was an insurrection in 
Kashmir when Shaikh Irnan-ud-din refused to carry out the 
transfer of Kashmir to Ghulab Singh. Thus, "without an hour's 
hestitation the Governor-General declared that the treaty 
must be enforced by British troops."l 
It is significant that this insurrection was acted upon 
"without an hour's hesitation" while the insurrection at 
Multan only a few months later did not receive attention for 
over six months. One can only assume that it was convenient 
to let the Multan revolt erupt into something bigger. 
The Kashmir issue was significant in that it justified, 
in Hardinge's view, a crucial revision of the Treaty of 
Lahore. Hardinge wrote to the Secret Committee: 
• the course which may be open to the British 
Government to take • • would be to carry on the 
government at Lahore in the name of the Maharaja 
during his minority, a period of about eight years, 
placing a British minister at the head of the 
governrnent.2 
Thus in a matter of a few months British influence over 
the Punjab had been expanded from an occupation of one year 
to a virtual control for a period of eight years. The new 
treaty provided for a Regency Council, presided over by 
Henry Lawrence and also that a British garrison would remain 
Ln Lahore till the Maharaja carne of age. 
1. Hardinge, op. cit.~ p. 147. 
2. Ibid, p. 149. 
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It was considered necessary that this new arrangement be 
honoured not only by the consent but by the invitation of 
the g h ost Durbar , for Hardinge wrote on December 10 , 1846, a 
week before the signing of the new treaty, " it is important 
that the proposal should originate with them. " 1 
This was to be Hardinge's last act in the conquest of 
the Punjab for the actual takeover was to be effected by Lord 
Dalhousie. But before he left there were indications of 
friction with the S ikhs for on April 29, 1847, Henry Lawrence 
reported: 
Sikh character may dictate the attempt to escape 
from under foreign yoke . . a British army cannot 
garrison Lahore , and the fiat of a British functionary 
cannot supercede that of the Durbar throughout the 
land, without our presence being considered a burden 
and a yoke.2 
In January, 1844 , Hardinge was relieved by Dalhousie and 
before the year was over the Punjab was to become a British 
province and the frontier pushed to the mountains of the 
North West. 
There is one slight misconception concerning the strength 
of t h e Indian army at Hardinge's retirement. Roberts states 
that the Indian army was vastly reduced after the First Sikh 
1. Hardinge to Currie, December 10 , 1846 , quoted in Singh, 
A History of the Sikhs, Vol~ II, p. 160. 
2. Lee-Warner, Sir William, The Life of the Marquis of 
Dalhousie , London, Macmillan and company, 1904 , Vol. II, p. 149. 
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war, reduced, in fact, by about 50,000. While this is true, 
it is important to remember that it concerns the total pic-
ture of the army in India; the situation on the North West 
area was considerably different. In fact the garrison on the 
North West Frontier had been doubled. On the Sutlej there 
were 50,000 men with 60 guns; at Firozpur, 10,000 men, and at 
Lahore, 9,000 men. When the insurrection subsequently broke 
out at Multan Lord Gough had an ample force for the operations 
which followed.l 
Within a few months of Dalhousie's arrival, the situation 
which was to decide the future of the Punjab broke out at 
Multan. 
Dalhousie's action concerning this outbreak provoked con-
troversy; but it appears that his actions were calculated to 
use this outbreak to justify annexation, for the unrest gave 
Dalhousie the opportunity to reorientate British thinking to-
wards the Durbar. 
The trouble at Multan apparently started because the 
Governor, Mulraj, was dissatisfied with his share of the rev-
enue and threatened to resign. Thereupon Lahore appointed 
Sadar Khan Singh Man to succeed him, with Vans Agnew and 
Lieutenant Anderson as Political Agents. Upon their arrival 
1. Hardinge, op. cit., p. 169. 
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the British officers were assaulted, but their last dispatches 
exonerated Mulraj. Vans Agnew wrote: "I don't think Mulraj 
had anything to do with it. I was riding with him when we 
were attacked " 1 ; similarly Herbert Edwardes wrote to the 
Lahore Resident , " I think Mulraj has been involved in rebel-
lion against his will. " 2 In any case, the next day after the 
assault Anderson and Vans Agnew were murdered by a mob at 
Multan. 
Henry Lawrence, who opposed annexation, was of the opinion 
that the outbreak at Multan should be put down immediately; 
and wrote to Dalhousie telling him what he would have done in 
such a case. 3 Likewise John Lawrence was of the same opinion: 
if we do nothing [he declared] the whole of the 
disbanded soldiery of the Manji will flock down 
and make common cause with the mutineers.4 
Junior officers, whose enthusiasm exceeded their sense 
of political scheming, cried for immediate action. For 
example, Peter Lumsden wrote: 
The example of one successful attempt is likely 
to lead to a dozen others, and unsettled mens minds, 
making them doubt the power of our government, 
which should always be felt to be irresistible, as 
well as available at all seasons of the year, 
l. Quoted in Edwardes, H., A Year on the Punjab Frontier, 
London, R. Bentley, 1851, Vol. II, p. 68. 
2. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 100. 
3. Henry Lawrence to Lord Dalhousie, October, 1848, quoted 
in Edwardes, The Necessary Hell, p. 110. 
4. John Lawrence to H. M. Elliot, quoted in Ibid, p. 111. 
should people once take it into their .heads that 
we cannot act in the hot weather, we shall soon have 
lots of summer campaigns. Had Lawrence been at our 
head we should have been in Multan at this time.l 
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However, this delay, for which Dalhousie was being cri-
ticized, was exactly what he wanted for according to S. S. 
Thorburn, " the Government of India had decided to let the Punjab 
abscess come to a head, and when ripe, to lance it freely. n 2 
As early as the 4th of May the Governor General had been 
informed of the insurrection, but he and the Commander-in-
Chief hesitated, giving as a reason that action was impossible 
in the hot season,. but, " they were conscious of the fact that 
they might have to be prepared for any outbreak and the de-
fection of allies. 'l 3 
Only Herbert Edwardes took immediate action and attacked 
Mulraj at Multan, fearing that Mulraj would summon the hill 
tribes to an insurrection around Dera Shazi Khan. Edwardes 
is a rather pathetic figure in his effort to save the Empire, 
for he was unaware of his superior's policy, since 
the policy of deliberate inactivity did not percolate 
down to the junior officers among whom the most 
enterprising was Lt. Edwardes.4 
1. Lumsden and Elsmie, op. cit., p. 51. 
2. Thorburn, S. S., The Panjab in Peace and War, Edin-
burgh, William Blackwood and Sons, 1904, p. 101. 
3. Lee-Warner, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 156. 
4. Singh, A History of the Sikhs, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 72. 
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While Edwardes started the siege of Multan, the revolt 
was spreading. The Maharani was corresponding with Mulraj 
and was attempting to stir up mutiny, for 
regiments had been approached and agreed to a gen-
eral uprising that was to mark the end of British 
rule in the Panjab. Moreover a date for the up-
rising had been fixed.l 
While Lord Gough and Dalhousie hesitated, Currie, the 
Resident at Lahore, decided to act on his own and sent Gen-
eral Whish towards Multan to assist Edwardes in the siege. 
On September 4, Whish issued a proclamation for the sur-
render of Multan, and while plans were being made for a siege, 
Sher Singh and 7,000 men went over to Mulraj.2 
At the same time the Sikh leaders enetered into an alli-
ance with Dost Mohammed " buying his aid with the surrender 
of Peshawar. " 3 
Dalhousie had hesitated, waiting for the situation to 
become such that British public opinion and the Company di-
rectors would support his actions. For Hobhouse had written 
to Dalhousie saying that the action of Mulraj had not pro-
duced a sensation in England. 4 Apparently jingoism was at 
l. Cork, OE· cit., p. 42. 
2. Lee-Warner, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 169. 
3. Roberts, op. cit., p. 342. 
4. Lee-Warner, O;E• cit., Vol. II, p. 170. 
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a low ebb in England and the murder of two British officers 
did not justify another war. 
However , the defection of Sher Singh was significant ; 
for , " the event was the turning point in the rebellion , " 1 and 
indicated to Dalhousie that the time had come to justify 
preparations for large scale war. 
Events were now mov ing rapidly ; the Rani had sent ernis-
saries to Kabul, Kandahar, Kashmir, Jammu and Rajputana while 
Dost Mohammed moved his troops to Jalalabad. About the same 
time that Sher Singh went over to Mulraj, Sher Singh's brother, 
Chattar Singh in Hazara , carne out in defiance of John 
Nicholson, "while from village to village throughout the 
Panjab went the call to the Khalsa. " 2 
The uprising was n o w a national one which was exactly 
what Dalhousie wanted, for he stated on September 18 , 1848: 
The insurrection in Hazara has made great head 
. I should wish nothing better . . I can see 
no escape from the necessity of annexing this in-
fernal country . I have drawn the sword and 
this time thrown away the scabbard.3 
Hard i ng e e xpresse d his support by saying 
The energy and turbulent spirit of the 
Sikhs are stated by one section of politicians 
1. Ibid, p. 172. 
2. Cork, op. cit. , p. 46. 
3. Baird, J. G. A. , Private Letters of the Marquis of 
Dalhousie , Edinburgh and London , W. Bla ckwood , l9ll, p. 33. 
here as ground for not annexing, ln ~X ju~g~ent 
this is the argument which would dispose me, if 
I were on the spot, to annex~l 
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I The sword was drawn, the scabbard thrown away~ and on 
February 22; 1849, the last battle for the advanced frontier 
was fought at Gugrat. Then a month later, March 29r 1849, 
annexation of the Punjab was declared. 
Th e struggle which had begun almost half a century 
before was now completed,. 11 a momentus step which finally 
carried the frontiers of British India to their natural limits, 
the base of the mountians of Afghanistan." 2 The outside 
force now augmented the strength of Rome as vassals. 
l. Hunter, W. W., The Marquis of Dalhousie,. Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1890, p. 83. 
2. Roberts, op~ ~it.~ p. 344. 
Chapter V 
TWO FRONTIER SYSTEMS 
After the annexation of Sind in 1843 and of the Punjab 
in 1849, the British administrators turned their attention 
to the problems of the defence of the North West Frontier. 
The real history of the frontier begins after the annexations, 
for '' British India had for the first time touched its natural 
limits • . the true policy for the frontier dates from this 
point, '' 1 and the frontier itself becomes the centre of 
attraction. 
Since the frontier problem was always a juxtaposition of 
local and imperial concerns the first problem to be solved 
was that of fixing and defining the frontier, then administer-
ing it. In the two recently acquired territories two distinct 
schools of thought evolved concerning frontier administration; 
the Sind System and the Punjab System. Each had its dis-
tinctive characteristics, each created frontier heroes and 
each system had its champions, but both were primarily con-
cerned with finding the best defensible line for the protection 
of India. This c hapter will be concerned with a description 
1. Morison , op~ cit., p. 184. 
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of the nature and mechanics of each system, their objectives, 
and an assessment of the degree to which each realized these 
objectives. 
The differences in the two systems may be generally ac-
counted for by natural as well as human factors. The systems 
were determined in part by the size and nature of the res-
pective terrains, in part by the temperament of the tribes 
that had to be administered, and the temperament of the 
administrator. 
The territory of Sind was much smaller than that of the 
Punjab, exposing a much short~r frontier and a much easier 
one to traverse. Specifically: 
At the point where the Panjab meets Sind the 
Western mountain barrier recedes from the Indus 
Valley, curving round to enclose the Kelat prov~ 
ince of Kachhi, a plain some six thousand square 
miles in extent, and separated from Upper Sind by a 
desert twenty or thirty miles across. The southern 
edge of this desert was generally recognized as 
the boundard between the territories of Kelat to 
the north and the Mirs of Hyderabad to the south. 
Sind in fact extended as far as the waters of the 
Indus would reach in their annual innundation.l 
Sind was only important because the easiest passes 
through the mountain barrier were approached across Sind, 2 
1. Lambrick, H. T., John Jacob of Jacobabad, London, 
Cassell, 1960, p. 33. 
2. Muir, R., The Making of British India, Manchester, 
University Press, 1923, p. 307. 
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therefore practically all of the activity of the Sind System 
was concerned with this Upper Sind province of Kachhi, which 
controlled the access routes to the principal pass, the Bolan. 
Kachhi is described thusly: 
The physical aspects of this flat country is 
tame and depressing even now • • • Kachhi still re-
mains, and may always remain, much as it was in 1839, 
a burnt up dusty plain of reddish brown earth, di-
versified by sandhills and low scrub jungle here and 
there, and intersected by the beds of occasional 
torrents from the hills that hem it in on three 
sides. The fertility of the soil is discounted by 
want of water, the crops depending on precarious 
rainfall,l 
North of Kachhi lay the mountains and the vital approaches 
to India: Quetta, the Bolan, and Kandahar. To the south it 
was insulated by a desert, pictured as: 
Kachhi was little better than a desert. Yet 
it was favoured land compared with Sind. No more 
forbidding region exists than those two thousand 
square miles of emptiness; a dead brown level of 
indurated soil not only devoid of animal life or 
vegetation in any form, but unrelieved by the 
slightest irregularity in the ground. Here, as 
nowhere else but on a calm sea, the curvature of 
the earth is plain to the eye; here the travellers 
tales are everyday realities--the dust storm which 
turns day into fearful night; the mirage in which 
a few bones assume the semblance of a walled city, 
and salt crystals a blue lake, the simoon beneath 
whose poisonous blast the springs of life are 
dried up and man or horse fall back and shrivelled 
in their tracks. From March to October the whole 
tract--Kachhi, the desert, and Upper Sind swelters 
under heat indescribable; the unrelenting sun has 
drained the country of colour, half tones only 
' 1. Lambrick, John Ja~ob of Jacobabad, op. cit., p. 35. 
remain, the dull grey green of the tamarisk, the 
grey brown of the inhospitable hills and the dun 
of the parched earth.l 
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Along the southern fringe of this desert lay the " Sind 
Frontier, " but the wardens of this march would always look 
beyond the desert~ beyond the mountains, to Kandahar, and 
the Afghan Plateau for the real defensible line of India. 
The Sind frontier and the Punjab frontier had one factor 
in common, neither had been successfully administered by 
their previous masters. Before the British neither the 
Talpur Amirs in S i nd nor Ranjit Singh in the Punjab had had 
any degree of success in controlling their frontiers. The 
Talpur s had only hired Baluchis of one tribe to guard their 
borders against Baluchis of another. The Talpur Amirs had 
adopted another policy towards the tribes which was likewise 
practiced on the Punjab frontier. Blackmail, or subsidies 
paid to the tribes, was practiced and in some cases found to 
be less expensive than military pressure. 
This feature of frontier administration, though adopt ed 
by the British somewhat reluctantly, was practiced on both 
frontiers. However, this particular policy of playing tribe 
off against tribe was more a feature of the Napier adminis-
tration before the appearance of John Jacob, and thus before 
t h e actual formulation of the Sind " System. " 
1. Ibid, p. 3 6 . 
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Although the Sind System~ per se, did not properly 
evolve until the mid~l840's, after annexation, this particu-
lar frontier was an area of concern for the British as early 
as 1838 when, during the First Afghan War the Bolan route 
was the avenue of conquest. Conflict with the tribes of this 
area was an important secondary feature of the conduct of 
the war itself. The interrelationship of frontier policy 
and imperial policy made itself apparent first of all on the 
Upper Sind frontier where valuable experience was painfully 
learned which determined later policy. 
As we have seen, British convoys through the Bolan had 
been attacked by the tribes with an alarming degree of success. 
As Lambrick explains: 
. it seemed incredible that bands so few in 
number could be so ubiquitous and come such dis-
tances over the pathless desert. The Dombki and 
Jakhrani raiders were tribes of horsemen who 
thought nothing of covering sixty miles without a 
halt~ to arrive at daybreak at the rendezvous . 
their retrea~ through the intense heat of the day, 
soon distanced all pursuit . . the Baluch is indeed 
well fitted by constitution and physique to per-
form such feats of endurance. No race in the 
world can endure without water for such long hours 
under a burning sun.l 
To the north-east and east of the desert lay the lands 
of the Marris, centered about Kahan, and the Bugtis of Dera. 
1. Ibid, p. 35. 
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Here was a mountain mass which formed a bastion to the Bolan 
route. Here 
the characteristics of India's great western 
Barrier are found in all their frimness, sharp 
foothills rising from a wilderness of drift sand1 
long stony plateaux intersected by water courses 
full of boulders and shingle1 ranges thrusting 
up almost perpendicularly and deeply cleft by 
avulsion, or the passage of torrents; naked saddle-
backs scored by innumerable ravines.l 
Here the Marris and Bugtis, nominally vassals of the 
Khan of Kalat, enjoyed a stormy independence and with the 
reputation of being invincible on their own ground, threatened 
the approaches to the Bolan. Consequently to control the 
Marris and Bugtis, Major Billamore led the first hill cam-
paign on the Sind frontier. This 1839 campaign was John 
Jacob's first. In it he made his reputation as a swordsman, 
he learned of handling cavalry and the problems of transport 
and an insight into the qualities of the Baluch tribesman, 
their methods of warfare and the workings of their minds. 
In October of 1841 a cornerstone of British frontier 
policy in Sind was allied with the signing of a treaty between 
the British Government and the Khan of Kelat. In this par-
ticular treaty the Khan acknowledged Shah Shuja and agreed 
to be guided by British advice and conceded the British the 
right to station troops in his territory. In return Kachhi 
l. Ibid, p. 40~ 
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was returned to him but the valley of Quetta remained in 
British possession. Although this particular treaty was 
short lived, it would be revived, for the Sind System was 
based in part on an alliance with the Khan of Kelat. This 
particular characteristic of alliance with a power beyond 
the border was a feature of the Sind System not shared by 
the Punjab System. 
At about the same time Jacob was promoted to the command 
of the Sind Irregualr Horse and significantly one of his 
first duties was to survey the " high road " from Shikarpur to 
Dadar~ the line to the Bolan. 
After the British reverses at Kabul, affairs on the 
Upper Sind frontier became more critical. Thus the Sind 
Irregular Horse was to guard the frontier from Sibi to 
Shikarpur, a distance of approximately 120 miles, with 475 
officers and men plus auxiliaries of Jakhrani and Dombki. 
This characteristic of employing tribal horsemen became a per-
manent feature of the Jacob system. To keep open the high 
road, Headquarters was established at Chattar, but Jacob ack-
nowledged Outram's foresight, that a defeat in Afghanistan would 
mean falling back from the forward position at Quetta back to 
the desert. 
If we have to evacuate Afghanistan [Outram pre-
dicted] I think it very probable the desert will be our 
boundary hereafter and Khangar [later Jacobabad] our 
frontier post.l 
1. Outram to Jacob, February 4, 1842, quoted in Lambrick, 
~ohn Jacob of Jacobabad, p. 59. 
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Following the Afghan War came the annexation of Sind. 
One argument against annexation was that a large number of 
troops would have to be exposed to guard the new frontier 
since there had been renewed plundering by the Dombki and 
Jakhrani. With the conquest the policing of the border 
beyond Shikarpur became the permanent responsibility of the 
British. However, as Lambrick says, 
Sir Charles Napier did not yet understand the 
character of the independent tribes of Kachhi. 
He seems to have assumed that his own prestige 
as conqueror of Sind was in itself almost enough 
to overawe the border robbers.l 
With renewed raiding Napier's policy was to turn tribe 
against tribe. Jacob described this type of policy as 
the most pernicious policy that could be adopted 
for securing the frontier, the practice of 
private warfare and the perpetuation of blood 
feuds were the main causes of its chronic disorder. 2 
Napier also initiated the policy of transferring inhabi-
tants from one area to another, but this only exposed the 
frontier to further raiding. Part of the problem causing 
the unrest on the frontier at this time was the personality 
of Napier and the fact that each frontier post had bo be 
in correspondence with Karachi. Individual officers were 
allowed little initiative, thus, 
This crushing of the initiative of officers in 
command of isolated detachments in the face of 
1,. Ibid, p. 109. 
2. Ibid~ p. 111. 
a cunning and vigilant enemy could have only 
one result.l 
ll9 
In December of l846 the Bugtis made the biggest raid 
into Sind ever known. Over l 1 500 Bugtis raided Sind and 
took lO,OOO cattle. They raided well within British posts, 
going within fifteen miles of Shikarpur. British troops 
were ineffective, particularly the strong post at Shahpur.2 
Thu s the Napier policy had had little success. He 
had built forts and posted detachments on the frontier but 
they were not effective. There was only one option left to 
Napier: 
• one body of troops, one man under his command, 
on whom he coul d depend not only to retrieve the 
disaster, but to solve the whole frontier problem 
for him. On December 20, l846, Jacob and the 
First Regiment of the Sind Irregular Horse left 
Hyderabad.3 
This was a turning point in the history of the Sind 
frontier, for 
until the arrival of Major John Jacob and the 
Scinde Irregular Horse in January l847 no effi-
cient protection had been afforded to British 
subjects along this exposed frontier.4 
In the period January to October l847 Jacob established 
himself on the Upper Sind frontier and revolutionized 
l. Ibid~ p. l26. 
2. Lambrick, Sir ~harles Napier and Sind, op. cit., p. 304. 
3. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, op. cit., p. l27. 
4. Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier, 
op. cit., p. 20. 
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Napier's system and established relative peace and a working 
system of frontier administration. Upon his arrival he 
established his headquarters at the then desolate post of 
Khangarh. 
Immediately he began to convince the · authorities to 
increase his personal authority. Colonel Forbes at Shik-
arpur placed all outposts under his command, giving him 
authority to destroy any marauders but not to enter the 
territories of the Khan of Kelat.l 
In his defensive arrangement he established five out-
posts: Rojhan, Khangarh, Mubarakpur, Mirpur, and Shahpur; 
moving the commanders outpost from Shikarpur to Khangarh. 
In the area to the westward of Rojhan the Camel Corps in 
Larkhana was responsible. Also a strong British force was 
established at Kashmar. Jacob was in direct command of the 
first five named posts and later moved the Mubarakpur out-
post to Gorhi Del Murad, retaining Baluch horsemen to watch 
the watering places between Murad and the hills. Jacob now 
established what was really the heart of his system, a 
system of patrols from all outposts, night and day along 
the frontier into Burdeka and up to the skirts of the hills. 
1. 
p. 13 4. 
Lambrick, John Jacob of JacobabadrQP~ ~i¢., 
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Although it was described as an energetic system of close 
border counter raiding1 Jacob's policy was not based entirely 
o n force. Rather he hoped to raise the moral and material 
status of the tribes by providing useful channels for their 
energies, for example the policy of enlisting some tribesmen. 
Part of the reason for Jacob's success was the fact 
that he was allowed so much personal responsibility. How-
ever, when Napier was replaced by Pringle there was a danger 
of his power being reduced, with political authority being 
placed in the h and s of the collector at Shikarpur. On this 
Jacob wrote to his immediate superior in the fall of 1847: 
Were I to wait for instructions from the collector 
at Shikarpur the whole country might be plundered 
before anything could be done to prevent it . 
I must have political and descretionary authority 
or I am powerless.2 
Actually Jacob's powers were increased rather than de-
creased for the Governor in Council wrote : 
[it is] most desirable the Major Jacob should be 
entirely trusted with the protection of the fron-
tier, and that our relations with the plundering 
tribes should be confided to his superintendence. 
[I am] therefore pleased to appoint him Political 
Superintendent as well as Commandant of the Scinde 
Frontier.3 
1. 
1958 ' p. 
Caroe , 0., The Pathans, New York, St. Martins Press, 
330. 
2. Quoted in Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, p. 148. 
3. Quoted in Ibid, p. 149. 
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During this question of authority Jacob elaborated on his 
tribal philosophy, and its result. He wrote: 
They [the tribesmen] have taken to cultivating 
their fields ~ . with as good a will as if they 
had been agriculturists all their lives. How has 
this been done? By my having made the business of 
a lootoo disreputable and unlucky as well as 
dangerous.l 
Jacob was given both his regiments on the frontier and 
held the entire line of outposts with full magisterial and 
political authority, and the right to make all arrangements 
with Kelat and Khairpur. On the British side of the border 
the carrying of arms without permit was prohibited and a 
persistent steady quiet stream of patrols broke down the 
habits of private warfare. 
By 1848 the frontier line of Upper Sind was established 
and defended. New posts were established at Tangwana, Kandhkot 
and Bandani in Burdeka. The frontier was now about 120 miles 
long and employed Khosa, Jakhrani, Dombki, and Chandia tribes-
men as guides. The outposts absorbed about 360 men (3 per 
mile) , plus guides, plus 1,000 men at headquarters at Jacobabad 
(formerly Khangarh) • Posts were approximately fifteen miles 
apart. 
In spite of minor incidents during the Second Sikh War, 
Jacob was able to report by the end of 1850, 
1. Quoted in Ibid, p. 151. 
the adventurous kind of life which the guarding 
of this frontier implied some years ago has now 
settled down into a regular routine , and the 1 
country is profoundly quiet along the whole border. 
In 1850 Dalhousie had written to Jacob asking for a 
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report on his system. In reply Jacob considered the salient 
features as being : the change from a defensive to an of-
fensive policy ; the disarming of the country ; the treatment 
of British subjects and foreigners as equally guilty when 
detected in marauding ; and the regular system of patrolling. 
Perpetual vigilance was a vital element , for 
my Beloochee Scouts give timely information of 
everyting stirring . . every strange footstep 
on the border is certain to be speedily reported 
to one or other of the posts and to be immediately 
followed.2 
Later Jacob denunciated the Punjab System on the grounds 
that it was a strictly defensive method ; the troops were 
prote cted by fortifications ; the people were encouraged to 
bear arms ; attacks in retaliation on hill men were welcomed ; 
and the exertion of moral influence on the tribes had not 
been considered. 3 
Although much of the success of the Sind System is ex-
plained by the relatively short distance which had to be 
l. Jacob to his brother (in England) Circa , December , 1850, 
quoted in Ibid, p. 164. 
2. Jacob to Dalhousie , August, 1850 , quoted in Ibid, p. 165. 
3. Lambrick , John Jacob of Jacobabad, p. 170. 
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patrolled and the nature o~ the terrain which was ideally 
suited to the type of patrolling instigated by Jacob, per~ 
haps more of the answer is found in the personality of 
Jacob and the makeup of the Sind Irregular Horse. The 
force was well officered, well armed, and well equipped 
with a high degree of mobility and excellent arrangements 
for transport. 
Apart from transforming the land by irrigation and 
canal systems and transforming the people by encouraging 
pacific occupations, Jacob never lost sight of the Imperial 
consideration in the context of local affairs. Nor did he 
visualize the defence of India depending upon the Sind 
frontier, rather he planned and built with the purpose of 
advancing the defensive line beyond the Sind frontier to 
the Afghan Plateau. 
Roads were built ostensibly to promote commerce, but 
moreso to facilitate rapid movement of troops and military 
stores. By 1852, 330 miles of road work had been com-
pleted with 159 bridges. Roads "forty-five feet wide, 
with trenches at the side, and running straight from village 
to village " l were perhaps more than adequate for trade 
in a land where commerce was minimal and wheeled transport 
practi~~lly UQkQown~ but ideal for military movements along 
" 
1. Ibid, p. 244. 
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the Indus and up the avenues to the mountain passes. 
Likewise a project for bridging the Indus between 
sukku r and Rohri would facilitate the movement of troops 
from anywhere along the length of the Indus road up to 
Jacobabad and Sibi and Quetta.l 
Furthermore, when the Sind Railway Company was promoted 
in 1855 and encouraged by Sir Bartle Frere with the idea to 
connect Karachi with the Indus, the question of alignment 
was opened by Jacob who proposed that the alignment should 
be decided with an eye to the " trade route '' through the 
Bolan. 2 Most of Jacob's schemes to improve the condition 
of the country likewise facilitated the rapid transit of 
troops to the Afghan Plateau. Likewise Frere urged railway 
building, for while the army could be reduced by one third, 
increased mobility would make a smaller force as effective 
as the larger one had been. 3 After the Mutiny particularly, 
the necessity of railroads was realized and the High Com-
rnand decided to build some main lines which would make 
transport of troops and material easy. 4 
1.. Ibid, p. 297. 
2 . Ibid, p. 297. 
3. Gopal, s., British Policy in India, Cambridge, 
University Press, 1965, p. 53. 
4. Panikkar, K. M .. , Relations of Indian States With the 
Government of India, London, Martin Hopkinson, 1927, p. 79. 
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Actually Jacob was anticipating Lord Curzon's advice 
to Sir Donald Stewart years later. 
I want [Curzon stated] to have all our troops 
ready when we call upon them for the big things 
instead of being wasted on the small things. Easy 
lines of advance~ troops ready to march without 
delay~ and light railways to hurry on their trans-
port from the base • • . these seem to be the 
principles at which we should aim.l 
The Sind System, unlike the Punjab System, was depend-
ent on maintaining a relationship with a power beyond its 
frontier. This relationship, combined with a system of 
patrolling was designed to keep the frontier quiet and 
enable a British advance up to a more defensible line be-
yond the Bolan. 
Thus~ in 1854 a new treaty was concluded with the 
~han of Kelat arranging for a subsidy of Rs. 50,000 annually 
to the Khan for which he would undertake to oppose the 
enemies of the British and act in subordinate co-operation 
with it. Most significantly the British authorities were 
to be at liberty to station troops anywhere in the state 
that they thought fit. This arrangement coincided nicely 
with Jacob's transportation arrangements. Furthermore, 
the Khan bound himself and his successors to prevent 
plundering in or near British territory and to protect the 
passage of merchants between that territory and 
1. Edwardes, M. High Noon of Empire, London, Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1965, p. 65. 
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Afghanistan. 1 Thus the British had a route guaranteed to 
the Afghan Plateau and could move freely through the passesp 
That the Sind frontier was never meant to be a de-
fensive line but merely a means to ensuring an advance to 
the ideal defensive line of India was admitted by Jacob 
during the Persian War of 1856. When Canning asked Jacob's 
opinion on defensive and offensive matters, Jacob proposed 
a defensive stance not on the Sind frontier but at Quetta. 
He advised the establishment of a large cantonment there 
with the reserves of Baluchistan available and amongst 
friendly people. The road to the Bolan could be improved 
and linked wi t h the Sind frontier with a railroad eventually, 
from Dadar to the Indus. A good force at Quetta, guaranteed 
by the treaty, with good communications, guaranteed by the 
patrols and transport system would 11 in Jacob's words_, "give 
us complete command of Afghanistan, without at the same 
time our giving offence to anyone around us. '12 
Thus the Sind System was not merely a local scheme for 
dealing with local problems but part of the whole scheme of 
Imperial consideration and falls into place with the search 
for a defensible frontier. The Sind System guaranteed the 
feas~b~l~t.:¥: .Qf an <;,idvance to Quetta and a defensive line on 
..... 
1. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, ~p~ cit., p. 260. 
2. J acob to Ca nning, June 30, 1852, quoted in Ibid, 
p . 304. 
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the Afghan Plateau and thus anticipated the '' scientific 
frontier n some twenty1:"'\five years before the second " for-
ward policy . .. 
Thus in the local context as well as the Imperial 
context the Sind System has to be considered as being vastly 
more successful than the Punjab System. 
Turning our attention now to the Punjab frontier, we 
see first of all that the Sind frontier was only a minia-
ture world in comparison to the world of the Punjab frontier~ 
The Punjab frontier was much longer and presented far more 
difficulty in the nature of the topography. 
The specific limits of the Punjab frontier were: 
• from the top of the Khagan Glen (a dependency 
of Hazara) near Chilas on the north-west corner 
of Kashmir, then passes round the north-west 
boundary of Hazara to Torbela; crossing the Indus 
it winds round the north and north-western 
boundary of the Peshawar valley to the Khaibar 
Pass. From there it skirts the Afridi hills, 
and follows the north-west boundary of the 
Kohat district along the Miranzai Valley to 
Thal. Turning to the east it encloses the 
Waziri hills and then runs almost due south 
at the base of the Suleiman Range to a point 
near Kasmor on the Indus, on the borders of 
Sind.l 
This in effect was the old Sikh boundary described by 
Pal as: 
1. Paget, W. H., and Masonr A. H., A Record of the 
Expeditions Against the North West Frontier Tribes, London, 
Whiting and Co., 1884, p. 3. 
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starting from a barrier of snowy peaks from lS,OOO 
to 20,000 feet high in Kashmir, the British fron-
tier line ran south west to the Indus, followed 
the river round the Bonair hills, bent westward 
to circuit the Peshawar plain, made a loop to 
avoid the Kohat Pass~ and then ran in a generally 
southern direction at the foot of the higher ranges 
to near Mithankot where the frontier of the Panjab 
ended.l 
In the Punjab there appeared to be two possible choices 
for the frontier line, either the Indus or the frontier 
running along the foot of the hills. Initially Lawrence 
preferred the former~ He wrote on October 2l, l858: 
From Kalabagh northwards the frontier line 
should be the river Indus instead of the base of 
the hill ranges and we should cede Peshawar and 
Kohat districts to the Afghan government • 
the river itself is a might barrier, being broad, 
deep, and rapid. The line of the river is far 
shorter than the present frontier line and there-
fore defensible at a far less cost in every 
respect. In the rear of the line there are 
several salubrious places eminently fitted for 
the location of European troops. On the present 
frontier many fortified places are necessary. 
Although the points at which an invader could 
emerge from the passes are known, yet we must 
hold in strength not only these points but the 
whole line, owing to the character of the hill 
tribes.2 
Although Lawrence is generally pictured as having ab-
solute faith in the Indus line he did concede that advance 
could be made from it~ obviously towards the mountain passes. 
l. Pal, D., The Administration of Sir John Lawrence 
in India, Simla, Minerva Book Shop, l952, p. l74. 
1858 , 
2. Punjab Goverment to Government of India, October 2l, 
as quo~ea in Ibid , p. l79. 
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He wrote continuing the October 21 letter: 
In the event of invasion ·we need not copfine our~ 
selves to the defense of the Indus line, 
offensive measures might be combined with defen-
sive at the descretion of the General of the Day. 1 
However, the policy of the Indus frontier was rejected 
because military authorities felt that a river is generally 
not a good line of defence since it can easily be forced. 2 
Eventually Lawrence became convinced that the old Sikh ad-
ministrative line had certain advantages; nevertheless, he 
was opposed to any forward move beyond the trans-Indus hills. 
The foot of the hills offered a well defined line, but 
once the hills were entered it would be difficult to know 
where to stop. The plains could be easily overrun and held 
and might respond to improved administration; but the 
mountain tracts of the North~West were difficult to traverse 
and subdue, and even if subdued, administration would be 
difficult. 
However, there was one decided disadvantage to the foot-
hill line as a strategical line. The value of a barrier 
such as a mountain range depends upon commanding both sides 
of the points of passage, and the power to operate on either 
side of the obstacle. Otherwise the mountain barrier acts 
as an obstruction, masking and protecting an enemy operating 
on the far side. 
1. Ibid: p. 17 5. 
2. Curzon, Frontiers, op. cit. 
l3l 
However~ the British took over the frontier districts 
from the Sikhs and accepted an ill~defined administrative 
boundary. The Sikh frontier administration had been of 
the loosest type with little influence in the trans-Indus 
tracts. What little authority they did have was confined 
to the plains, and even here their authority had only been 
o beyed in the immediate vicinity of their forts. Thus, 
" on the Panjab frontier the British succeeded to a heritage 
of anarchy."l 
In general the British policy adopted in the frontier 
region of the Punjab was not unlike that of Ranjit Singh, 
which was described as 
a 'tip and run' policy, i.e., when any particular 
tribe became too aggressive~ committing too many 
raids, a military column went into the country, 
inflicted whatever damage it could and came out 
again. The mountaineers were kept down by a mov-
able column constantly in the field.2 
Furthermore, the centres of British defence likewise 
followed the pattern established by Ranjit Singh, and 
the most important part of his plan of defence was 
connected with the acquisition of Tank, Bannu, 
and Dera Ismail Khan. Dera Ismail Khan established 
a connection along the banks of the Indus with 
Pe~h~w~r ~~ ' 
l. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 450. 
2. Sinha, Ranjit Singh, op. cit., p. 109. 
3. Ibid, p. lll. 
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In addition he held Bannu , Kohat and Peshawar. His frontier 
policy, limited in success, depended on a chain of frontier 
1 forts : Nara, Darum, Maru, Satana , Machin , Sikham , Kairbad , 
2 
Jahangira , Shabkadur , Attoack, Manshera , Nawasahr, and Haripur. 
Limited as Ranjit's influence was , perhaps he did grasp 
the realities of the frontier situation. In terms of com-
parison with Sind , perhaps it was not reasonable to expect 
the same results. For under the Ranjit Singh regime 
the authority of the Lahore, government was always 
admitted and often asserted, but subject to that 
admission the people were left to wrangle among 
themselves and to settle their own disputes with 
sword and daggar . tribal authority was relied 
on to keep society together and prevent anarchy.3 
Likewise , Lawrence's objectives in this area were limited , 
as compared to Sind. It was, as Morison explains 
useless to suppose that unbroken peach could be 
maintained , success meant lowering the average 
of tribal raids and wars and limiting their scope 
by resolute and immediate action.4 
Henry Lawrence expressed this limited scope of 
aspirations: 
It is not to be expected that such a frontier can 
1. Chhabra, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 70. 
2. Ibid , p. 7 0. 
3. Sinha, Ranjit Singh, op. cit., p. 114. 
4. Morison, J. L., Lawrence of Lucknow, London , G. Bell 
and Sons , 1934, p. 188. 
ever be what is called quiet, but it is quite in 
our power to prevent it becoming dangerous.l 
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At any rate, the Punjab frontier was arranged for admin-
istrative purposes in roughly the same manner as that adopted 
by the Sikhs. There were six districts: Hazara, Peshawar, 
Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan, each of 
which had a longer border to defend than the whole of the Sind 
frontier. Hazara and Kohat were hilly and mountainous while 
the other four were almost level plains broken by deep ravines 
and torrent beds. 2 
Most of the credit for organizing the military defence of 
3 the frontier goes to Sir Henry Lawrence. He created the 
Punjab Irregular Force, which was aided by the Guides. This 
force was entrusted with the defence of the frontier except 
for Peshawar. The Punjab Irregular Force was under a Briga-
dier General who was subject to the control of the Civil 
Government of the Punjab while the Peshawar division was 
under the Commander in Chief of the Army of India. This sys-
tern of mixed command was criticized by the Commander in Chief, 
but the idea was defended by the Punjab authorities since it 
allowed action without delay, which was exactly the situation 
enjoyed by Jacob in Sind. 
1. Henry Lawrence to Lord Stanley, March 31, 1853, quoted 
in Morison, "From Burnes to Roberts, " p. 186. 
2. Paget and Mason, op. cit., p. 4. 
3. Pal, op. cit., p. 175. 
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The Punjab Irregular Force and, more particularly 
the Guides,were patterned after the Sind Irregular Horse. 
During the First Afghan War, Henry Lawrence had seen the 
difficulties the army encountered in the mountains and 
passes amongst the hill tribes, hence, "he resolved that 
there should be men accustomed to every region and familiar 
with every dialect. " 1 
There was a common element in the Sind and Punjab Sys-
terns that was at the same time a source of strength and a 
vital weakness; namely, the part played by the strength of 
the character of the individual. Personalities were more 
effective than systems. In the Sind there was a Jacob; in 
the Punjab there was Lawrence as well as Edwardes, Nicholson, 
Harry Lumsden, Hodson, Lake, James Abbott and George 
Lawrence. As Morison describes this characteristic 
Civilized machinery simply did not function 
in the hills, and the one obvious instrument of 
government was the individual master, whose cour-
age, truth, fair play, and mixture of humorousness 
and humanity could convince the hillmen that he 
must be obeyed.2 
The Lawrence system of tribal control depended upon 
sending a specially selected officer with a force of 
irregulars, giving him the largest possible measure of 
1. Lumsden and Elsmie, op. cit., p. 64. 
2. Morison, Lawrence of Lucknow, op. cit., p. 188. 
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individual initiative. The measure was effective, although 
sometimes enthusiasm overestimated the effectiveness, as in 
Edwardes pacification of Bannu when he wrote: 
In a word, the Valley of Bannu, which had 
defied the Sikh arms for four and twenty years, 
had in three months been peacefully annexed to 
the Punjab and two indepe_ndent Afghan races, the 
Waziris and the Bannuchis, been subjugated without 
a shot being fired.l 
To protect the frontier, a chain of forts was erected 
a long the borders roughly corresponding with those of Ranjit 
Singh. Parallel to the border a military road was constructed, 
However, communications along the frontier, unlike Sind, were 
" very defective, " 2 because of the nature of the country. 
Actually there was a double line of communications, a road 
in the interior of the districts connecting the principal 
towns and another close to the border connecting the military 
outposts. 3 
Three means of coercion were used against the tribes: 
fines, blockades and expeditions. The cases in which a 
blockade could be successfully employed were extremely limited 
since the blockading power must command the approaches and 
the arteries of trade and supplies, and also have the co-
operation of the s~rrounding tribes. 4 
1. Edwardes, Hp, A Y~ar on the Punjab Frontier, op. cit., 
Vol. 1, p. 352,. 
2. Paget and Mason, op. cit., p. 4. 
3 • Ibid, p • 4 • 
4. Dodwell, 'op. cit., p. 452. 
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While punitive expeditions were condemned as a system 
of 'semi-barbarous reprisals, " 1 they were considered a last 
resort. 
Actually the basis of the Punjab policy was one of for-
bearance since the tribesmen were allowed to trade within 
the British borders even though British officials were pre~ 
vented from entering trib~l territory. Furthermore, the 
policy adopted was an attempt firstly at conciliation " to 
show the tribesmen how they would benefit by becoming 
friendly neighbours."2 The steps taken towards conciliation 
show that force obviously was a last resort, for instance, 
the capitation tax of Sikh days and frontier duties were 
abolished7 complete freedom of trade was allowed; steps were 
taken to protect and increase Powindah trade; fairs were 
held; roads were constructed from passes to bazaars; free 
medical treatment was provided; tribal maliks and jirgas 
were encouraged to enter British territory for settlement 
of disputes; attempts were made to colonize waste lands with 
families from across the border; and the ranks of the army 
an~ po~i~e , were open to tribesmen. 3 
' ' 
1. Ibid, p. 452. 
2. Ibid, p. 451. 
3. Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier, 
op. cit., p. 25. 
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Thus the policy was one of conciliation backed by force, 
but the ultimate sanction was force. 
Unlike Jacob, Lawrence attempted to refrain from inter-
terence with the tribes and to retain a laissez faire 
relationship, probably because he did not share Jacob's 
policy of the need to keep the routes to the passes under 
control to establish a line of defence. For instance, when 
the District Commissioners requested to be relieved of some 
executive details of their position, Lawrence replied, on May ll, 
1864, 
it is well known that political officers 
with no legitimate duties of administration 
often unduly interfere in the concerns of the 
chiefs to whom they are accredited and thus 
raise up feelings of ill will and animosity to-
wards the British government . . while he should 
be very accessable to their representations, he 
cannot do better than to leave their affairs alone 
and employ himself on his own civil duties.l 
Even if desired, force could not be completely avoided. 
For instance, in 1849, George Lawrence reported that 
as no troops of ours had been sent beyond the can-
tonment of Peshawar, an impression had got abroad 
among the ignorant hill tribes throughout the 
frontier that we had either no force, or were 
afraid to approach their fastness.1 
l. Minute by John Lawrence, May ll, 1864, quoted in 
Pal, op. cit., p. 183. 
2. George Lawrence to Government of Punjab, October, 
1849, as quoted in Lumsden and Elsmie, op. cit., p. 78. 
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When used in the proper proportions with forbearan ce, 
expeditions were not without success in commanding the respect 
of the hill tribes, as an 1864 report states : 
The military success [Lawrence wrote] which, 
in varying degrees, has always attended expeditions, 
and the demonstration that their roughest hills can 
be penetrated by our troops, have done much to sub-
jugate the minds and compel the respect of the hill 
populations, and so reconcile them to peaceful 
pursuits.l 
Essentially the purpose of expeditions and the essence of 
the system was summarized in this way by Henry Lawrence, " now 
they hate us but do not fear us. I should try to reverse the 
case--to conciliate them when quiet, and hit them hard when 
2 troublesome. 11 
In considering the two frontier systems, we must consider 
the length of the respective borders, the nature of the topog-
raphy of each, the personalities of the frontier administrators 
and their views as to where to establish the defensible borders 
of India. 
Another consideration, perhaps the most vital , previously 
untouched in this c h apter, is the nature of the tribes with 
which both systems had to deal, their numbers and peculiar 
characteristics. 
1~ Quoted in Ibid, p. 82. 
2. Henry Lawrence to Lord Stanley, March 31, 1853, as 
quoted in Edwardes, H. B. , Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, London , 
Smith Elder & Co., p. 501. 
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In terms of actual numbers alone the tribes along the 
Punjab frontier presented a much greater problem. There 
we re approximately thirty~four major tribes with a total 
fighting force nearing 225,000 men . 1 While the exact 
number of Baluch tribesmen is more difficult to ascertain, 
it would ~ppear that only about 10 per cent of this figure 
might be realistic. 
But apart from mere figures, it was far more difficult 
to deal ·with the Punjab tribes because of the nature of 
their tribal organization. Jacob found it convenient and 
relatively easy to deal with the Baluch tribes through their 
chiefs since, traditionally, 
a Baluch [Lambrick claims] can generally be con-
trolled if a personal ascendancy is gained over 
his chief : who exercises patriarchal authority, 2 
but this approach was not possible on the Punjab frontier 
since their tribal organization was quite different. In 
the Punjab System: 
the tribes had no recognized chiefs and thus it 
was not possible to influence them through their 
chiefs. Their national organization was popular 
rather than aristocratic. Each tribe was divided 
and subdivided into numerous clans, each indepen-
dent of \lle other and yielding but small obedience 
' 
1. Paget and Mason, op. cit., p. 4. 
(Lumsden and Elsm1e, op. cit., claim that Sir 
Henry Daley, in 1884, estimated the actual fighting strength, 
that is, what they could put on the field at one time, as 
being nearer 100,000.) 
2. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, op. cit., p. 34. 
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to its own petty headman, constantly indulging 
in internecine war7 hating each other with the 
hatred begotten of generations of blood feuds7 
with interests ever in collision, and only uniting 
under the most exceptional circumstances against 
a common enemy. Control exercised over such tribes 
though their chiefs did not exist.l 
While there were some who felt that the Pathans and 
Punjab tribesmen were no more formidable than the Baluchis, 
for example, Sir Bartle Frere and Sir George Clerk, the 
Governor of Bombay, who urged the application of Jacob's 
principles to the Punjab line~ 2 others felt that there was 
a considerable difference in the individual qualities of 
the two groups of tribes. For example, "one attacks his 
enemy from the front the other from behind1 the one is bound 
by his promises, the other by his interests." 3 
The Baluch, according to Paget and Mason, is less tur~ 
bulent, less treacherous, less bloodthirsty and less 
fanatical than the Pathan. He is 
frank and open in his manner, and without 
severity, fairly truthful, faithful to his 
word, and looking upon courage as the highest 
virtue . • a pleasant man to have dealings 
with.4 
1 • Pal , ' op .. cit . , p • 18 4 • 
2. Larnbrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, , op., cit., p. 389. 
3. Paget and Mason, op. cit., pp. 7-13. 
4. Ibid, p. 7. 
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On the other hand, again according to Paget and Mason, 
the Pathan 
is bloodthirsty, cruel and vindictive in the 
highest degree; he does not know what truth or 
faith is, and though he is not without courage 
he would scorn to face an enemy whom he could 
stab from behind • • For centuries he has been 
subject to no man, he leads a wild, free, active 
life in the rugged fastness of his mountains.l 
Naturally S ind administrators tended to show the tribes-
men of their frontier as the most savage on the face of the 
earth while Punjab people make similar claims about their 
wards. But perhaps we can agree with Mr. Temple, the secre-
tary of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, who wrote in 
a r eport on the relations of the British Government with 
the frontier tribes (1855) that " the Baluchis are still of 
a far milder and more amiable disposition. " 2 
In considering the approach of the two different sys-
terns to the problems of these tribes, it has been claimed 
that the Sind System was primarily a military system while 
the Punjab was not. For example, C. C. Davies states that, 
" it [the Sind System] can be roughly described as an uncom-
promising repression of outrages by a strong military force, " 3 
while T. H. Thornton claims, 
1. Ibid, p. 6. 
2. Ibid, p. 6. 
3. Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier, op. 
<:.!.!_. ' p. 20. 
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for the preservation of peace upon the border 
the Sind authorities depended more upon military 
measures of protection and repression than upon 
conciliatory treatment of the tribes.l 
In the Punjab it was clear from the first that it 
would be impossible to organize the defence of the frontier 
on a purely military basis, accordingly, from the very first 
the system of border defence maintained by the Punjab Govern-
ment was partly mil i tary, partly political, and partly 
conciliatory. 2 
However, the contrast is not quite that clearly defined. 
It is true that the Punjab System of administration had 
clear cut divisions of military and political auth ority. 
Military control was exercised by officers of the Punjab 
Frontier Force while the political administrative business 
was managed by the Deputy Commissioners of the frontier dis-
tricts. In Sind, because of the realtively miniature extent 
of the frontier and the forceful personality of Jacob, he 
and his successors united in their own hand s all military 
and political authority on and beyond the frontier wi th ad-
ministrative responsibility for the Upper Sind Frontier 
District. 3 
1. Thornton, T. H., Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, 
London, J. Murray, 1895, p. 31. 
2. Ibid, p. 71. 
3. Martineau, J., The Life and Correspondence of Sir 
Bartle Frere, London, J. Murray, 1895, Vol. 1, p. 165. 
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But, because a system has united and combined functions does 
not justify its being called a purely military system. 
Furthermore, calling the Sind System one of uncompro-
mising militarism is not completely accurate. That charge 
is more properly applied to the Sind frontier during the 
First Afghan War and immediately after annexation before 
the evolution of the Jacob system. In fact, as early as 
1854 Jacob wrote: 
I shall have considered our proceedings a 
failure, had it been necessary to continue to use 
violent measures. Having, by the use of force, 
made ourselves feared and respected, we were able 
to apply better means, and to appeal to higher 
motives than fear. This I had in view from the 
very first.l 
Furthermore, Captain Green, one of Jacob's successors, 
inherited his views of moral force to transform the lives 
of the tribesmen. For instance, 
nothing tames them so much [he wrote] as regular 
pay and food; once having touched this they sel-
dom return to their old habits, and their families 
and relations partaking, to a certain degree, of 
the little luxuries which ready money enables 
them to procure, urge them to remain peaceable 
members of society.2 
Lawrence rejected adaptation of the Sind methods basically 
because t h e nature of the Punjab frontier was not conducive 
l. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, op. cit., p. 410. 
2. Henry Green to Government of India, August 16, 1866, 
quoted in Pal, op. cit . , p. 187. 
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to the idea of patrols unprotected by fortifications. 
Actually it is now generally concluded that the methods of 
the Sind System were not applicable to the Punjab frontier. 
Thus two distinct systems had grown up, each appropri-
ate for the area in which it was to serve. The two were 
vastly different in their methods of approach, the size of 
the frontier they served, the nature of the terrain and the 
character of the tribes they had to administer. The success 
and the results of each is difficult to assess since the two 
differed, not only in their approach but in their philosophy 
and in the objectives to be achieved. Within their own 
frames of reference each was successful; while one created a 
peaceful oasis the other had to be content with a .situation 
that was considered successful when the number of expeditions 
necessary in one year was less than in the preceding year. 
Viewed in an Imperial context there was a significant 
difference. In Sind the frontier line was not considered the 
best defensible line but only served to hold the approaches 
to the Afghan Plateau while in the Punjab, Lawrence felt that 
the defensible frontier of India lay behind the administrative 
line, certainly not beyond it~ 
Chapter VI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE JOHN LAWRENCE PERIOD 
The foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence was conditioned 
by his earlier experiences as Governor of the Punjab, the 
lesson of the First Afghan War and the experience of the 
Indian Mutiny. Thus many of the characteristics of his 
policy as Viceroy were evident before he assumed that office. 
Certainly the First Afghan War had infected the Afghans 
with suspicion and dislike of the English, and quite natur-
ally during the 1850's Canning and Lawrence disliked and 
avoided the idea of a closer connection with Afghanistan 
and discussed the advisability of a withdrawal to the Indus. 
During the early 1850's foreign policy was a matter of 
secondary concern. The new annexatioris and the resulting 
problems of administration occupied the total concentration 
of Jacob in Sind and of Edwardes and Lawrence in the Punjab, 
" and for a while these men had little time for thoughts on 
external policy. " l 
In a sense the problem of Central Asia was somewhat 
simplified after the First Afghan War since the annexation 
l. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 122. 
146 
of Sind and of the Punjab had placed the Government of India 
in direct contact with the region concerned. 
Furthermore, from 1840 until the outbreak of the Cri-
mean War, the Russian threat did not seem to be a matter of 
vital concern. In 1839 their efforts with respect to Herat had 
failed and a later expedition against Khiva from Orenburg had 
also failed. Russian energy was temporarily absorbed in 
changing their base of operations from Orenburg to the Sea 
of Aral. 
As far as Afghanistan was concerned, the ten years after 
the restoration of Dost Mohammed saw British relations with 
that country undefined but sullen. In 1848 Dost Mohammed 
had joined the Sikhs in the Battle of Gujrat and since then 
relations had consisted of "sullen quiescence on either side, 
without offence but without goodwill or intercourse. " 
The impetus for a change in this situation came again 
from Persian activity. In 1852 the Persians had taken Kan-
dahar; and although it was relinquished under British pressure 
it was again attacked in 1854. Herbert Edwardes wanted to 
take advantage of this situation to renew a friendship with 
Dost Mohammed. Edwardes believed that British interests 
could best be served by an Afghan alliance and persuaded 
Dalhousie of the merits of this idea, over Lawrences opposition.l 
1. Fletcher, Arnold, Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 122. 
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While Edwardes was concerned with Persian activities, 
Dalhousie was perhaps moved by Russia and the situation in 
crimea. Dalhousie saw no immediate threat to India from 
Russian movements but insisted that the British 
should leave nothing undone which would tend to 
make Afghanistan an effectual barrier against 
Russian aggression ; or which would encourage and 
induce the Afghan tribes to make common cause with 
us against an enemy whose success would be fatal 
to the common interests of both Afghan and British 
power.l 
With the appearance of external danger, Dalhousie turned 
to the old policy of providing for the security of India by 
establishing Afghanistan as a potential buffer by reassuming 
friendly relations with that country. In 1855, because of 
the Persian threat and as a result of peace feelers thrown 
out by Edwardes, Dost Mohammed changed his position in re-
gard to the English. The Amir was 
disposed to forget the past, if Britain would do 
the same, and to ally himself with them as a 
counter to Russian pressure and Persian asser-
tions of paramount cy.2 
While Lawrence was described as being only ,, lukewarm••3 ~o 
the proposals, the negotiations were left to Edwardes. In 
March of 1855 the Amir's son, Ghulam Haider, came to Pesha-
war and signed a treaty of three clauses which re-opened 
1. Lord Dalhousie, Minute of March 14, 1854; quoted in 
Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 122. 
2. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 123. 
3. I b i d, p. 123. 
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diplomatic relations; gave assurances that the British had 
no aggressive intentions; and pledged the Arnir to be " friend 
of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the East India 
Cornpany. " l Actually, this treaty did little more than re-
open diplomatic relations. 
Although Lawrence had been hesitant about entering into 
this arrangement, events over the next year were to draw 
him even closer, although still reluctantly, towards a deeper 
involvement with Afghanistan. For in 1856 Herat again carne 
into the picture, when in October the Persians seized the 
city. Britain treated the seizure as a casus belli and de-
clared war on Persia. Within three months the Persians 
agreed to withdraw from Herat and to never again attempt to 
interfere with its independence or with that of Afghanistan. 2 
Meanwhile to ensure Dost Mohammed's co-operation in the 
British-Persian Wa r, he had been invited to Peshawar and a 
supplement to the previous treaty had been signed. This 
agreement provided that the Arnir would get a lakh of rupees 
a month during the war, would maintain troops to defend his 
possessions, and would permit British agents to administer 
1. Aitchison, c. U., A Collection of Treaties, Engage-
ments and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, 
Calcutta, Government of India Publication Branch, 1929-33, 
Vol XI, p. 340. 
2. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 47, p. 42. 
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the subsidy. Following the signing, Dost Mohammed visited 
Peshawar early in 1857 and the 1855 treaty was ratified 
"with a British promise to aid the Arnir if he were attacked 
by a foreign enemy."l 
However, Lawrence was hesitant and reluctant about the 
situation. In the first place he had wanted to see Herat 
remain independent of Afghanistan for he apparently saw 
more danger from Afghanistan than from Persia or Russia, for 
he admitted, " it [Herat] was not to belong to the Barakzyes 
for we had injured Dost Mohammed too much to make us wish 
unnecessarily to increase his power. " 2 
Furthermore, Lawrence was opposed to a meeting with 
Dost Mohammed after the treaty of 1855 since it would only 
create a deeper involvement. 
It appears to me [he wrote] we shall get nothing 
out of the Ameer, except by paying through the 
nose for it; and this being the case I would not 
bring on an interview . . the best chance for 
getting on well with the Afghans was to have as 
few points of contact as possible.3 
When Herat was taken by the Persians, Edwardes restated 
the old policy of establishing the Indian defences on a 
line beyond the mountains. He wrote a memorandum imploring 
1. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 123. 
2. Smith, R. B., Life of Lord Lawrence, London, Smith 
Elder and Co., 1883, Vo l. 1, p. SOT 
3. Ibid, p. 513. 
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Lawrence to dispatch troops to Kabul and Kandahar. In 
Lawrence's reply he clearly stated the case for a line of 
defence on the Indian side of the mountians. He wrote: 
I consider that the battle fo r India is to 
be fought on this side of the Suleiman Range, and 
not on that . If we carry on war in Afghanis-
tan we shall ruin our finances , and in the event 
of a reverse, the very Afghans will sell us to our 
enemies. They will make friends of them at our 
expense. On the other hand, should a Russo 
Persian army press on and meet us at the mouth of 
the Bolan or Khyber and experience a reverse, then 
the Afghans, who have united with them, will play 
the same game against them.l 
In a letter to Canning he further elaborated on this 
policy and the motivation for it. As to the end of his career, 
financial considerations entered into every thought. His 
ideas for improvements of a non-military nature were upper-
most, even before the Mutiny. He wrote: 
. the conclusion which has been invariably 
forced on my judgment is, that it would be a fatal 
error for us to interfere actively in Central Asia. 
I admit that the interests of the Afghans are, 
at present identical with ours, but it does not 
follow that such will always be the case. If we 
prove successful in the contest, no doubt the 
Afghans will remain faithful. But in the event 
of a reverse, it might prove their true game to 
take the other side. 
I am equally averse to the measures of dis -
patching an irregular force to garrison Candahar. 
If the Ameer cannot fight his own battles on his 
own ground, it seems vain for us to attempt to do 
so. 
l. Ibid, p. 514. 
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If we send a force to Candahar, it will 
eventually necessitate the re~occupation of the 
country. Afghanistan will then become the battle-
field for India, and the cost of maintaining our 
posi t ion will render India bankrupt. 
Whereas, on the other hand, if we leave 
Afghanistan alone, and concentrate our means 
on this side of the Suleiman Range, we should 
meet an invader, worn by toil and travail, with 
a weak artillery and distant from his resources, 
as he debauched from the passes. Under such 
circumstances defeat should be certain and de-
feat would be annihiliation. 
The money we should expend in beseiging 
Herat and in fighting in Afghanistan would 
double our European force in India, finish our 
most important railroads, and cover the Punjab 
river with steamers.! 
In this pre Mutiny, pre Viceroyalty period, his primary 
consideration was no doubt with the Punjab and the adrninis-
trative problems of the frontier. Practically a decade had 
passed since the annexation of the Punjab and the qualified 
success of pacifying the frontier had to influence his out-
look on foreign affairs. 
Furthermore [he goes on] an expedition into 
Afghanistan would mean taking men from the Pun-
jab which would leave the frontier in a dangerous 
position. The mountain tribes have never yet 
been thoroughly punished, let alone subdued; and 
the force which Colonel Edwardes indicates as 
available to take their place can ill be spared . 
I do not forget that I have informed Your Lordship 
that I could spare 2,000 of the Punjab force for 
service in Persia. But this was with much diffi-
culty; and if nearly double that number be 
1. Ibid, p. 517. 
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withdrawn, we must permanently confine ourselves 
to a defensive system on the frontier. And such 1 
a system has proved radically weak and ineffective. 
If Lawrence was suspicious and hesitant about involve-
ment in Afghanistan he was not alone in his thinking, 
certainly others of influence shared his views. In 1854 Sir 
James Outram spoke clearly against any advance. " England 
2 
should establish her power on the Indus, " he declared; and 
in a Minute dated February 6, 1857, Lord Canning stated with 
the same conviction that, " a wise foresight had fixed our 
boundaries at the foothills of the trans-Indus valley. " 3 
The agreement of 1857 inspired Canning to record this 
Minute setting forth his views on Afghan policy, which were 
that in no circumstances should Britain interfere in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan; and moreover that Herat 
should be absorbed by Afghanistan. 4 
In a letter to Captain Lumsden shortly after the Minute 
of February 6 Canning revealed the extent to which Lawrence 
had influenced his policy: 
You cannot [he wrote] impress too strongly 
upon every man you meet that the British 
1. Lawrence to Canning, quoted in Ibid, p. 517. 
2. Minute by James Outram, 1854, quoted in Ghose, D. K., 
England and Afghanistan, Calcutta, The World Press Private 
Ltd. , 19 6 0, p. 3. 
3. Canning's Minute of February 6, 1857, quoted in Ibid, p. 4. 
4. Cannings Minute of February 6, 1857, quoted in Fraser-
Tytler, op. cit., p. 126. 
Government does not desire to send into Afghanis-
tan a single man, armed or unarmed, except with 
the full consent of the Afghans themselves . 
Endeavour to convince them of the truth, that what 
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we most desire is that they would govern themselves 
and defend themselves after their own fashion without 
any thought from us, and that in return for con-
tributing to their defence we ask for nothing but 
confidence in ourselves and their resistance to the 
common enemy.l 
Undoubtedly Lawrence's (and Canning's) hesitation during 
this period was conditioned by the memory of the First Afghan 
War. Lawrence, it was said, '' could not overcome the memory 
of a bone strewn Khurd Kabul, 112 and was definitely suspi-
cious of Dost Mohammed and the Afghans. After his meeting 
with Dost Mohammed he stated that he was not particularly 
impressed with the Amir. Specifically, on January 30, 1857, 
he said: 
As regards the Ameer, it is very difficult to 
devine what are his real views and feelings. I 
confess that I felt no confidence in anything 
which he said.3 
Ironically, however, it was precisely this agreement 
with the Dost which saved the British from an Afghan invasion 
during the troubled days during the Mutiny; and furthermore, 
determined Lawrence's future policy towards Afghanistan. As 
his biographer says: 
l. Canning to Lumsden, circa February, 1857, quoted in 
Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 126. 
2. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 126. 
3. Quoted in Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 523. 
The interview between John Lawrence and Dost 
Mohammed at Peshawar helped so much to determine 
the attitude of the Afghans towards the British 
throughout the Mutiny and the attitude of John 
Lawrence to Afghanistan throughout the whole of 
his subsequent career.l 
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It was fortunate for British India that Lawrence's sus-
picions of Dost Mohammed were not verified, for the 
possibility of an Afghan invasion during the Mutiny was not 
remote. MacMunn, for example, maintains that, 
During the Indian Mutiny many Afghans favoured 
an invasion of India . . the Dost nearly gave 
way . it was his son, Azim Khan, who reminded 
him of his relationship with Sir John Lawrence 
and his goodwill to the British.2 
While it is true that Azim Khan restrained t h e Dost 
from attacking India it was not simply out of "good will " 
but fear of British retaliation if the Afghans assisted the 
Sepoys. 
As a good Mussulman [Azim warned his father] 
you may properly wage war against the infidel 
Feringhi; but before committing yourself to so 
hazardous an enterprise, count well your chances 
of success. We have had the English here before, 
when the Punjab lay wide between us, but now they 
stand at our very door; if ~ou bring them here 
again, they will stay here. 
1.. Ibid, p. 449. 
2. MacMunn, Sir G. F., Afghanistan From Darius to 
Amanullah, London, G. Bell and Sons, 1929, p. 162. 
3. Wheeler, Stephen, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, London, 
Bliss, Sands and Foster, 1895, p. 30. 
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Certainly the atmosphere in 1857 was "delicate," the 
Afghans were "anxious for support but ready to shy off at 
any suggestion of interference in their internal affairs." 1 
At the same time the Crimean War had influenced Russian 
activity and caused speculation concerning a move towards 
India, at least on the part of some Russian frontier gener-
als. In 1856, for example, General Khruleff stated that: 
It would be easy for us to march 30,000 men 
to Kandahar and by inciting Afghan hostilities 
against the English to break down the power of 
the latter.2 
This was precisely the type of activity which Lawrence 
felt would be best met by a policy of non-interference in 
Afghanistan, and a defensive line on the I~dus. 
Although Russian activity was not really apparent 
during the fifties, the .undercurrents were present, which 
became more obvious in the late sixties and seventies. 
As Rawlinson assessed the situation: 
During the Crimean War Russia realized her 
false position in regard to England. If she 
were to develop into a leading power it was neces-
sary to redress this inequality, thus she must find 
a weak point in the British armour. Hence create 
a great Oriental satrapy which would envelop the 
north west frontier of India and from which an 
l. Fraser-Tytler, ~op ~ cit., p. 124. 
2. Vambery, Arminius, 'Will Russia Conquer India," 
Nineteenth Century, Vol. 17, 1885, p. 30. 
occasion might arise, pressure could be exerted 
on, or if necessary, armed demonstrations might 
issue, which would neutralize British opposition 
in Europe.l 
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By 1853 the Russians controlled the Syri Darya for 
almost three hundred miles from its mouth, and had expanded 
into the Ili valley. Consequently, in the fifties the two 
opposing points of view concerning defensive policy began 
to emerge although they did not take distin ct lines until 
a decade later. 
Lawrence believed in falling back to the Indus ~iver 
as a boundary. Indeed, during the Mutiny Lawrence advo-
cated the restoration of the trans-Indus territories to the 
Afghans. He would have evacuated Peshawar and held the 
left bank of the Indus. It was Edwardes who regarded Pesha-
war as "the anchor of the Punjab" and influenced Canning to 
negate Lawrence's proposal by his telegram, "Hold on to 
Peshawar to the last. " 
However, Lawrence still had faith in the Indus line. 
To him it had certain advantages: it would remove troops 
from positions deterious to their health; it would concili-
ate the Afghans and thereby strengthen relations; and it 
would not diminish strength of defensive positions since 
the area could easily be reoccupied. 2 
1. Rawlinson, Sir Henry, " The Russian Advance in Central 
Asia, " Nineteenth Century, Vol. 17. , 1885, p. 558. 
2. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 130. 
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Although some, like Outram, felt that nature had 
rendered the Indus frontier so exceptionally strong as to 
merit the epithet " impregnable ," it is now generally agreed 
that a river, any river, is not a good line of defense. In 
the case of the Indus it was constantly shifting its course 
rendering permanent defences impossible. Also the Indus 
valley was unhealthy for European soldiers,and undoubtedly 
an Indus defense would have had a disastrous moral effect 
on all of India.l 
However, opposing views to the Lawrence scheme were 
being expressed, As early as 1854 Jacob was advocating 
pushing through the Bolan Pass to Quetta to protect the 
left flank of the defensive line. In 1855 he expressed 
doubts of the existing policy. 
It seems to me [he declared] that if arrange-
ments for the permanent defense of our north west 
frontier be not speedily applied and manfully 
c a rried out they will have caused the loss of our 
Indian Empire within the next generation of men.2 
In 1856 Jacob urged Canning to garrison Quetta. To 
him the British frontier system was that of an army without 
outposts, while Quetta could threaten the flank of an in-
vading army advancing upon the Khyber. This proposal was 
l. D~v~~~, ~ ,C. C., The Problem of the North West 
Frontier , ~qp~,~it. chapter I. 
2. Green, Henry, " The Great Wall of India, " Nine-
teenth Century, Vol. 17, 1885, p. 906. 
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rejected by Canning (influenced by Lawrence) on the grounds 
that Quetta was too isolated and surrounded by tribes which 
might prove to be unfriend ly. 
Thus we see that by the end of the Mutiny the lines had 
been drawn which would only be more clearly traced during 
the sixties and seventies. Lawrence, long before becoming 
Viceroy, had adopted attitudes and the nucleus of a policy 
while the opposing school had begun to take shape and to 
gather the support which would eventually overpower the 
Lawrence mystique. 
While Fletcher claims that, 
the years passed and British control over India 
was strengthened, new policies began to contend 
with Lawrence in the minds of the British leaders,l 
actually there was no new policy developing at all. Rather 
the old policy that had existed since the beginning of the 
century, to seek a defensible frontier for India in advance 
of the mountains, in abeyance under Lawrence, was reiter-
ated more strongly than ever before. 
After the treaty of 1857 with Dost Mohammed, events 
were relatively calm until the mid sixties when Afghanistan 
again became prominent in Indian affairs. Now three 
factors, seemingly unrelated, began to play on each other 
1. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 126. 
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to create a renewed interest in Afghan relations and defen-
sive plans. These were: the death of Dost Mohammed, the 
appointment of John Lawrence as Viceroy of India, and a re-
newed vigorous activity on the part of Russia in Central 
Asia. 
In January of 1864, John Lawrence returned to India as 
Viceroy to conduct Indian affairs for the next five years. 
He brought with him an atmosphere of near infallibility. 
As Dod\vell writes, 
Upon the generation that had witnessed the Indian 
Mutiny Lawrence's vigor of character and single-
ness of purpose produced a remarkable effect. His 
opinions were accepted as oracles, and men forgot 
or ignored the fallibility of his judgment.l 
The India to which he returned was politically calm 
but troubled by natural calamities of famine and cyclone 
damage. 2 Finances were in an unfavourable condition, and 
the situation was aggravated by a commercial crisis caused 
by the American Civil War. This consequent necessity to 
cut expenses had a strong influence on Lawrence's foreign 
policy, which is sometimes underestimated by his biographers. 
The India of 1864 was considerably different from that 
of 1856; 
the Mutiny had shaken the attitudes of both 
l. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 406. 
2. Aitchison, C. u., Sir John Lawrence, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1892, p. 125. 
British and Indians into new molds . . the 
Indian army was radically altered, the position 
o£ the princes was stabalized and the states were 
to act as bulwarks o£ traditional strength.l 
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A different India demanded a different approach £or 
the India that John Lawrence returned to was no 
longer the almost free and easy administration 
o£ traders and men o£ action. The sword was 
giving way to the pen, the dynamic to the ordered, 
the adventurous to the caution o£ the bureaucrat.2 
India was, and had to be, his primary concern; foreign 
a££airs had to take a secondary position to internal admin-
istration. Initially 
his policy was o£ peaceful progress at home . 
he conceived that his duty in India was to cen-
tralize and unify. He saw the Afghan problem as 
a will-o'-the wisp, leading to dangerous swamps.3 
However, it had been frontier a££airs that determined 
his appointment, £or the Punjab frontier was in a troubled 
condition, and frontier wars were the exceptions to the 
generally calm political scene. In the early 1860's the 
Mahsuds were raiding across the border in the area around 
Tank. Temporary peace was achieved by a force under 
Brigadier General N. B. Chamberlain. Again in 1863 Chamber-
lain led another expedition against the "Hindustani Fanatics" 
at Malka on the slopes o£ the Mahaban Range. By the time 
1. 
1958, p. 
Edwardes, M., The Necessary Hell, London, Cassell, 
188. 
2. Ibid, p. 189. 
3. Ibid, p. 19 0. 
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Lawrence had arrived in India the fourth expedition against 
the Mohmands had been carried out. The Mohmands had the 
Khyber area at their mercy and raided the plains around 
Peshawar, plundering caravans. 1 
As far as the management of the frontier tribes was con-
cerned, there was a difference of opinion between Lawrence and 
Sir Bartle Frere. Frere wanted to extend his influence among 
the tribes on the frontier while Lawrence was for confining 
his attention to the plains. To both, the tribal problem 
could not be separated from the Afghan problem, and the 
Afghan problem could not be separated from the Russian problem. 
Frere's advice was actually a restatement of the forward 
policy of the late 1830's, to push forward to the Afghan 
Plateau. This policy, as expressed in the mid-sixties, 
[to] make your influence paramount at Quetta, at 
Khelat, at Kandahar, and at Kabul, in order that you 
may checkmate Russia there and may therefy and 
thereafter secure the 2peace, and prosperity, and 
contentment of India, 
was premature, for Lawrence's attitude was the opposite. His 
policy was to: 
Make India as it is in your power to do, 
peaceful, prosperous, and contented first. 
1. Paget and Mason, op. cit., Chapters V-VIII. 
2. Quoted in Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 436. 
Assure the neighbouring tribes that you do 
not covet their territory and will not meddle with 
their independence, and then, whem Russia comes, 
if ever she does come, with hostile intention, 
they will be to you as a wall of adament against 
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her, and you will be able to enter their territories, 1 not as their enemies but as their allies and friends. 
While this tribal policy was partly conditioned by the 
ever pressing economic factor, Lawrence justified his stand 
on a stubborn attachment for the Indus line and a concern 
for the internal condition of India. 
To take [he wrote] any of those steps advo-
cated by the Sind school . would draw us away 
from our natural frontier of an almost impassable 
river and then of mountain wall piled behind moun-
tain wall ~ . would be guarding against a future 
and contingent danger by neglecting those which lie 
beneath our feet ; would concentrate the attention 
of Indian and English statesmen on matters over 
which they can exercise little appreciable influ-
ence; would employ an Indian army on a service 
which they hate; would throw away crores of rupees 
on barren mountain ridges and ever vanishing fron-
tier lines.2 
But tribal policy was an integral part of foreign policy, 
and certainly the most serious question in foreign policy 
during Lawrence's term as Viceroy was Afghanistan. But 
Lawrence's policy towards Afghanistan has been described as 
the belated result of the old dogma of non intervention 
which in India had produced little but undesired and 
unexpected war.3 
1. Quoted in Ibid, Vol. II, p. 436. 
2. Quoted in Ibid, Vol. II, p. 437. 
3. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 407. 
163 
In practice it meant "friendship towards the actual rulers 
combined with rigid abstention from ·interference in domestic 
feuds.'' 1 
The most serious Afghan problem during the Lawrence 
administration was that concerning the succession. For 
Dost Mohammed, having recaptured Herat and reduced most of 
the provinces of Afghanistan to his control, had died a few 
months before the arrival of Lawrence in Ind~a, and at a 
time when the British were in the throes of the Ambela up-
rising of 1863. 
The struggle for the succession to the ~fghan throne 
was marked by treachery, intrigue, and bloodshed, charac-
teristic of the Afghans throughout their history. Five 
principal characters took part: SherAli, the Dost's third 
son; Afzal, Governor of Turkestan; his half brother, Azim, 
Governor of Kuram; Amin, the Governor of Kandahar; and 
Abdur Rahman, the son of Afzal. Dost Mohammed's designated 
heir, and the one recognized by Lord Canning, was Sher Ali. 
Sher Ali, reportedly pleased with the appointment of 
Lawrence, sent an envoy to him in March of 1864 asking for 
the renewal of the treaty made with his father; recognition 
of his son, Mohammed Ali as heir; and a gift of 600 muskets. 
1. Roberts, op. cit., p. 407. 
164 
Lawrence granted the first two requests but refused the 
gift of arms. 1 
When Afzal and Azim asserted their independence from 
Sher Ali, the signal was given for the beginning of the war 
of succession. Throughout that confused period two factors 
are clear: Lawrence's policy of recognizing the de facto 
ruler and his desire to avoid becoming involved in the 
situation. 
In 1866 when Azim and Abdur Rahman took Kabul, the 
British Government still recognized Sher Ali. Lawrence 
explained to the Cabinet, 
We should not be hasty in giving up the 
Amir's cause as lost. We should await the develop-
ment of events and for the present continue to 
recognize Sher Ali as the Amir of Afghanistan. 
If the Amir fails in his attempt to recover Kabul, 
and Sadar Muhammad Azim Khan establish his power 
and make overtures to the British Government, the 
latter can then be recognized as the ruler of such 
parts of the country as he may possess. It should 
be our policy to show clearly that we will not 
interfere in the struggle; that we will not aid 
either party; that we will leave the Afghans to 
settle their own quarrels; and that we are willing 
to be on terms of amity and goodwill with the 
nation and with their rulers de facto.2 
Obviously Lawrence was trying to avoid the repetition of 
the situation that produced the First Afghan War. 
1. Aitchison, Sir John Lawrence, op. cit., p. 177. 
2. Quoted in Wheeler, op. cit., p. 38. 
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When Sher Ali failed in an attempt to recover Kabul , he 
continued to hold Herat and Kandahar while Afzal Khan was 
proclaimed Amir. Afzal wrote to Lawrence requesting recog-
nition and friendship but Lawrence's reply, rather than 
addressing him as Amir, simply addressed as " Wali of Kabul. " 
Afzal was told : 
My friend, the relations of this government are 
with the actual rulers of Afghanistan. If You r 
Highness is able to consolidate Your Highness' power 
in Kabul , and is sincerely desirous of being a friend 
and ally of the British Government , I shall be ready 
to accept Your Highness as such. But I cannot break 
the existing engagement with Amir Sher Ali Khan and 
I must continue to treat him as the ruler of that 
portion of Afghanistan over which he retains control. 
Sincerity and fair dealing induce me to write this, 
plainly and openly to Your Highness.l 
Thus far Lawrence adhered to his pre-Mutiny policy of 
non-intervention in Afghanistan and maintenance of the treaty 
of 1855 with Dost Mohammed. 
On January 17 , 1867, SherAli made another attempt to 
recover Kabul. Defeated , he had to fall back on Kandahar only 
to find it closed to him, thereupon he retured to Herat. 
When Afzal announced his victory to Lawrence he was ad-
dressed this time as '1 ruler of Kabul and Kandahar. " Obviously , 
Lawrence was determined to recognize only the de facto situ-
ation. He would wait to see who would emerge as Amir of all 
Afghanistan , but he would not contribute to that even t . 
1. John Lawrence to Afzal Khan , July 11 , 1866, quoted 
in Wheeler , op. cit. , p. 39. 
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Critics of Lawrence's policy of having relations with 
only the de facto ruler claim that such action was a direct 
encouragement to successful rebellion, a premium on anarchy, 
and furthermore, played into the hands of Russia. However, 
rebellion and anarchy were characteristic of the Afghan sue-
cession. British interference would only have established 
an artificial ruler who might need permanent British support. 
Whether or not the Lawrence policy played into the hands 
of Russia, the rejected claimants did attempt to make arrange-
ments with the Russians, forcing Lawrence to consider Central 
Asia in his policy. For after Lawrence wrote to Afzal Khan 
recognizing him as ruler of Kabul and Kandahar only, Afzal 
still tried to get British aid by using the Russian threat 
as a lever. He wrote to Lawrence's s e cretary, dwelling on 
the victorious advance of the Russians and e xpressing fear 
for Afghanistan as a consequence. But he was told that nthe 
most friendly relations exist between the British and the 
Russian governments and that there was no reason ±o fear 
/. 
Russia." 
This message Afzal Khan sent to Bokhara, adding that 
the English did not care if the Russians took Bokhara and 
that they should therefore make peace with the Russians. 
Thus Afzal attempted, despite British warnings, to use the 
Bokhara situation to solicit Russian aid for himself and 
1. John Lawrence to Afzal Khan, quoted in Wyllie , J. w. s., 
"Masterly Inactivity, 11 Fortnightly Review , December, 1867. 
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Azim. General Romanovski, the Russian Governor at Tashkent, 
who had been sent a copy of Lawrence's letter, was told that 
both Afzal and Azim were disgusted with the British Govern-
ment; and they therefore looked upon the Russian s as their 
real friends to whom they hoped to send ambassadors.l 
Undoubtedly, the activity of Afzal Khan , together with 
the encroachment of Russia, led the Amir of Bokhara to soli-
cit Lawrence's aid for his own cause and reopen relations 
between Bokhara and India.* But Lawrence wrote to the Amir 
asserting the same principles of non-involvement as he had 
in the case of Afghanistan.2 
No doubt Lawrence's r e fusal to aid the Amir facilitated 
Russian ambitions in Central Asia, but considering the situ-
ation in Afghanistan, no other course of action was open to 
Lawrence, who still slung to the hope that Sher Ali would 
emerge successfully from the war of succession. J. w. s. 
Wyllie informs us that: 
Sir John Lawrence has taken no less pains 
to let it be known throughout the length and 
breadth of Afghanistan that England does not 
l. Wyllie, J. W. s., "Masterly Inactivity, " Fort-
nightly Review, December, 1869. 
* During the First Afghan War two British officers, 
Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly, were sent to 
Bokhara to bar Russian progress by organizing a Tartar 
confederacy under Amir Nassur of Bokhara. They were 
both murdered, thus relations with Bokhara ended. 
2. Wyllie, "Masterly Inactivity, " op. cit. 
depart lightly from her engagements, and that no 
pretender can hope for any countenance from her, 
so long as the prince whom she has once recog-
nized as sovereign retains any material hold upon 
the country.l 
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Azim Khan, as well as Afzal Khan, attempted to win 
British support; but he was given the same treatment by 
Lawrence as Afzal had received. Thereupon Azim too attempted 
to gain support through the suggestion of Russian compliance. 
The rumour of Russian influence [Wyllie re-
ports] in the Cabul Durbar spread through Meshed 
to Tehran, and the tale, as told in Persia, was 
that Abdool Rehman had obtained through the media-
tion of Bokhara recognition from the Russian 
Government as Ameer of Afghanistan, on the con-
dition of vassalage to the Emperor Alexander.2 
The year l867 marks the last phase of the war of sue-
cession and a shift in the policy of Lawrence. Towards the 
end of l867 the plight of Sher Ali was worse than it had 
ever been. His appeals for help from the British were 
refused. He then sought assistance from Persia and Russia. 
He had facilities for communicating with the Russians 
across the Oxus from his position in Balkh. 3 Also he 
sent his son Yakub Khan to Persia offering Herat as a fief 
to the Persian crown. The Shah of Persia refused assistance 
since he was bound by treaty with the British not to 
l. Wyllie, J. W. s. "The Foreign Policy of Sir John 
Lawrence, ll Edinburgh Review, Vol. CXXV, January, l867, p. 26. 
2 • Ibid I p . 3 2 . 
3. Wyllie, "Masterly Inactivity", op. cit. 
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interfere in Afghanistan. 1 
There is an interesting difference of interpretation 
of Lawrence's reaction to SherAli's negotiations with 
Persia and Russia. One historian, at least, claims that 
this action caused a change in Lawrence's policy and forced 
him to recognize and give assistance to Sher Ali. The argu-
ment is stated as follows: 
For some time opposition to this hands off 
policy had been growing in India and London, and 
it won the day when Sher Ali approached the 
Russian military government in Turkestan. Once 
convinced of his error, Lawrence acted swiftly; 
he sent a message to Sher Ali recognizing him as 
Amir and forwarded a gift of 20,000 rupees and 
3,000 muskets. This effectively ended the civil 
war, with Sher Ali firmly on the throne.2 
Others claim that Lawrence told Sher Ali that if he 
sought assistance from Persia and Russia, British India 
would assist the party in power at Kabul with a subsidy 
and arms to resist Sher Ali. 3 
The significant point is not which candidate Lawrence 
would support, but that he would now support someone in 
Kabul. Whether Sher Ali or not, is not really important as 
far as strategy is concerned. What is important is that 
Lawrence, for the first time, looked beyond the mountains for 
the source of Indian security. 
1. Ibid 
2. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 125. 
3. Aitchison, Sir John Lawrence, op. cit., p. 183. 
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In fact the war of succession was brought to an end, not 
by Lawrence's intervention, but by the change in fortunes of 
Sher Ali aided by an act of nature, an historical accident, 
the natural death of Afzal Khan in October of 1867. Tern-
porarily, Azim ascended the throne and was recognized by the 
British. 
SherAli, no doubt encouraged because Azim's rule was as 
detested by the people as had his brother's, regained strength 
in Herat and once again moved on Kandahar. He defeated the 
Kabul army and recovered the capital. Now Sher Ali was the 
undisputed ruler over all Afghanistan and had regained all 
his father's possessions. 
Sher Ali was congratulated by Lawrence, who now found 
it possible to strengthen the Amir in an attempt to secure 
his goodwill, and to establish him as a friendly buffer be-
tween India and Russia. 
Lawrence admitted his change in policy and his concern 
over Russia's advance when he wrote to the horne authorities in 
1869: 
I think it should be carefully explained to him 
[Sher Ali] that we are interested in the security 
of his dominions from foreign invasion, and that, 
provided he remains strictly faithful to his en-
gagements, we are prepared to support his independence ; 
but that the manner of doing so must rest with our-
selves • • while strictly refusing to enter into1 
anything like an offensive and defensive alliance. 
1. Quoted in Ibid, p. 187. 
l7l 
In pursuance of this policy, Lawrence, who had been 
given authority to "act on your own judgment in assisting 
l Amir SherAli, " gave the Amir .fJ 60,000 and 3,500 muskets 
and proposed a meeting between himself and the Afghan ruler. 
Despite the fact that Lawrence's policy had its strong 
supporters, including the five Secretaries of State under 
whom he had served2 there were those who severely criticized 
it. 
Dodwell, in the Cambridge History of India, for instance, 
criticized it because it alienated Abdu r Rahman and drove 
him to "shelter with the Russians since he had never seen 
the benefit of English friendship."3 But this seems a rather 
pointless criticism, since at the time Abdur Rahman was not 
yet twenty-five years old and not a major figure on the Afghan 
stage. Indeed, if the Lawrence policy had not been reversed, 
he might never have become prominent. 
A second criticism is that Lawrence's non-intervention, 
and non-support of a particular candidate during the wars 
of succession, had in fact made rebellion popular. But when 
the competition for the throne began, Sher Ali was the recog-
nized Amir, and to interfere with material help and to 
maintain a ruler not acknowledged by his people would have 
been a dangerous policy forbidden by the provisions 
l. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 48. 
2. Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 583. 
3. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 407. 
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of existing treaties. Moreover, one should not forget the 
dictum that in Afghanistan "the rightful sovereign is he who 
can take the crown and wear it." 1 
Lord Dalhousie had admitted the validity of this Afghan 
national custom when, by treaty, he recognized Dost Mohammed 
as founder of a new dynasty in supercession of the House o£ 
Sadowzai. I£ Dalhousie's act was justifiable so too must have 
been Lawrence's policy. And if we accept this argument we must 
also accept that the course followed did not contribute to the 
situation in Afghanistan and did no injustice to Sher Ali. 
A third criticism is that Lawrence's policy was on the basis 
that it was basically a "do nothing policy," more inactive than 
masterly. But his biographer maintains that the term Masterly 
Inactivity 
does not bring out that knowledge and that watchful-
ness which were of its very essence . . a policy of 
self reliance, o£ waiting and of watching, that he 
might be able to strike the harder and in the right 
direction, if the time for aggressive action should 
ever come.2 
Probably the most serious charge against the Lawrence 
stance was that it ignored the danger from Russia and in fact 
played into her hands. As the Cambridge History of India puts it 
Russia was pursuing this policy [of expansion] 
while Lawrence was being 'masterly inactive' 
he [Lawrence] seems wholly to have ignored the point 
that unless England could entrench herself 
1. Wyllie, "Masterly Inactivity," op. cit. 
2. Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 571. 
so strongly in Central Asia as to convince Russia 
of the futility of movements in that direction an 
agreement in Europe could only be reached by sub-
ordinating English to Russian interests on the 
continent.l 
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However, it is noteworthy that Russian generals did not 
pursue a policy of meeting British plots in Afghanistan by 
plots of their own ; Afzal and Azim both had been refused 
Russian aid. Perhaps it is possible that Russia kept out 
of Afghanistan simply because the English also did; or more 
likely the Russians abstained from interference for the 
same reasons as did the English. 
Lawrence was not unaware of Russian expansion ; he simply 
did not see it as something to be counteracted by an advance 
into Central Asia. As he said, " The Anglo-Indian mind for-
gets that we are lords paramount of India only, not all of 
Asia. " 2 
In a minute dated October 3, 1867, Lawrence, opposing 
a British advance, argued that the further Russia penetrated 
into Central Asia, the longer her supply line would become, 
while the length of the British supply line would remain 
3 the same. 
1. Dodwell~ op. cit., p. 408. 
2. Wyllie, " Masterly Inactivity, '' op. cit. 
3. Kazemzadeh, Firuz, Russia and Britain in Persia, 
l864-l9l4, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. l3. 
174 
Furthermore , Lawrence urged the Home Government to come 
to some definite agreement with Russia as to a line of de-
rnarcation between their respective spheres of influence. If 
t h at could be accomplished, then there would be little to 
f . . 1 fear rom Russ1an expans1on~ Actually Britain had little 
right to object to Russian expansion , rather , he felt, that 
Britain should welcome the civilizing influence of Russia on 
Central Asia. As he said on October 3 , 1867 : 
I am not myself at all certain that Russia 
might not prove a safer ally, a better neighbour , 
than the Mahomedan races of Central Asia and Kabul. 
She would introduce civilization, and she would abate 
the fanaticism and ferocity of Mahomedanism, which 2 
still exercises so powerful an influence in India. 
Lawrence did not want to get deeply involved in Afghan-
istan or in Central Asia simply because India , at that time , 
lacked the resources to carry out such a responsibility, thus 
as G. S. Alder comments, " India should incur no responsibility 
where her arm could not reach. ll 3 
But to interfere in Afghanistan, in order to check 
Russia , she would have had to dominate Afghanistan up to the 
point of effectively taking responsibility for her foreign 
affairs. As A l der has explained the situation : 
1. Roberts, op. cit., p. 409. 
2. Minute of John Lawrence, October 3 , 1867, quoted in 
Kazemzadeh , op. cit. , p. 13. 
3. Alder, G. J. , British India's Northern Frontier, 
London , Longmans Green and Company, 1963, p. 32. 
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The moment one great nation says to another, 
'I will not permit you to interfere with this 
small state on my border,' it becomes responsible 
to the other nation for restraining the smaller 
state from injuring its neighbour, and may justly 
be called upon to exercise that restraint or to 1 allow the other nation to redress its own wrongs. 
As far as Russia was concerned, Lawrence felt that she 
could be considered a nbetter neighbour " only up to a cer-
tain point and therefore should be told, 
that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the 
affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any state 
which lies contiguous to our frontier . If 
this failed, we might give that power to understand 
that an advance towards India, beyond a certain 
point, would entail on her, war, in all parts of 
the world, with England.2 
But war with Russia was unlikely to Lawrence. His main 
hopes were in reaching an agreement with the Russian Govern-
ment on Central Asia and the line of demarcation between 
their spheres of influence. In a letter of September, 1867, 
Some understanding [he wrote] should be come 
to with the Czar's government so that up to a cer-
tain point the relations of the British and Russian 
governments should be openly acknowledged, and ad-
mitted as bringing them into necessary contact and 
treaty with the tribes and nations on the several 
sides of such a line. If an understanding, or even 
an engagement, of this nature were come to, the 
Government of India on the one hand could look on 
without anxiety or apprehension at the proceedings 
of Russia on her southern frontier and welcome 
the civilizing effect of her border government on 
1. Ibid, p. 180. 
2. Memo of John Lawrence, November 25, 1868, quoted 
in Ibid, p. 165. 
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the wild tribes of the steppes and on the bigoted 
and exclusive governments of Bokhara and Khakand ; 
while Russia, on the other hand, assured of our 
loyal feeling in this matter, would have no jealousy 
in respect of our alliance with the Afghan and 
neighbouring tribes.l 
In the event of a Russian invasion of India, Lawrence 
did have a policy, summed up in a covering despatch from 
the foreign office. It reveals that Lawrence s mentality 
was conditioned by a mutiny complex, probably the strongest 
impression in his mind. More likely than an actual frontal 
invasion, Lawrence felt that Russian activity would mani-
fest itself by generating internal disharmony in India. Thus 
there was a social and moral element in any scheme of Indian 
defence. The British dominion was that of a foreign people, 
few in number, and with a European army so limited that the 
concentration and utilization of it on an advanced frontier 
necessarily weakened British strength in the sub-continent 
that was still recovering from the Mutiny. 
Therefore, his policy of defence was summarized when 
he said in a dispatch of January 4, 1869: 
Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever 
seriously think of invading India, from without or 
what is more probable, of stirring up the elements 
of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true 
policy, our strongest security, would then, we con-
ceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from 
1. Aitchison, Sir John Lawrence, op. cit., p. 184. 
entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any 
similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact 
highly equipped and disciplined army, stationed 
within our own territories or on our own border; 
in the contentment if not in the attachment of the 
masses; in the sense of security of title and 
possession with which our whole policy is gradu-
ally imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and 
the native aristocracy; in the construction of 
material works within British India which enhance 
the comfort of the people, while they add to our 
political and military strength ; in husbanding 
our finances and consolidating and multiplying 
our resources; in quiet preparation f o r all con-
tingencies which no Indian statesman should 
disregard ; and in a trust in the rectitude and 
honesty of our intentions, coupled with the 
avoidance of all sources of complaint which 
either invite foreign aggression or stir up 
restless spirits to domestic revolt.l 
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Unquestionably the strongest factor in Lawrence's at-
t itude was his memory of 1857. As Edwardes points out : 
Superficially, it might seem that such a 
policy had been based upon ordinary common sense 
and memory of 1838, or perhaps even upon moral 
grounds, but this was in fact not the case. 
Lawrence never forgot the lesson of the Mutiny: 
that the British government in India was main-
tained by a combination of power and consent, and 
that a wave of popular feeling and hatred, properly 
led and supported from outside could drive the 
British into the sea. The aim of Lawrence, an aim 
to which all Imperial policy must be subordinate 
was simply to prevent the possibility of another 
and perhaps successful, mutiny.2 
It appears then that many factors conditioned Lawrence's 
opinions and helped develop his policies along what he saw 
l. Dispatch from Foreign Department, Government of India, 
January 4 , 1869 , quoted in Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 586. 
2. Edwardes, The Necessary Hell , op. cit. , p. 197. 
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as the only logical lines. The memory of the cause and the 
disastrous results of the First Afghan War ; the memory of 
the Mutiny ; the reality of the post Mutiny period ; the reality 
of the North West frontier situation and the reality of the 
Indian finances--these were the factors. In this context, 
the Lawrence policy was appropriate and logical. But these 
factors could change and thus leave the Masterly Inactivity 
policy inadequate and outdated. 
Thus one is forced to accept the verdict that : 
It was a magnificant policy so long as the 
Arnir remained friendly and undisturbed by Russian 
propinquity, and it could with little difficulty 
be changed into a more positive policy if the Arnir 
asked for closer relations. But it took an iron 
nerve and much confidence to remain untroubled in 
India , not knowing when the Russians might move .or 
what devils cauldron might be brewing behind the 
mountains of the Hindu Kush . The issues of the 
policy of Masterly Inactivity were too difficult 
and too delicate, there were so many factors which 
might destroy their equilibrium, and there was no 
means of restor~ng the balance once this was 
upset.l 
Certainly one of the things that could destroy the 
equilibrium was Russian expansion and the Russians were 
moving in the 1860's. This brought the end to Masterly 
Inactivity. As MacMunn says , 
The Policy was wise enough and might have 
held for all time had it not been for the steady 2 
absorption of the Central Asian Khanates by Russia. 
1. Fraser- Tytler, op. cit., p. 134. 
2. MacMunn, op. cit. , p. 166. 
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This development brought new forces into play in India, 
strengthened the existing opposition to the Lawrence policy, 
and brought about a restatement of the old forward policy 
which substituted action for inaction. 
Chapter VII 
FROM LAWRENCE TO LYTTON 
The ten years after Lawrence left the Indian scene 
was a period of transition, not only in the Indian domestic 
situation but also in Indian foreign policy. While the 
Viceroys Mayo and Northbrook attempted to work within the 
framework of the Lawrence policy , at least in principle, 
there were forces at work to create a change in British 
attitudes towards Afghanistan and Central Asia which de-
termined a modification of the Lawrence policy, if not an 
outright change of approach. 
There was, during the seventies, an ever-growing oppo-
sition to the Lawrence policy which became more and more 
influential in shaping official policy. The motivation of 
the opposition was the changing political climate beyond 
the Indian frontiers and the growing momentum of the Russian 
absorption of Central Asia which brought her closer and 
closer towards Afghanistan. 
Since Indian policy was for.med against this background 
of Russian expansion, it is desirable to examine this pheno-
menon briefly. 
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Russian activity in Central Asia, which at least one 
author compares to the American westward movement,l began 
to manifest itself in the late 1850's in the form of re-
conaissance and intelligence. For example :: 
In 1858 a mission of enquiry, accompanied by a 
large body of topographers was dispatched under 
Ignatief, to collect information about military 
conditions, roads, and means of transport.2 
During the 1860's Russian activity seemed to reach its 
peak and was therefore the more disturbing to the British; 
for as Thornton says, 
The strides made by the Russians into Central 
Asia between 1864-1869 were greater than any 
they took thereafter in that area,3 
one reason for this activity being the increased demand for 
Bokhara cotton, due to the American Civil War.4 
Recovering from the Crimean War, Russia set herself to 
strengthening her position in Central Asia.S Two means were 
employed: firstly by closing the open frontier between her 
l. Riasanovskyny, N. V., A History of Russia, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 432. 
2. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 407. 
3. Thornton, A. P., 1' Afghanistan in Anglo Russian 
Diplomacy, 1869-1873, " Cambridge Historical Journal, 
Vol. XI, 1954, p. 204. 
4. Thornton, A. P., " The Re-opening of the Central 
Asian Question 1864-1869, " History, Vol. 41, 1956, p. 128. 
5. Allworth, Edward, Central Asia: A Century of 
Russian Rule, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967, p. 131. 
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advanced positions at Perovsk on the Orenberg Line and 
Vernoe on the line of Siberia, and secondly by increased 
activity on the Caspian Sea, resulting in the occupation of 
Krasnovodsk and the advance along the Atrek. 1 By 1864 she 
had begun to move westward from Vernoe and eastward from 
Perovsk ; Auliata was taken by the force moving from Vernoe 
and the city of Turkestan taken by the Perovsk force , while 
Chamkand in the centre completed the line. This movement 
brought Russia face to face with the Uzbeg Khanates of 
Khokand, Khiva and Bokhara ; 
their absorption was obviously a mere matter 
of time but the movement only became marked to -
wards the end of Lawrence's period of office.2 
Russia had also advanced to the Jaxartes by the occu-
pation of Tashkent and Chinaz in 1865. Early in 1865 
General Cherniaev had emphasized that it was impossible for 
Russia to maintain her position in Central Asia if Tashkent 
were not occupi ed.3 Thus the fate of Kokand, Khiva and 
Bokhara appeared sealed. As Wyllie observed, 
All three retain an independent existence 
only so long as Russia pleases, two hundred 
1. Aitchison , Sir John Lawrence , op. cit., p. 184. 
2. Roberts, op. cit., p. 409. 
3. Allworth, op. cit., p. 132. 
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navigable miles of the Oxus are all that separate 
Khiva from the Russian flotilla on the Aral Sea ; 
and Kokand . • it is not a hundred miles from 
the large Russian garrison at Tashkent.l 
This prediction proved accurate enough, for in 1866, 
Khokand, Oratippa, and Jizak were annexed, coming under 
Czarist control and adding 4,200 square miles south of the 
Jaxartes to the Russian possessions. Bokhara fell next by 
the occupation of Samarkand and Katikurgan. By 1867 Bokhara 
had been reduced, and the province of Russian Turkestan set 
up, under the Governorship of General Kaufmann, 'l a fervent 
expansionist. r; 2 
Thus by the late 1860's only Khiva remained separate 
from Russian domination ; but it was felt that Khiva, like 
Tashkent a few years earlier, would give a sense of solidar-
ity to the Central Asian conquest. 3 
Just as there were different opinions on how best to 
deal with the Russian expansion, there were likewise differ-
ent motives ascribed to the actual cause of the expansion, 
and different opinions as to whether it constituted a threat 
to British India. 
1. Wyllie' I Foreign Policy of Sir John Lawrence' r· op. 
cit., p. 36. 
2. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 127. 
3. Allworth, op. cit., p. 143. 
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Prince Gorchakov, the Russian Chancellor, directed 
Russian representatives abroad to explain Russian expan-
tion through the same theory that the British had used. 
Gorchakov in his dispatch wrote : 
The position of Russia in Central Asia is 
that of all civilized states which are brought 
into contact with half savage , nomad populations , 
possessing no fixed social organization. 
In such cases it always happens that the 
more civilized state is forced, in the interests 
of the security of its frontier and its commer-
cial relations, to exercise a certain ascendency 
over those whom their turbulent and unsettled 
character make most undesirable neighbours. 
First there are raids and acts of pillage 
to put down. To put a stop to them, the tribes 
on the frontier have to be reduced to a state 
of more or less perfect submission.l 
However, some felt that the drive into Central Asia 
was motivated by purely political considerations. For 
example, 
Russian activity in the Central Asian khanates after 
1858 was produced more by political motives than 
by the supposed necessity of imposing order on bar-
barous neighbours.2 
Furthermore, it was felt that the '1 p o litical motives " 
were directed towards Europe rather than Asia : 
. neither strategy, nor lust of conquest, nor 
military glory, nor any one of the thousand and 
l. Kazemzadeh, op. cit. , p. 8. 
2. Dodwell, op. cit. , p. 407. 
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one motives which in matters of peace and war 
ordinarily actuate nations, was the governing 
principle in directing the Russian advance into 
Central Asia. That principle was, I believe, an 
intense desire to reach the threshold of India, 
not for the purpose of direct or immediate attack, 
but with a view to political pressure on Great 
Britain.l 
This principle was verified in 1858 by Ignat'ev, the Russian 
military attache in London, when he wrote : 
In the case of a conflict with England, it 
is only in Asia that we shall be able to struggle 
with her in any chances for success and to weaken 
her.2 
Nevertheless, to some observers, expansion appeared as 
a positive good impeded by British policy in Europe. 
for example, says 
Russian absorption was in its way all to the good 
of mankind and civilization . . Had it not been 
for our policy of maintaining Turkey in Europe 
and in Asia, and therefore getting at loggerheads 
with Russia, we might have had a settlement which 
would have relieved us of much of our anxieties.3 
Others saw it as a definite plan to invade India. 
MacMunn, 
General Cherniaev the conqueror of Tashkent, who, accord-
ing to Wyllie, desired no further annexations, wrote: 
The mysterious veil which has hitherto covered 
the conquest of India, a conquest looked upon until 
now as fabulous, is beginning to lift itself before 
my eyes.4 
l. Rawlinson, " The Russian Advance in Central Asia, " 
op. cit. 1 p. 560. 
2. Allworth, op. cit., p. 150. 
3. MacMunn, op. cit., p. 166. 
4. Vambery, Arminius, "Will Russia Conquer India, " 
op. cit., p. 25. 
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Arminius Vambery claims that it was only after the 
capture of Tashkent that the Russians looked towards India ; 
this was the great turning point ; or as Vambery says, " It 
may be therefore asserted that it was then only that the 
Indian light began to burst upon the eyes of Russia. u.l 
And we must not forget that Russian frontier generals, 
even more than their British counterparts, often determined 
frontier policy. On one occasion, Lord Clarendon, the Sec-
retary of State for foreign affairs, observed that Russian 
armies were 
impelled forward either by direct orders from 
St. Petersburg, or by ambitions of generals 
in disregard of the pacific intentions of the 
Emperor,2 
while Gorchakov agreed that the military " had all exceeded 
their instructions in the hope of gaining distinction . . , 3 
Following this line of thought o n e writer claims that 
even the occupation of Tashkent was ''unknown to St. Peters-
burg and without authorization;" furthermore, 
in all these cases of Russian annexation, the 
British were inclined to see Russian deceit and 
calculated design, where in fact there was simply 
lack of control from St. Petersburg.4 
1. Ibid, p. 2 6 . 
2. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 15. 
3. Ibid, p. 15. 
4. Lederer, Ivo J. (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 247-248. 
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This period of intense Russian activity coincided with 
Lawrence's policy of non-intervention and non-involvement 
in trans-frontier affairs and with the war of succession in 
Afghanistan. About the time that Samarkand fell, Lawrence 
had to reconsider his position and pressed for some arrange-
ment with Russia. 
Thus Lawrence made two proposals, to assist the es-
tablished government at Kabul and to conduct friendly 
negotiations with Russia. Out of these proposals grew the 
subsequent British policy: firstly, the grant of assistance 
to Sher Ali when he had recovered Kabul; secondly, the meet-
ing with Sher Ali at Ambala in March, 1869; thirdly, the 
proposal of a neutral zone between the Russian and British 
spheres of influence in Central Asia; fourthly, the negotia-
tions with Russia for the delimitation of the northern and 
western frontiers of Afghanistan; and fifthly, the measures 
taken for the consolidation of the Afghan Government down 
to the time of Lord Lytton.l 
At almost the same time that the Russian influence 
was extended to the River Oxus, John Lawrence was replaced 
by Lord Mayo (January, 1869). There is a considerable 
difference of opinion as to whether this marked a departure 
1. Aitchison, Sir John Lawrence, op. cit., p. 186. 
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from the Lawrence policy of Masterly Inactivity or whether 
Mayo continued that policy, only to change it later under 
other pressures. The differences center about what was 
the highlight of Mayo's administration : his meeting with 
Sher Ali at Ambala. 
Mayo ' s biographer contends that there was no change in 
policy at Ambala, but also admits that Lawrence had himself 
previously changed his policy. He writes: 
It has been represented that Lord Mayo, by the 
Ambala Durbar in, March 1869, reversed his pre-
decessor's policy towards Afghanistan. Now the 
truth is, in the first place , that the policy was 
not reversed, and, in the second place, that any 
changes which took place in it were marked out by 
Lord Mayo's predecessor himself.l 
However, Lawrence's biographer claims that Mayo sup-
ported an u n changed Lawrence policy. He writes that: 
The pledges of friendly feeling and of non-
interference given by John Lawrence to Dost 
Mohammed in 1855 and 1856 at Jamrud, and after-
wards to Sher Ali in 1869, had been endorsed by 
Lord Mayo at Umballa, and had been renewed, with 
still more explicit assurances by Lord Northbrook 
at Simla.2 
Whether a change in policy or a li legitimate development ," 
Lawrence was apparently satisfied that his disciples were 
continuing his work. As Bosworth Smith reports: 
-1. Hunter, W. w., Life of the Earl of Mayo, London, 
Smith Elder & Co., 1875, Vol. I, p. 256. 
2. Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 622. 
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Lawrence had the infinite satisfaction of feeling 
that . . Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook were 
strenuously endeavouring to carry out the policy 
which he had constantly advised towards Afghanis-
tan, towards Central Asia and towards Russia.l 
While Hunter portrays the Ambala meeting as a great 
success , not everyone agreed. There were those who not 
only regarded the meeting as a change in policy , but also 
questioned its effectiveness. Fletcher, for example, says 
that, " the talks there were unproductive ; the British were 
in the final throes of masterly inactivity. " 2 
Before the meeting with Sher Ali, Mayo himself expressed 
the hope that he would not have to depart from the Lawrence 
policy; but at the same time he realized that he would have 
to be careful not to alienate Sher Ali. Hunter quotes him 
as saying : 
I think any treaty or promise of permanent 
subsidy most unadvisable. At the same time we 
must not shut ourselves out altogether from 
assisting Sher Ali if we find it advantageous 
so to do.3 
Actually the meeting with Sher Ali had been arranged 
before Lawrence's departure from India. Sher Ali had wanted 
closer relations with the Indian Government and had asked 
for a definite treaty, a fixed subsidy , and assistance in 
l. Ibid, p. 6 2 2 . 
2. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 127. 
3. Hunter, op. cit. , Vol. I , p. 257. 
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arms and men. He actually wanted a commitment on the part of 
the British to support his throne and his dynasty. Further-
more, he wanted recognition of Abdulla Jan rather than Yakub 
Khan as heir. 
While we may agree that the meeting itself was "no breach 
in continuity in policy," 1 the demands of SherAli "went far 
beyond anything Mayo was prepared to concede, " 2 since they 
would have linked up British power and prestige in India with 
the fortunes of Afghanistan, which was far from being a stable 
dynasty. Thus Sher Ali had to be refused, yet his friendship 
had to be maintained. 
Thus Sher Ali was not given a treaty of alliance but a 
letter of friendship and support, plus a gift of two batteries 
of artillery and 10,000 stands of arms. While he was given 
nothing that he asked for, yet "Mayo sent the Arnir away sat-
isfied and deeply impressed with being on good terms with 
3 
the British power." 
Sher Ali expressed his satisfaction with the meeting and 
his impression of British power , in a letter to Mayo (April 3, 1869) 
If [he declared] it please God, as long as 
I _arn alive, or as long as my government exists, 
l. Roberts, op. cit., p. 412. 
2. Ibid I p. 413. 
3. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 257. 
the foundations of friendship and goodwill between 
this and the powerful British Government will not 
be weakened.l 
l9l 
Despite this declaration, and however charmed Sher Ali 
might have been by Mayo it must be that having got so little 
of what he had asked for he left Ambala slightly disappointed. 2 
Bosworth Smith recognizes this when he writes, 
If Sher Ali was still dissatisfied it was because 
he had asked for pledges which would certainly 
have drawn us into the vortex of the internal 
politics of Afghanistan.3 
For his part Mayo was delighted with his achievements 
and expressed the belief that a new day had begun in Indo 
Afghan relations. He wrote: 
The Afghans were once our friends I believe 
they may be so again , if we adhere strictly to 
what has been commenced here ; and the day may not 
be far distant when we may find the advantage of 
possessing on our frontier an almost impenetrable 
country manned by some of the best hill troops in 
the world.4 
Accordingly , Mayo expressed his satisfaction to Lawrence , 
revealing that he had not departed from the Lawrence policy, 
but suggesting that Lawrence had, during his last few months 
as Viceroy, taken a different position to the held previously. 
l. Sher Ali to Lord Mayo , April 3 , 1869 , quoted in 
F r aser- Tytler, op. cit. , p. 132. 
2~ Thornton , A. P., " British Policy in Pers ia 1858 -
1890 , " English Historical Review , Vol. 69 , 1954 , p. 569 . 
3. Smith, op. cit., Vol. I I , p. 622. 
4. Hunter , op. cit., Vol. I., p. 216. 
But I adhered [Mayo wrote] rigidly to the 
line laid down--i.e., no treaty or engagements 
which may, hereafter, embarass us I believe 
that when you sent Sher Ali the money and arms 
last December you laid the foundation of a policy 
which will be of the greatest use to us hereafter. 
I wish to continue it.l 
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One positive aspect of the Ambala meeting was the fact 
that a personal contact, "so vital in dealing with an 
Afghan,"2 had been established between Amir and Viceroy which 
Lawrence had never established. 
Some historians regard the Ambala meeting as that turn-
ing point in British policy which marked the beginning of 
the transition form "Masterly Inactivity" to a new line re-
sulting eventually in Lytton's forward policy. According to 
this school, the meeting with Sher Ali was held to convince 
him that a change was taking place. As the Cambridge History 
of India puts it, 
Endeavours had been made to remove the unfavourable 
impressions produced upon SherAli by Lawrence's 
policy which even before Lawrence's retirement from 
the Governor Generalship in 1869 was already recog-
nized by its author as inadequate.3 
This view is supported by Thornton who points out that, 
before Lawrence left India he laid aside his policy 
of inactivity since he held out his hand both to 
greet and support Sher Ali.4 
l. Smith, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 625. 
2. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 132. 
3. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 409. 
4. Thornton, "Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy, " 
op. cit. , p. 2 0 7 . 
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In any case, if we continue to follow Thornton, the meeting, 
seen in this context, was something less than a diplomatic 
triumph. For he contends that 
Sher Ali came looking for a fixed treaty 
but got a handout and assurance that the 'Govern-
ment of India would endeavour from time to time, 
by such means as circumstances may require, to 
strengthen the Government of Your Highness' 
Mayo intended this as an evasion ; Sher Ali as a 
pledge.l 
It is significant that J. W. S. Wyllie, whom we already 
know as a strong supporter of the Lawrence policy, inter-
prets the Ambala Durbar not only as a sensational break with 
the policy of the past, but also as one of those significant 
turning points which affected all of Central Asia and started 
a new policy of "Mischievous Activity. " As he puts it, 
the same English who lately had not an obolus of 
alms for his [SherAli's] distribution are now 
eagerly cour£in g the honour of his exaulted 
friendship.2 
Since Lawrence was at the end of his term, he was pre-
pared to concede to his successor "a certain dalliance with 
milder forms of p 9 pular infatuation. " He had concluded that 
his policy was doomed to some modification, but felt that he 
had it in his power to trace what the modification would be. 
1. Ibid, p. 208. 
2. Wyllie, J. W. S., "Mischievous Activity, " Fortnightly 
Review, March, 1870. 
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Thus, to confine what he regarded as impeding mischief 
within manageable bounds he proposed that money should be 
granted to Sher Ali. 
While the general attitude of historians is that Mayo 
gave very little at Ambala , Wyllie c h arges that he gave too 
much and that the Durbar appeared to Sher Ali as a British 
apology for past policy. 
Mayo [Wyllie charges] erred on the side of 
excessive gomplaisance to his Afghan quest . 
instead of being decently grateful for benefits 
to which he [Sher Ali] had , by desert, no claim 
whatever, he grumbled aloud that our bounty had 
been long in coming and that he had been all but 
ruined by the delay.l 
Furthermore , Wyllie contends that Sher Ali demanded 
and Mayo agreed, that Persia should be called to account 
for encroachments in Seistan. Actually, as we shall see , 
a new arrangement in regards to Seistan was a vital part of 
the new policy and very much in the interest of British India. 
To Wyllie the Durbar had far reaching consequences. 
For Mayo had committed the Indian Government to the support 
of Sher Ali and thus to a deeper involvement in Afghan 
politics. The alternative would be to repudiate an alliance 
and thereby lose face. 
1. Ibid. 
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In India, Wyllie reported, the Durbar was interpreted 
as a slap in the fact to Russia ; the " Grand Game l( was re-
vived in the Indian newspapers which predicted that soon 
there would be British agents in Afghanistan and British 
officers training the Amir's army. 
In Persia likewise the Durbar had repercussions. The 
result was equally mischievous for the Shah was suspicious 
of a British-Afghan alliance. Alarmed over Seistan, he 
called upon the British cabinet for an explanation and had 
to be assured by British diplomats that the Afghan policy 
was not hostile to Persia. 
More important, the Durbar was reported by Wyllie to 
give offence to St. Petersburg. More likely it was con-
venient for Russia to pretend that offence had been given 
in order to justify her own Central Asian policy. However, 
the Russian press denounced the event as 11 the first stone 
of the wall which the Anglo Indian Government was hastening 
to build across the road of the Russians in Central Asia. 11 1 
The Moscow Gazette observed that if England had chosen 
to intrigue in Afghanistan the same game was open to Russia 
in Bokhara, and Turkestan would be a formidable base of 
operations against the Indian Empire. Furthermore, the 
l. Ibid. 
Russian publication, The Golas, reported : 
The commercial war already being waged be-
tween England and Russia on the northern frontier 
of Afghanistan is not at all unlikely to give way 
some day to a combat with more sanguinary weapons 
than weights and measures. In this case, t h e 
rifles presented to the Amir by the Earl of Mayo 
would stand him in good stead , though, for the 
matter of that , the Amir , after taking pounds 
sterling , is quite as likely as not to try 
roubles for a change.l 
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Thus, in Wyllie's interpretation , the Durbar had pro-
found repercussions and were bound to influence Anglo 
Russian diplomacy. Generally , according to Wyll i e , the 
results of the Durbar were to leave 
Russia irritated into the very course of 
aggression we wanted to prevent ; Persia sul l enly 
augmenting her encroachments towards Seistan and 
Mekran ; India startled from her task of self-
improvement by expectation of a ' Great Game ' 
being opened to decide her destiny ; and British 
influence in Afghanistan staked on the fate of 
an ungrateful and half- crazy individual.2 
If Mayo had inherited Lawrence ' s foreign problems , he 
likewise inherited Lawrence's problem of an unsettled fron-
tier; but was not completely inclined to accept i t as 
Lawrence had left it. In fact, he was critical of the tac -
tics employed on the frontier. Thus he proposed , 
to substitute as far as possible , for surpr i se , 
aggression, and reprisal, a policy of vigilant, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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constant, and never ceasing defence of those parts 
of our frontier which are by their position liable 
to be attacked by foreign tribes.l 
However, this was part of a new foreign policy and a 
realization of possible invasion, particularly if the border 
area betrayed signs of British weakness. 
Every shot [he continued] fired in anger within 
the limits of our Indian Empire reverberates through-
out Asia ; gives to nations who are no friends to 
Christian or European rule the notion that amongst 
our own subjects that there are still men in arms 
against us ; and corroborates the assertion that 
the people within our frontier are not yet wholly 
subjected to our sway and that British power is 
still disputed in Hindustan.2 
Actually, Mayo took two approaches to foreign affairs, 
through negotiations at St. Petersburg and by consolidating 
relations with the frontier states. As far as Afghanistan 
was concerned, relations could best be consolidated by ob-
serving the principles that had guided Lawrence: first, 
that there would be no European officers placed as residents 
in Afghan cities; second, that there would be no offensive 
and defensive treaty ; third, no British soldier would be 
sent across the frontier to coerce the Amir ' s subjects. 3 
But in consolidating relations with the frontier states, 
Persia presented a problem. The Persian boundary was not 
1. Hunter, op. cit., Vol~ I, p. 236. 
2~ Ibid, p. 237. 
3. Aitchison, Sir John Lawrence, op. cit., p. 191. 
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settled and Mayo feared that the Persian frontier might ad-
vance to be coterminous with India , with Persia absorbing 
the territory between Sind and the Mekran. 
In 1870 he wrote : 
Persia by her policy of aggression in the Gulf , 
on Mekran coast , Beluch frontier and Seistan 
has got into what is rapidly proving for herself 
a dangerous line.l 
The Seistan basin, on the Persian Afghan border, was 
of real importance to the British since it commanded the 
valley of the Helmand and with it a route to India. Colonel 
Holdich writes : 
It is, after all, the highways of Herat and 
Seistan that form the only avenues for military 
approach to the Indian frontier that are not 
barred by difficulties of Nature's own providing , 
or commanded from the sea.2 
Lord Curzon's evaluation of Seistan, although expresse d 
near the end of the century was no less true for the l870's. 
He wrote : 
Seistan is, by virtue of its position and its 
features , an object of much interest both to Russia 
and Great Britain. Situated at the point of junc-
tion of the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan, and 
Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies of 
all three countries. Lying, as it does , almost 
l. Hunter , op. cit. , Vol. I , p. 288. 
2. Holdich , T. H. , The Gates of India, London , Mac 
Millan and Co. , l9l0 , p. 525. 
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midway between Meshed and the Persian Gulf, no 
advances can be made from Khorasan to the sea 
except through Seistan. Its position upon the 
exposed flank of Afghanistan would render its 
occupation of great value to any power contemplat-
ing a move against that country, or an advance 
upon Kandahar. Nor will it be denied that the 
Kandahar~Herat line could not be held with safety 
by India, nor the valley of the Helmand defended, 
were a hostile power in possession of Seistan.l 
Likewise, Valentine Chirol claimed: 
Seistan alone, amidst the wilderness of Eastern 
Persia, would afford her [Russia] in virtue of 
its natural resources and geographic position a 
tempting field for economic and political expan-
sion, as well as an admirable strategic base for 
future military operation.2 
Thus it was very much to British India's advantage to 
improve relations with Persia as well as with Afghanistan. 
Therefore, at the Shah's request, 3 Mayo agreed to the ar-
bitration of the Persian-Kalat boundary, and in 1872 the 
Seistan boundary was demarcated. 
As far as Persia and Afghanistan were concerned, the 
situation was reminiscent of the early part of the century 
when the British were hastening to cement relations with 
neighbouring states to serve as buffers for the outer limits 
of Indian defence. That situation too was a prelude to 
intervention and eventually, war. 
1. Quoted in Greaves, op. cit., p. 18. 
2. Chirol, Valentine, The Middle Eastern Question, 
London, John Murray, 1903, p. 288. 
3. Greaves, op. cit., p. 18. 
For Hunter says of Mayo's policy 
By these varied means and by firmly estab-
lishing our internal influence in Afghanistan and 
Kalat he had surrounded the whole western and 
north-western frontier of India with friendly and 
well defined states.l 
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As far as Russia was concerned, Mayo's attitude shows a 
departure from the Lawrence policy, conditioned with a note 
of caution. 
I hope [he declared] that sensible men will 
not continue to advocate the extreme line of in-
action, or the worse alternative of meddling and 
interfering by subsidies and emissaries . the 
Central Asian question is only a bugbear if pru-
dence be observed.2 
His policy of 11 habitual watchfulness and friendly intercourse " 3 
he felt was best facilitated by negotiation at St. Petersburg, 
consequently in November of 1869 Sir Douglas Forsyth was 
sent to St. Petersburg. On this line, Mayo's ideas of for-
eign policy were similar to those of Lawrence, who had 
suggested as early as l867 that it might be expedient to 
come to some understanding with Russia. 
Since the Cabinet in London was reluctant to take any 
but diplomatic steps against Russian expansion, 4 negotiations 
between the British Foreign Secretary and Prince Gorchakov 
l. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 295. 
2. Quoted in Ibid, p. 258. 
3. 
p. 209. 
Thornton, '' Afghanistan in Anglo-Russian Diplomacy, " 
4. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. l4. 
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began. Clarendon proposed that the two governments might 
agree to establish a neutral zone in Central Asia. On 
March 27 , 1868, Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, trans -
mitted to Clarendon a letter from Go rchakov giving assurance 
in regard to the neutrality of Afghanistan. 1 But the India 
Officer could not accept the idea of Afghanistan as a neu-
tral zone since the frontiers of Afghanistan were too ill 
defined. But 
the core of the objection lay in the plain fact 
that they could not afford to allow to Sher Ali 
the privileges of a neutral . the Amir at 
Kabul s ~ould certainly be independent--but he 
must also live in friendly relations with the 
Government of India.2 
Rather, the India Office proposed the line of the Upper 
Oxus as a boundary which neither power should permit its 
forces to cross ; but there was little chance of Russia 
accepting this since Khiva was south of the Oxus. 
Thornton states that Clarendon and Gortchakov treated 
the matter as an exercise in diplomacy rather than an 
investigation into the possibilities of practical action.3 
Kazemzadeh supports this view. He claims that: 
The Clarendon- Gorchakov pourparlers 
neither did nor could lead to an understanding. 
1. Ibid, p. 14. 
2. Thornton , ! I Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy, " 
op. cit., p. 212. 
3. Ibid, p. 212. 
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St. Petersburg was aware of the indecision in 
London. If anything, Britains conciliatory 
attitude and the acceptance of Gorchakov's version 
of the causes of Russian conquests in Central Asia 
encouraged further moves southward and eastward. 
Negotiations, exchanges of notes, reminders con-
cerning old pledges, and expressions of dissatis-
faction on the part of the British had not the 
slightest effect upon Russian planning and exe-
cution of conquests. Now that Tashkent and 
Khojent had been annexed, it was Khiva ' s turn 
to fall before the armies of the Aq-Khan (the 
White Tsar) .1 
Actually Sir Charles Wood, then Secretary of State 
for India had advised that England should not put her sig-
nature to any convention or agreement which might tie her 
hands in the future in circumstances which could not then 
be foreseen. Consequently a dispatch proposing that both 
England and Russia limit their expansion had been so 
emendated by the India Officer that it was rendered 
meaningless. 2 
In November of 1869 the Russians had established a 
base at Krasnovodsk on the southern Caspian and opened a 
caravan road to a point on the Oxus, a movement which was 
interpreted by Wyllie in 1870 as a prelude to a campaign 
against Khiva.3 
1. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 15~ 
2. Thornton, A. P., " TheRe Opening of the Central 
Asian Question~ 1864-69, " op. cit., p. 133. 
3. Wyllie, ''Mischievous Activity,· op. cit. 
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Because of border interference on the part of the Khivans, 
Kaufmann reported to St. Petersburg the necessity of military 
action and received permission to undertake it.l However, 
Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 
deduced that the Imperial Government did not wish to annex 
Kh iva but preferred to make a client of the Khan, since, " Russia's 
financial position was not such as could allow her to continue a 
career of military adventure in Central Asia. " 2 
Thus Britain pressed again to settle the Afghan border. 
Britain would hold Sher Ali to these boundaries and 11 all causes 
of uneasiness and jealousy between England and Russia in re-
gard to their respective policies in Asia could be removed. " 3 
On January 24, 1873, Granville wrote to Gorchakov con-
cerning SherAli's rights on the northern Afghan front i er 
which were conceded. 
The understanding was arrived at that the 
northern boundaries of Afghanistan should include 
all territories then in possession of the Arnir up 
to the Oxus but the Amir was not to cross the river 
or interfere in Bukhara • the British Govern-
ment would see that the Amir adhered to this and 
Eussia would not encroach southwards.4 
l. Pierce, R. A., Russian Central Asia, Berkley, 
University of California Press, 1960, p. 29. 
2. Thornton, 11 Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy," 
op. cit., p. 215. 
3. Jbid' p. 216. 
4. Hunter, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 274. 
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Thus Granville managed to end the diplomatic game sug-
gested by Lawrence and Mayo, but the idea of a neutral zone 
was abandoned. However, the agreement of l873 has been inter-
preted as a diplomatic victory for Russia, since 
by the l873 agreement Russia gained her point. 
Her policy was now to advance up to the effective 
borders of Afghanistan. All that was rea lly ob-
tained was an admission that Russia regarded 
Afghanistan as beyond her sphere of interest.l 
Opponents of the Lawrence school were not impressed by 
the diplomatic notes; they felt that the Russian drive into 
Central Asia towards British India was unlikely to be brought 
to a halt by a line of frontier which neither Englishmen nor 
Russians had ever seen. The same outlook was expressed by 
General Cherniaev: 
As long as England and Russia [he wrote] mean well 
towards each other their respective interests in 
Cent ral Asia will not require the protection of a 
written agreement, which, on the other hand, is of 
such a character that Russia will easily find a num-
ber of pretexts for breaking it when necessary.2 
Through this agreement and Russian statements regarding 
Khiva, Britain felt that Russia had pledged herself not t o 
occupy and hold Khiva. Then in August of l873 Khiva fell to 
t h e Russians; the " English press expressed great agitation, 
l. Dodwell, op. cit., p. 409. 
2. Thornton, "Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy, " 
op. cit., p. 2l7. 
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declaring that this new Russian conquest was a threat to 
Afghan independence. " 1 In January of 1873, Granville had 
been assured that orders had been issued against the 
occupation of Khiva, 2 yet within a year it had become a 
Russian province_ Shortly after the occupation of Khiva , 
Lord Lawrence, in a minute on the Central Asian question, 
admitted that Russia's approach to India was " fraught with 
future trouble and danger. n 3 
The fall of Khiva to the Russians was the single most 
dramatic incident in Anglo-Russo-Afghan relations. Russia, 
in pursuit of her "manifest destiny, " 4 was drawn into this 
area by the same geographic magnetism that had compelled 
both British and Russian annexations. Geographically the 
Upper Oxus and all the northern slope of the Iran and Afghan 
plateaux belong to the Ural Caspian reg ion, and 
As soon as the Russian Empire had stepped 
into the delta of the Amu the conquest of the 
whole basin became a sad necessity. The march 
on Khiva already implied the occupation of Merv ; 
and as soon as a footing was taken on the eastern 
l. Allworth, op. cit. , p. 147. 
2. Edwardes, Asia in the European Age, op. cit., p. 182. 
3. Quoted in Greaves, op. cit., p. 25. 
4. Thornton, A. P., " TheRe Opening of the Central 
Asian Question, 1864-69, " op. cit., p. 133. 
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coast of the Caspian, the conquest of Geok-Tepe 
of Merv, and Penj-deh were unavoidable. The 
advance no longer depended on the will of the 
rulers, therefore, it became one of those natural 1 phenomena which must be fulfilled sooner or later. 
The design on Khiva was well under way when British 
and Russian diplomats were attempting to come to terms over 
Central Asia. For, during the same period as the negotia-
tions were taking place, 1870-73, the St. Petersburg Geogra-
phical Society was beseiged with schemes of exploration of 
the Amu Basin: 
The Government [Kropotkin claims] took ad-
vantage of this scientific glow for planning its 
advance into the Turcoman Steppes thousands 
of roubles were immediately voted by all possible 
ministries for pushing forward the learned pioneers 
into the Trans Caspian. This willingness to sup-
port scientific exploration precisely in that 
direction, was obviously the result of a scheme 
long ago elaborated at the Foreign Office for 
opening a new route towards the Indian frontier. 
Far from checking the advance the government 
favoured it by all means.2 
The possession of the Khiva opened new avenues to the 
Russian frontier generals whose ambitions were boundless. 
General Skobeleff predicted: 
It will be in the end our duty to organize 
masses of Asiatic cavalry, and to hurl them into 
India under the banners of blood and pillage, as 
l. Kropotkin, ''The Coming War, " Nineteenth Century, 
Vol. 17, 1885, p. 746. 
2. Ibid, p. 747. 
a vanguard, as it were, thus reviving the times 
of a Tamerlane.l 
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And towards this end Kropotkin declared that, " The ad-
vance in the Trans Caspian region had been really made with 
a determined aim- - the seizure of Herat. " 2 And from Herat, 
according to Skobeleff , the road might well lead to 
Constantinople.3 
The importance of Khiva to Russia was not to be under -
estimated , for with Khiva in their hands the Russians could 
establish themselves on the Lower Oxus. The problem of sup-
plying Tashkent and Turkestan from Oren burg was now solved. 4 
The Oxus was a navigable river, new communications would 
connect it with Tashkent and Samarkand on one side and on 
the southern side with the Caspian Sea either through Merv 
or Khiva. Now the Persian flank , the whole frontier of 
Khorassan lay exposed. 5 The Russian incursion into Khiva 
had made Herat the key not only to western Afghanistan--
Kabul-~India--but also Kandahar and the Persian Gulf. 
p. 
The fall of Khiva had thus changed the true centre 
of gravity in Central Asian affairs so far as 
1. Vambery , ll Will Russia Conquer India, " 0}2. cit. , 
40. 
2. Kropotkin, op. cit., p. 747. 
3. Vambery, I Will Russia Conquer India, ' OE· cit., p. 
4. Thornton , A. P., '" British Policy in Persia , 1858-
1890 , '' op. cit., p. 561. 
5. Greaves, op. cit., p. 27. 
41. 
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British India was concerned, from the mountains 1 
of Afghanistan to the Persian and Turkoman plain. 
This new state of affairs was to influence British 
Afghan relations, for Sher Ali became alarmed at the nearness 
of Russia and demanded a clear and definite statement of 
policy from the Viceroy. However, in 1872 Lord Mayo had 
been assassinated and the personal link that had been forged 
at Ambala was now broken. 
Sher Ali, with only Merv and the Oxus between him and 
the Russians, turned to the British. Since there was no 
British agent in Kabul, the Amir's agent went to Simla and 
asked for a definite statement of British policy in the 
event of Russian aggression. 
The envoy asked that a written assurance 
might be given to him to the effect that if Russia, 
or any state of Turkestan or elsewhere under 
Russian influence should commit an aggression on 
the Amir's territories, or should otherwise annoy 
the Amir, the British government would consider 
such aggressor an enemy, and that they could prom-
ise to afford to the Amir promptly such assistance 
in money and arms as might be required until the 
danger should be past or invasion repelled. Also, 
that if the Amir should be unable to cope single-
handed with the invader, that the British Government 
should promptly dispatch a force to his assistance 2 by whatever route the Amir might require the same. 
The Amir was looking for the British to act on that pledge 
that he felt had been given at Ambala. But instead of getting 
l. Thornton, "Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy, " 
op. cit., p. 203. 
2. Dolwell, op. cit., p. 410· 
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action he got a further evasion. He was merely told that: 
The Russians had agreed to respect the north-
ern boundaries of Afghanistan which followed the 
course of the Oxus from its source in the Pamirs 
to a point named Dhivaja Salar, thence South West 
to the Persian border so as to include within 
Afghanistan's limits Balkh, Andkhui, Maimana and 
Herat and that the Russian Government had agreed 
that the territories of the Amir contained by this 
boundary were completely outside the sphere within 1 which they might be called on to exercise influence. 
With the approach of the Russians, Sher Ali, by 1873, 
realized that he had to accept closer and likely more sub-
ordinate relations with either the British or the Russians. 
The appearance of his envoy at Simla showed that he gave 
the first preference to the British connection. The envoy . 
stated his Amir's position to Northbrook, (July 12, 1873) 
The rapid advances made by the Russians in 
Central Asia had aroused the gravest apprehensions 
in the minds of the people of Afghanis~an. What-
ever specific assurances the Russians may give, 
and however often these may be repeated, the people 
of Afghanistan can place no confidence in them, 
and will never rest satisfied unless they are 
assured of the aid of the British Government.2 
However, in the 1870's, the Viceroy was unfortunately 
not allowed the freedom of action which earlier Governors 
General had exercised. There was a difference of opinion 
as to the sincerity of Sher Ali and the Russian threat 
1. Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 135. 
2. Singhal, D.P., India and Afghanistan, St. Lucia, 
University of Queensland Press, 1963, p. 11. 
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between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India. 
Lord Northbrook, who had replaced Lord Mayo, was ap-
parently more concerned with the trans-border situation than 
had been his predecessor. As far as Persia was concerned, 
he advised stronger relations in the form of a military at-
1 
tache to the Legation at Teheran. And as far as Afghanistan 
was concerned he would apparently have given the Amir more 
encouragement, for he wanted to inform him that: 
if he unreservedly accepts our advice in all 
external relations, we will help him with money, 
arms and troops if necessary to expel unprovoked 
invasion.2 
But the Secretary of State, apparently still under the 
Lawrence policy of non-intervention, rejected this proposal 
and the envoy was told by Northbrook: "The question is of such 
importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a 
more sui table opportunity. '1 3 
Thus the Amir was told by his envoy that the mission had 
failed~ To this disappointment was added the dissatisfaction 
of the British award in the Seistan dispute 4 and the British 
position on the matter of his successor. 
1. Greaves, op. cit., p. 28. 
2. Quoted in Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 135. 
3. Quoted in Ibid, p. 135. 
4. Thornton, A. P., uBritish Policy in Persia 1858-
1890, '' op. cit., p. 566. 
2ll 
This Simla meeting was obviously a turning point in 
British~Afghan relations, and marked a change in the attitude 
of Sher Ali. As Roberts puts it : 
It is a matter of regret that at this oppor~ 
tunity a more binding agreement was not entered 
upon with Sher Ali. In l869 it was not feasible 
since Sher Ali was new on the throne, but by 1873 
he had proved his ability.l 
Before the Simla meeting the regard Sher Ali had for 
the British was expressed by Bosworth Smith in these words: 
Sher Ali had governed Afghanistan well ; had re-
garded Lawrence with reverence ; Mayo with passionate 
affection ; Northbrook without any feelings of 
hostility.2 
But after Simla he was disillusioned with the British and 
embittered. As Thornton says: 
It was clear to him that the British Government 
would never stir to maintain the power of the Arnir 
of Kabul for love of him , but perhaps it might 
be induced to do so for fear he found another, and 
firmer , friend to take his part.3 
Thus it is suggested that Sher Ali turned to the Russians 
simply to pressure the English into giving more satisfaction 
than expressed at Simla. On the other hand it is suggested 
that Sher Ali had no other hope but to turn to Russia after 
l. Roberts , op. cit., p. 425. 
2. Smith, op. cit.~ Vol. II, p. 580. 
3. Thornton, :' Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy, n 
op. cit., p. 207. 
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being rejected by the English. Fletcher, for example , 
quotes him as saying, 
The English look to nothing but their own interests 
and bide their time. I will not waste precious 
time in entertaining false hopes from the English 
and will enter into friendships with other 
governments.l 
Lord Napier of Magdala was one who considered that the 
English had taken the wrong turn at Simla and had treated 
Sher Ali badly. 
First [he declares] we stood aloof in his 
struggles for life and Empire . . Then, when 
Sher Ali had subdued his enemies, he came for-
ward to meet us with an alliance, but we were 
willing o nly to form an imperfect alliance. He 
was willing to trust us provided that we would 
trust him, but we felt that we could not bind 
ourselves to unreserved support of a power whose 
ideas of right and wrong were so different from 
ours.2 
Thus by 1874 relations with Afghanistan were already 
strained when a new government under Disraeli took office 
in London , and 
The new cabinet, as energetic in foreign 
affairs as its predecessor had been lethargic , 
contained many members who had long chafed at 
the policy of Masterly Inactivity.3 
With the possible estrangement of Sher Ali, and the 
increased activity of Russia, and a realization of the 
1. Fletcher, op. cit., p. 127. 
2. Singhal, op. cit., p. 12. 
3. Fletcher, op. cit. , p. 128. 
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inadequacy of the policy of non-intervention, which Law-
renee himself had several times been on the verge of admitting, 
there was to be a revival of the forward policy of the pre-
First Afghan War period. Once again the defenders of British 
India were to seek security beyond the mountain barrier. 
Thus the new Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, ins-
tructed Northbrook to get the assent of the Amir to station 
British officers at Herat and other Afghan locations. The 
Viceroy protested, resigned, and early in 1876 was replaced 
by Lord Lytton. On the eve of his departure Northbrook 
warned: 
To force Sher Ali to receive an agent against 
his will was likely to subject us to the risk of 
another unnecessary and costly war in Afghanistan 
before many years are over.l 
l. Roberts, op. cit., p. 428. 
Chapter VIII 
LORD LYTTON AND THE FORWARD POLICY 
Lord Lytton's administration was characterized by the 
Second Afghan War and the high tide of the Forward Policy. 
However, even during the Lawrence administration and the 
policy of non-intervention, there were undercurrents of the 
forces which expressed themselves dramatically in the late 
1870's. Suggestions for a more forward policy were put forth 
even before the Mutiny. With each fresh wave of Russian activ-
ity in Central Asia, there was a reaction on the English side 
to press forward to meet this Russian advance rather than wait 
for it on the Indus. 
Before the Mutiny, as we have seen, John Jacob saw that 
the frontier presented a problem in scientific strategy and 
that Baluchistan was of the greatest strategical importance. 
At that time, 1856, Persia had taken possession of Herat and 
Jacob advised the occupation of Quetta for the better pro-
tection of the frontier, since he felt it necessary to occupy 
advance posts. He based his argument on the premise that 
there were two possible routes of invasion, the Khyber and 
the Bolan. Unfortunately the British posts, Peshawar and 
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Jacobabad, were on the British side of the passes. Thus, in 
an act of self-preservation, the British should advance from 
Jacobabad. The procedure he outlined was to first take ad-
vantage of the article in the treaty with the Khan of Khelat 
which permitted British troops in his territory, and with 
those troops to occupy Quetta. Quetta should then be connected 
to Sind by a continuation of the Sind Railway and a road through 
the Bolan Pass. The next step would be to take a body of 
Baluch irregulars and establish them at Quetta. Once estab-
lished in Baluchistan, the British could subdue the Afghans 
and pave the way for the peaceful occupation of Herat. With 
a garrison at Quetta and twenty thousand men at Herat, they 
could block the Bolan and outflank an army proceeding to the 
Khyber. 1 
If he beheld Herat converted to an English fortress and 
garrisoned by British and native troops to secure the North 
West Frontier, basically security rested on the occupation of 
Quetta,since, 
From Quetta we could operate on the flank and 
rear of any army attempting to proceed towards the 
Khyber Pass; so that, with a British force at Quetta, 
the other road would be shut to an invader, inasmuch 
as we could reach Herat itself before an invading 
army could even arrive at Kabul.2 
1. Wyllie, J. W. S., "Foreign Policy of John Lawrence," 
op. cit. 
2. Pelly, L., Views and Opinions of Gen. John Jacob, 
London, 1858, p. 379. 
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This scheme not only would protect India from invasion 
but would have other advantages, since Britain would be in 
possession of a position 
which would preclude all possibility of successful 
invasion, which would give us by moral influence a 
full control over Afghanistan ; establish the most 
friendly relations with us throughout the country; 
and ere long bring down a full stream of valuable 
commerce from all Central Asia to the sea.l 
Jacob, to no avail, tried to defend his scheme on the 
grounds that such a move was not really contrary to existing 
policy , inasmuch as 
You wish the red line of England on the map to ad-
vance no further. But to enable this red line to 
retain its present position ... it is absolutely 
necessary to occupy posts in advance of it.2 
However , Canning, influenced by Henry Durand, did not accept 
Jacob's proposals. 
The inclination towards a forward policy was assisted dur-
ing the Mutiny by Edwardes when he refused to abandon Peshawar, 
although Lawrence was inclined to give it to the Amir of 
Afghanistan. Edwardes was acutally contradicting the Indus 
policy when he replied to Lawrence: 
it would be a fatal policy to abandon it, and 
retire beyond the Indus. It is the anchor of the 
Panjab, and if you take it up, the whole ship will 
drift to sea.3 
1. Hanna , Colonel H. B., The Second Afghan War, Archibald 
Constable & Co., London, 1899, Vol~--r,-p~ -lOl. 
2. Quoted in Pelly, op. cit., p. 397. 
3. Edwardes to John Lawrence, June 11, 1857, quoted ln 
Morison, 11 From Burnes to Roberts, " p. 188. 
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Furthermore, he was anticipating a new approach in tribal 
policy which indeed was interwoven with the later forward 
policy. His idea was that, according to Morison, 
Frontier policy must henceforth deal with the whole 
border fringe itself, its population, its geography 
and the strategy imposed by that geography . 
frontier statesmanship must first stabalize the 
actual border strip, but not stopping there, it 
must exert the full force of its influence among 
the hills.l 
In 1865 the Jacob scheme was revived by Sir Henry Green, 
Jacob's successor, and endorsed by Sir Bartle Frere. 
proposal_ was not as radical as Jacob's however, as it 
Did not advise a sudden and immediate advance to 
Quetta but merely the adoption of measures in 
Baluchistan and the Bolan which would lead the 
British thither.2 
Green's 
This proposal was likewise rejected, this time by Law-
renee, supported by Durand and the Commander in Chief, Sir 
William Mansfield. It was rejected because of the expense 
that would be involved and the fear that it might alarm both 
the Afghans and the Persians. Furthermore, the British could 
always occupy Quetta if a real danger were present, but ac-
cording to Mansfield the occupation would need nine thousand 
men while there were then only two thousand defending the 
Sind frontier. Also additional cost would be involved by 
1. 1-lorison , '' From Burnes to Roberts , 11 p. 188. 
2. Hanna, op. cit., p. 103. 
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the building of a fort at Quetta. All this would be unneces-
sary since the best defence of the Bolan would be its eastern 
end. 1 
Like Mansfield, Durand was committed to a line of defence 
on the Indus, 
It will be all that political and military 
considerations demand, if our lines of river and 
rail communications on the Indus frontier are ren-
dered as perfect as it is easily in our power to 
make them . If our position on the Indus fron-
tier be one of unmistakable strength, it will long 
paralize aggressive presumption.2 
Actually, Green did not anticipate fighting the invader 
beyond the existing British line but merely to effect a de-
laying action. He felt 
it was absolutely necessary that a position should 
be occupied in advance of our existing line of 
frontier, not so much with a view of attempting to 
stop the actual Russian advance, which would require 
a much greater effort, but with a view of being pre-
pared to meet her with advantage on our side under 
any circumstances that might occurr at some future 
time.3 
Shortly after Green's proposal for a forward tendency, 
another appeared issued by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lumsden. 
He too would defend India by pushing forward into Afghanistan. 
l. Wyllie, op. cit. 
2. Ibid. 
3. 
p. 906. 
Green, Henry, "The Great Wall of India," op. cit., 
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Although he agreed that the Bolan was the only route by which 
a Russian army was likely to enter India, he condemned the 
idea of halting the enemy at Herat. Rather, he advised taking 
possession of the valleys of Kuram and Khost. With the con-
trol of the Peiwar and Shutargardan Passes, the British could 
then master Kabul. 1 
Russian activity in Central Asia continued to evoke pro-
posals for counteracting it, and with the fall of Samarkand 
in May of 1868 the strongest proposal to date followed as a 
consequence. May 28, 1868, Rawlinson's minute was issued and 
" enunciated the forward policy in a more complete form." 2 
Actually Rawlinson's thesis was first enunciated in gen-
eral terms in 1865 in the Quarterly Review3 when he expressed 
doubts of dealing with Russia through diplomatic channels. He 
claimed there was no hope of making, nor any use in trying to 
make, any engagement with Russia concerning Central Asia on 
a basis of uti possidetis. England should retain her freedom 
of action, she might someday not find it expedient to remain 
within the boundaries of British India, therefore England 
l. Hanna, op. cit., p. 105. 
2. Ghose, D. K., England and Afghanistan, Calcutta, 
S. Bhattacharji, 1960, p. 10. 
3. Thornton, A. P., "Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Di-
plomacy, " op. cit., p. 205. 
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must watch her every move and seek to forestall any upsetting 
consequences since diplomatic interchange had only a limited 
use_ If Russia continued to press on to the Oxus, the British 
should secure a strong flanking position by the occupation of 
Kandahar and even Herat. What the British needed, Rawlinson 
advised, was " a series of first class fortresses in advance of 
our present territorial border and .on the most accessible line 
l 
of attack.n 
Furthermore, he accused the non-intervention policy of not 
fulfilling its obligations to the Empire. He asked, 
Are we justified in allowing Russia to work her 
way on to Kabul unopposed and there to establish 
herself as a friendly power, prepared to protect 
the Afghans against the English?2 
In his 1868 Minute, he advocated the occupation of Quetta 
and the building of a strong fortress* at a point which would 
cover the frontier and would delay an enemy sufficiently to 
enable the massing of full forces in the rear, as Lumsden had 
recommended. 
In reference to Afghanistan, Rawlinson asserted Auckland's 
old doctrine of "establishing a strong and friendly power on 
our north west frontier," not so much out of fear of a Russian 
l. Rawlinson's Minute of May 28, 1868, quoted in Ibid, 
p. 203..-.206. 
2. Ibid. 
* Hanna claims that in this suggestion Rawlinson differed 
from Jacob and Green, since neither had recommended fortifi-
cations at Quetta, but desired a strong mobile native force. 
Hanna, op. cit., p. ll2. 
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invasion of India as to forestall her influence at Kabul. 
Furthermore, he urged that the subsidy formerly paid to Dost 
Mohammed be restored to Sher Ali "to establish a quasi pro-
tectorate over that country" 1 and he furthermore suggested a 
British mission at Kabul. 
Rawlinson's proposals appear to differ signigicantly 
from Green's and Lumsden's in that his appear to be an ag-
gressive imperialistic mot i v e fo r a foreign policy, whereas 
Green and Lumsden were speaking in terms of a forward policy 
in a sense of defensive measures. If this be the case, then 
Rawlinson's philosophy inspired Lytton more than the actual 
mechanics of his project. 
However, like the previous proposals for a change in policy, 
Rawlinson's scheme failed to move the entrenched policy of non-
intervention beyond the existing frontier. Lawrence said of 
it: 
A careful perusual o£ the Memorandum forwarded to 
us, and a further discussion o£ the subject in all 
its bearings, has not led us to recommend any sub-
stantial alteration in the course of policy to be 
adopted on the frontier, or beyond it.2 
But it became another f actor in a mounting pressure that would 
eventually be recognized and become the basis of the forward 
policy o£ the 1870's. 
l. Ghose, op. cit., p. 10. 
2. The Government of India to the Secretary o£ State, 
January 4, 1869; printed in Philips, Select Documents, op. cit., 
p. 444. 
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The final plea for a change in policy, and the one which 
coincided with the change in government in England and the 
consequent appointment of Lord Lytton as Viceroy, was pro-
claimed by Sir Bartle Frere in 1874. Like the previous 
proposals, Frere's was inspired by Russian advances in Central 
Asia, In the spring of 1873 Khiva had fallen to the Russians 
and on June 12, 1874, Frere elucidated his fears and the pro-
posals to allay these fears. He suggested that the Russian 
influence in the court of Kabul, which could stir up elements 
of the Indian population, could be counteracted by following 
three proposals: firstly, ad advanced post at Quetta should 
be established as a strong military post, with or without the 
Arnir's consent, to watch southern Afghanistan and act on the 
flank of any force threatening India from the Khyber; secondly, 
English agents should be established at Kabul, Kandahar, and 
Herat; thirdly, the Arnir of Afghanistan must be persuaded to 
consult the British Government in all matters of foreign 
policy. 1 
Nevertheless, Frere did not advise an attempt to secure 
subjugation of Afghanistan nor even its military occupation, 
nor would he advise interference in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan since he would not advise attempting to enforce 
l. Ghose, op. cit., p. 12. 
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union of all Afghan states under a single ruler, although 
he would not oppose it if a ruler be capable. 1 
In many aspects, Frere's letter influenced Lytton's ap-
preach, at least "the forward policy acquired at length a 
definite shape." 2 This letter was forwarded to the Viceroy 
in India, but the rejection of the proposals were this time 
ineffective for Northbrook's resignation was in the same 
mail as his letter condemning what was, by this time, the 
framewrok of a new foreign policy. As his last official act 
Northbrook had written: 
It is in the highest degree improbable that 
the Amir will yield a hearty consent to the loca-
tion of British officers in Afghanistan which the 
mission is intended to accomplish; and to place 
our officers on the Amirs frontier without his 
hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most 
impolitic and dangerous movement.3 
To bring this momentum for a more forward policy to its 
logical conclusion, Lord Lytton appeared as Viceroy in 1876, 
charged with instructions to break away from the old policy 
of Masterly Inactivity. Not only was there already existing 
this theoretical tradition for a forward policy, but, more 
significantly, there was a growing realization that frontier 
policy, tribal policy, and Imperial policy 
l. Ibid, p. l2. 
2. Ibid, p. l2. 
3. Hanna, op. cit., p. 7l. 
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were not separate problems but indeed had become aspects of 
the same problem. This meant taking a new look at India's 
defensible frontiers. In this new light the old frontier 
ideas were no longer adequate. For instance, Lord Napier of 
Magdala, who 
approved of a haphazard frontier at the base of the 
hills so long as our only enemies were the border 
tribes, has entirely changed his view since Russia 
mingled in the fray, and the prospect has thus arisen 
that we may be called upon to meet an Afghan army 
led by Russian officers. Napier now says, 'A 
mountain chain that can be pierced in many places 
is no security if you hide behind it.•l 
In the same manner, the methods of dealing with the fran-
tier tribes had also begun to go through a change, inspired 
by the forward policy ideals and the limited success of the 
Lawrence system of non-intervention. Originally the govern-
ment had tried pacific measures leaving the management of 
tribal affairs to local governments. The system introduced 
was the "close border " system, but the method of frontier de-
fence through punitive expeditions and go-betweens proved to 
be less than effective. Between 1849 and 1877 thirty puni-
tive expeditions were called against the border tribes.2 
Thus a change in tribal policy was required, since 
" this unsatisfactory state of affairs on the frontier made it 
necessary that some intimate relations should be established 
with the tribes!' 3 Hence the Sandeman system was created, 
1. Rawlinson, H. c., " The Afghan Cr i sis, " Nineteenth 
Century, Vol. 4, 1878, p. 987. 
2. Paget and Mason, op. cit., p. 16. 
3. Ghose, op. cit., p. 16. 
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based simply on friendly interference backed by force, ever 
ready and ever present. Furthermore, it was based on the prin-
ciple that the only way to deal with the tribesmen was "to 
turn the wild tribesmen from enemies i n to friends. • 1 
It seemed to Sandeman that the English could not expect 
a quiet border as long as there was no settled authority on 
the other side. However, the Sandeman system was created 
originally only with a view to provincial thinking, outside 
of the· broader context of Imperial thinking, and was initiated 
as early as 1867. In that year the Marris and Bugtis were 
raiding into Dera Ghazi Khan, and a number of prisoners were 
taken. Later the prisoners were returned and Sandeman took 
into employment a number of tribal horsemen, partly as mes-
sengers and partly as patrols to keep open the main caravan 
routes from triba l strongholds into the settled districts. 
2 This was the beginning of the system of tribal employment. 
In 1871 a conference was held between the Sind and Punjab 
authorities in which Sandeman's system of employing tribal 
horsemen and keeping in touch with the friendly tribes was 
approved. 3 
Basically the Sandeman~ system worked in this manner: 
l. Roberts, F. S., Forty_One Years in India, Richard 
Bentley and Son, London, 1897, Vol. II, p. 100. 
2. Woodruff, P., The Men Who Ruled India, London, 
Jonathan Cope, 1954, p. 144. 
3. Roberts, Forty-One Years in I n dia, op. cit., p. 144. 
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Tribal employment was the cornerstone; the more 
amenable elements of the tribe must be encouraged 
and strengthened. This could best be done by letting 
the tribal leaders present men for service in the 
tribal levies, thus providing an alternative to 
loot as a source of cash, while at the same time 
a force was available when the leader needed help. 
Tribal levies could be genuinely useful and should 
be used constantly.l 
But although Sandeman's views in the beginning were merely 
local and provincial~ his policy as it developed in Baluch-
istan fused with Lytton's imperial views to create a single 
wide-engulfing idea. 
Actually Baluchistan had been in a disturbed state during 
Northbrook~ administration, and the Indian Government had been 
obliged to intervene in order to open the Bolan route. Sande-
man had been able to bring about a reconciliation between the 
Khan of Kelat and his subject. However, when Sandeman with-
drew,fighting broke out again. Actually the occasion was 
advantageous to the occupation of Quetta, but the Northbrook 
Government forbade such a scheme taking place~ However, 
Northbrook's resignation was effective at precisely the time 
that Sandeman had to return to Baluchistan for a second time, 
and Lord Lytton took advantage of the opportunity, for 
withdrawal did not enter into Lord Lytton's views, 
on the contrary , his mind was set upon increas~ng 
l. Ibid, p. 14 5. 
2. Balfour, Lady Elizabeth, Lord Lytton's Indian Adminis-
tration, New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899, p. 97-98. 
3. Hanna, op cit., p. 114. 
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the strength of the British force in Baluchistan, 
and so localizing it that it should not only exer-
cise a commanding influence in that state, but also 
menace Afghanistan.l 
Recognizing the Imperial implications of Sandeman's 
mission, Lytton wrote to Sandeman (March 23, 1877): 
If it be conducive to British interests, as we 
have no doubt it is, to influence the tribes and 
the peoples who live beyond our border, we must be 
in contact with them.2 
Thus, "Masterly Inactivity had gone down before the new 
policy of conciliatory intervention. " 3 
Lytton sent his secretary, Colonel G. P. Colley, to ac-
company Sandeman to the Khan of Kelat, provided with a treaty 
which would effect the permanent occupation of the prince's 
territory and instructed to occupy Quetta. Colley later wrote 
about this step in the forward policy, claiming that it brought 
together Imperial and Frontier policy. He wrote, 
We believed that an opportunity had presented itself 
of substituting a friendly, peaceful, and prosperous 
rule for the utter anarchy and devestation that had 
prevailed in Baluchistan for nearly twenty years, 
and at the same time of securing a position of 
enormous value strategically for the defence of our 
southern border. Militarily speaking Quetta covers 
five hundred miles of our trans-Indus frontier from 
the sea to Dera Ghazi Khan.4 
1. Ibid, p. 115. 
2. Woodruff, op. cit., p. 146. 
3. Ibid, p. 14 6. 
4. Bruce, R. I., The Forward Policy and Its Results, 
London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1900, p. 232. 
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This significant step, the move into Baluchistan and the 
occupation of Quetta, marking the definite end of the Lawrence 
policy which had prevailed for almost t wenty years, was ex-
plained by Lord Lytton in a dispatch to the India Officer dated 
March 23, 1877. Significantly he enunciated the motives for 
a forward policy, as well as bringing together Imperial policy 
and Frontier policy. The dispatch read: 
Whilst, therefore, we were fully alive to the 
difficulties and responsibilities of the permanent 
intervention advocated by Maj. Sandeman, we could 
not disguise from ourselves the greater difficulties 
and responsibilities of renouncing the position in 
which the success of his mediation had conspicuously 
placed us. Moreover, we were also of opinion that 
the highest and most personal interests of this 
Empire (interests no longer local but Imperial) 
rendered it necessary to place our relations with 
Khelat on a much firmer more durable, and more in-
timate footing than before. Whatever may have been, 
the personal disinclination of this Government in 
times past to exercise active interference in 
Khanates beyond our border, it must now be acknowl-
edged that, having regard to possible contingencies 
in Central Asia to the profound and increasing inter-
est with which they are already anticipated and 
discussed by the most war-like population within 
as well as without our frontier, and to the evidence 
that has reached us of foreign intrigue in Khelat 
itself (intrigue at present innocuous, but sure to 
become active in proportion to the anarchy or weak-
ness of that State and its alienation from British 
influence), we can no longer avoid the conclusion 
that the relation between the British Government 
and this neighbouring Khanate must henceforth be 
regulated with a view to more important objects 
than the temporary prevention of plunder on the 
British border. But, indeed, the experience of 
late years is no less conclusive that even the 
permanent protection of British trade and property 
equally demands a more energetic and consistent 
exercise of that authority which we are now invited 
by its ruler, its chiefs, and its people, to ex-
ercise in Khelat ..• l 
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In a letter to the Queen, Lytton explained the importance 
of Kelat 
. To begin with Khelat [he wrote] through the 
territories of this state Your Majesty's Indian 
Empire is most open to attack, either from the 
Russian army of the Caspian, or from Afghanistan, 
if the Amir of Kabul were to enter into any al-
liance hostile to us.2 
Thus the death knell of the Lawrence policy was sounded 
and provincial affairs were clearly seen in the context of 
Imperial concerns. 
The occupation of Quetta, " the bastion of the frontier ," 3 
was referred to as " one of the decisive moments in frontier 
4 history.'; It occupied a position of natural strength and was 
of vital strategical importance, either for a flanking move-
ment against an enemy advancing via Kabul, or as a jump off 
point to take Kandahar or move against Herat. As A. J. 
Toynbee explains, Quetta was the meeting point of four roads: 
north west to Kandahar ; south east through the Bolan to Sukkur ; 
5 
" the great east road '' to the Indus; southwest to Meshed. 
l. Lawrence to India Office, March 23, 1837, quoted in 
Thornton, T. H., Sir Robert ~andeman, p. 85. 
2. Quoted in Balfour, op. cit. , p. 100. 
3. Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier, op. cit. 
4. Morison, " From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts, " 
op. cit. , p. 194. 
5. Toynbee, A. J., 
Oxford University Press , 
Between Oxus and Jumna, London, 
l96l, p. 166-170. 
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Almost immediately after its occupation orders were 
issued for connecting Jacobabad with Quetta by a telegraph 
l line through the Bolan. The next move was the building of 
the railway to Quetta, which was almost finished before the 
outbreak of the Second Afghan War. 2 Actually Quetta was oc-
cupied even before the signing of a treaty with the Khan of 
Kelat. 3 
The project was formalized by a treaty signed at Jacoba-
bad by Lytton and the Khan of Kelat. The first three articles 
renewed and reaffirmed the treaty of 1854 whereby the Khan 
agreed to oppose the enemies of the British Government, to 
act in subordinate co-operation with it and to a b stain from 
entering, without its permission, into any negotiations with 
any other state. By the fourth and fifth articles the politi-
cal agency was permanently established at the court of the 
Khan, and the British Government was constituted the final 
referee in case of dispute between the Khan and his Sirdars. 
This is the key part of the whole treaty since it terminated 
the old system of non-intervention and placed the supreme 
control of affairs in Baluchistan in the hands of the British 
Government. 4 
l. Thornton, "Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy," 
op. cit., p. 94. 
2. Martineau, op. cit., p. 158. 
3. Thornton, "Afghanistan in Anglo Russian Diplomacy, " 
op. cit., p. 89. 
4 . I .bid , p . 9 3 . 
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Article six arranged for the location o£ British troops 
in Baluchistan and the subsequent articles provided for the 
construction of railways and telegraphs in Khelat territory, 
and an increase in the subsidy granted to the Khan from 
Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 100,000 per annum. 1 
The forward move into Baluchistan was only the beginning 
of f r ontier activity. For Lytton, like Jacob saw the necessity 
of "treating all frontier questions as parts of a whole question." 2 
As the Jacob plan saw fulfillment by Lytton, so did Peter 
Lumsden's scheme of an occupation of the valleys of Kuram and 
Khost. Lumsden, now Adjutant General, supported by Frederick 
Roberts, was able to impress Lytton with his scheme of domin-
ating Kabul from the summit of the Shutargardan, and to prepare 
for its realization 
Lytton had the road between Rawal Pindi--the largest 
cantonment in Upper India--and Kohat--an important 
frontier station commanding two roads into the 
Duram Valley--repaired; the approaches to the Indus 
at Kushalgarh put into order, and a bridge of boats 
substituted for the ferry at that place; whilst to 
Thal, a village separated from Afghan territory by 
the Kuram River, he sent cavagnari and other officers, 
with orders to select the site for a military camp 
and to obtain all possible information as to the 
country lying beyond that stream. He further es-
tablished a bullock and mailcart service between 
Rawal Pindi and Kohat, and opened an alternative 
route suitable for the passage of guns, between 
the latter place and Altock on the Indus, via the 
l . Ibid, p. 9 3 . 
2. Balfour, op. cit., p. 97. 
Nilabgashah and Quarra jungles; he dispatched a 
commissariat officer to form a large depot at Kohat, 
and gave orders to collect at Rawal Pindi immense 
quantities of ammunition and ordnance stores, also 
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a large number of transport animals; and finally, he 
directed the Commander in Chief to hold in readiness 
to move to Kohat, or its neighbourhood, three bat-
teries of artillery--two of which were to be equipped 
with mountain guns--two companies of sappers and 
miners, a regiment of British and two of Native cav-
alry, and two regiments of British and four of native 
infantry.l 
By advocating the occupation of the Kuram Valley, Lytton 
facilitated the advance of Roberts during the Second Afghan 
War and provided, 
a military post in the valley, commanding the dis-
tricts of Dawer, Khost and Furmul, important in 
preserving order and tranquility through the cen-
tral mountain region of Afghanistan.2 
Along with the southern and central sectors of the frontier, 
Lytton also considered the northern frontier, pushing forward 
to command the passes and the zones that would be logical 
bases to spearhead a movement into Afghanistan. Thus Chitral 
attracted h~s attention and, 
determined to impress Sher Ali with the salutary 
truth that the British arm was long enough to 
reach him on his north east as well as his south-
west frontier, he supplied the Maharaja of Kashmir 
with arms of precision and encouraged him to push 
forward with troops into the passes leading to 
Chitral.3 
1. Hanna, op. cit., p. 118-119. 
2. Rawlinson, H. C., "The Situation in Afghanistan, n 
Nineteenth Century, Vol. 7, 1880, p. 215. 
3. Hanna, op. cit., p. 119. 
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The Mehtar of Chitral was now caught between two forces, since 
he was threatened with absorption by the Afghans, and in con-
sequence in 1876 placed himself under the suzerainty o£ the 
Maharaja o£ Kashmir, with the approval o£ the British Govern-
ment.l 
In a manner similar to that which had been adopted in 
Baluchistan, 
Lytton arranged a treaty between the Mehtar o£ 
Chitral and the Maharaja o£ Kashmir, wh ereby the 
former acknowledged the suzerainty o£ the latter 
in return £or a cash subsidy, while the British as 
their part o£ the bargain were permitted to estab-
lish a political agency in Gilgit.2 
This gesture positioned the British £or either a defensive 
or an o££ensive move in relation to both Afghanistan and Cen-
tral Asia £or 
the deep narrow valleys o£ this zone gave access 
to several di££icult passes over the mountain barrier 
into Central Asia, and, at their southern ends led 
to passable routes to the Vale o£ Peshawar and the 
Kabul Valley.3 
Thus Lytton ~nitiated a forward tendency along the whole 
o£ India's North Western Frontier, £rom Chitral to the sea. 
However, this was only one aspect o£ his general policy; the 
other, the more complicated and more controversial, was in 
1. Barton, Sir William, 
London, John Murray, 1939, p. 
India's North West Frontier, 
57. 
2. Harris, Leslie, "Chitral and the Forward Policy," 
Unpublished paper. 
3. Younghusband, F. E., Report on the Passes o£ the 
Hindu Kush, as quoted in Harris, op. cit. 
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his relationship with Afghanistan and Sher Ali, which led 
ultimately to the Second Afghan War. 
When Lytton arrived in India in 1876, he was charged with 
instructions to initiate a new basis of relations with Afghan-
istan and its Amir, 1 hopefully to improve relations with that 
country, taking into account SherAli's loss of confidence in 
the sincerity of the British Government, since 
the Government of India has apparently failed to 
find , for the increased security of its own fron-
ti~r,2pacific pledges in the friendship of the 
Am1r. 
Specifically he was directed to dispatch a mission to 
Kabul to require the Amir to accept a permanent British resi-
d t d f t h f . . . 3 en an ree access o t e ront1er pos1t1ons. However, he 
was also sanctioned to take a firm stand with the Amir, for 
he was to be informed that, according to Salisbury's advice, 
if the language and demeanour of the Amir be such as 
to promise no satisfactory results of the negotiations 
thus opened, His Highness should be distinctly re-
minded that he is isolating himself, at his own peril, 
from the friendship and protection it is in his own 
interest to seek and deserve. If negotiations re-
sulted in the irretrievable alienation of SherAli's 
confidence in the sincerity and power of the Indian 
government no time must be lost in re-considering 
from a new point of view, the policy to be pursued 
in reference to Afghanistan.4 
1. Secretary of State to the Government of India , Feb-
ruary 28, 1876 ; printed in Philips, Select Documents, op. cit., 
p. 446. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Salisbury to Lytton, quoted in Hanna, op. cit., p. 79. 
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It appears that Lytton was prepared for such a contin-
gency , perhaps even looked forward to it, since, 
even before the Viceroy designate had left the shores 
of England he had independently come to the conclu-
sion that Russia ' s advance in Central Asia necessitated 
an active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, 
and that if the Arnir should refuse to come under the 
influence of the Indian government , it should cast 
about for some alternative a r rangement in that 
country.l 
For the possibility of England's having to take action in 
Central Asia was considered by the new Conservative Government 
in view of the Eastern Question and the fact that Russia might 
be moved to make an attempt on Constantinople. On July 22 , 
1877 , Disraeli reported to the queen , 
It is Lord Beaconsfield's present opinion that in 
such a case Russia must be attacked from Asia, that 
the troops should be sent to the Persian Gulf and 
the Empress of India should order her armies to clear 
Central Asia from Muscovites and drive them into the 
Caspian ; he went on to say, we have a good instrument 
for this purpose in Lord Lytton , and indeed he was 
placed there [in India] with that view.2 
Considering the situation in regard to Russia, not only in 
Central Asia but also in Eastern Europe , it became obvious to 
the British Government that Afghanistan must be maintained, 
first of all as a buffer state between the north western 
frontier of British India and the Russian advances from 
1 . 3 Centra As1a , but secondly arrangements must needs be made 
1. Ghose , op. cit. , p. 25. 
2. Disraeli to Queen Victoria, July 22 , 1877, as printed 
in Monypenny , W., and Buckle , G. E. , Life of Disraeli, (Six 
Vols.) , London, John Murray, 1920, Vol. VI, p. 155. 
~ Forbes, op. cit. , p. 161. 
236 
to guarantee the passage of British troops through a friendly 
Afghanistan towards Central Asia in case of a conflict in 
that area. To prepare for this, 
Lord Lytton's Afghan policy . . was to obtain co-
operation from the Amir as would enable a British 
Indian army to be fed as it marched through Afghan-
istan into Russian Central Asia in the event of war 
in Europe, making the disintegration of the Russian 
empire an object of British policy.l 
Although the object for which Lytton had been sent to 
India to effect might have meant the virtual subordination of 
Afghanistan to Indi~2 any contemplation of serious action in 
Central Asia demanded the co-operation of the Amir. But 
the need to be prepared for a general Anglo- Russian war and 
fears for India's internal security compelled Lytton to avoid 
action that might involve him in war with the Afghans, 3 at 
least for the present. 
However, preparations for action in Central Asia did not 
prompt the Amir's co-operation, in fact it further alienated 
him for 
the massing on the Afghan frontier in November and 
December of 1876 of the spearhead of the Central 
Asian expedition almost certainly convinced the Amir 
~hat action was intended against him.4 
l. Cowling, Maurice, "Lytton, the Cabinet and the 
Russians, " English Historical Review, Vol. 76, 1961, p. 61. 
2. Hanna, op. cit., p. 96. 
3. Cowling, op. cit., p. 61. 
4. Cowling, op. cit., p. 61. 
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In compliance with his original instructions to establish 
permanent British agents at Kabul, a step which was prerequis-
ite to any Central Asian policy, Lytton attempted to open 
negotiations with Sher Ali. Sher Ali refused to receive a 
temporary mission, giving as his reasons: that he was quite 
satisfied with the existing friendly relations, and further-
more could not guarantee the safety of the British envoy and 
his people, and also if he admitted a British mission he would 
have no excuse for refusing a Russian one.l Looking back 
thirty years, his fears for a British mission were well founded 
and probably genuine, for, as Singhal explains, 
the Amir personally had no objections to stationing 
a European agent at Kabul, but he was genuinely 
afraid of the Afghan people, who were vehemently 
opposed to such an arrangement.2 
When Sher Ali refused to receive a temporary mission, but 
suggested sending his own envoy, he was cautioned that 
if he persisted in his refusal the Viceroy would 
have to regard Afghanistan as a state which had 
voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and 
support of the British Government.3 
Therefore a preliminary conference was held between the 
Amirs envoy, Atta Muhammed Khan, and Lytton's representative, 
Sir Lewis Pelly, at Simla in October of 1876. However, during 
l. Forbes, op. cit., p. 163. 
2. Singhal, op. cit., p. 23. 
3. Forbes, op. cit., p. 164. 
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the discussions the Viceroy's tone was one of threat and in-
timidation, for the Amir's envoy was instructed by Lytton 
the moment we have cause to doubt his [SherAli's] sin-
cerity, or question the practical benefit of his al-
liance, our interest will all be the other way, and 
may greatly augment the dangers with which1 he is al-ready threatened, both at home and abroad. 
On the other hand, a contemporary writer put all the hos-
tility on the side of the Afghans, in an attempt to justify 
subsequent events. Rawlinson reported, 
the envoy's vearing throughout was so unconciliatory , 
not to say, imperious, as to give rise to the sus-
picion that he must have come to Simla predisposed to 
quarrel--a suspicion that was strengthened by the 
subsequent course of events, for each succeeding act 
of the Amir, after the envoys returned to Kabut, was 
unfr iendly and in some cases directly hostile.2 
Furthermore, 
on the return of the messengers from Simla he [Sher 
Ali] resolved to throw in his lot with Russia, and 
accordingly formed an alliance with that government, 
which continued uninterrupted till the final catastrophe 
in 1 878.3 
Nevertheless, Atta Mohammed Khan left Simla instructed to 
persuade the Amir to accept British officers in Afghanistan and 
to inform him that, according to Lytton's instructions 
non acceptance would leave the Viceroy free to adopt 
his own course in his rearrangements of frontier 
relations , without regard to Afghan interests.4 
l. 
cit., p. 
Lytton to Atta Mohammed Khan , quoted in Ghose , op. 
31. 
2. Rawlinson, " The Afghan Crisis, " op. cit., p. 994. 
3. Rawlinson, "The Situation in Afghanistan ,11 op. cit, p. 198. 
4. Lytton to Atta Mohammed Khan , paraphrased by Ghose, 
op .. cit .. , p. 32. 
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Thus the Simla conference held out little promise of 
improved relations, and shortly after Sher Ali's reasons for 
hostility to the British Government were further intensified 
by the action of the British Government in concluding the 
treaty of alliance with the Khan of Kelat (who had originally 
been a tributary of the Duranni Empire), and the occupation 
of Quetta. 1 The action had its effect on British-Afghan re-
lations as Bruce reported, 
relations between the British Government and the 
Arnir of Kabul became strained, and he and his agents 
commenced intriguing with the Khan, and rousing up 
discontent among the Kakar and other Pathan tribes 
living in the neighbourhood of Quetta, inciting 
them to commit offences against government.2 
Nonetheless, Sher Ali agreed to a second conference and 
sent Nur Mohammed Shah and Mir Akhar Ahmed Khan to Peshawar, 
but the Peshawar conference was as unproductive as the Simla 
one had been, since the Viceroy virtually demanded the sur-
render of the independence of Afghanistan. As Rawlinson 
reports it, 
Sir Lewis Pelly would have signed an offensive 
and defensive treaty with Sher Ali, and would 
further have pledged the British Government to 
recognize and support the succession as determined 
by the Arnir, if His Highness would only have placed 
l. Barton, op. cit. 
2. Bruce, op. cit., p. 71. 
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his foreign relations in our hands, and have per-
mitted British officers to reside, for the mere 
purpose of observation, not at Kabul, but at Herat 1 
and on the frontiers exposed to Russian aggression. 
Not only did these demands appear to the Amir to be extra-
vagant but he was further disturbed by Lytton's frontier 
activity, not only at Quetta, which indicated an intention to 
advance on Kandahar, but also in the region north of the Kabul 
River, and further by the advance of the Kashmir froces to-
wards Chitral to gain possession of the eastern passes of the 
Hindu Kush: the Ishkaman, the Darkut and the Biroghi1. 2 
From the activities of both parties, it appears that posi-
tive results of a conference were not really anticipated, for 
on Lytton's sTd.e,Reverend T. P. Hughes reported to Sir Bartle 
Frere, 
I must however acknowledge that Lord Lytton's attempt 
to carry out your and Sir Henry Rawlinson's programme 
was not such as to command success. Although his 
Lordship has denied it, there is not the slightest 
doubt that at the very time Sir Lewis Pelly's mission 
was at Peshawar there were small warlike preparations 
at Rawal Pindee and Kohat which were calculated to 
excite the suspicions of SherAli Khan.3 
But at the same time 
intelligence reached India from Kabul during the 
Peshawar Conference that the Amir was making every 
effort to increase his military force; that he was 
massing troops at various points of his British 
1. Rawlinson, "The Afghan Crisis, " op. cit., p. 9 7 7. 
2. Ibid, p. 977-979. 
3. Martineau, op. cit., p. 156. 
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frontier; that he was publically exhorting all his 
subjects and neighbours to make immediate prepara-
tions for a religious war, apparently directed 
against the English, whom he denounced as the tra-
ditional enemies of Islam, that on behalf of this 
religious war he was urgently soliciting the author-
itative support of the Akhoond of Swat and the armed 
do-operation of the chiefs of Dir, Bajour and the 
neighbouring Khanates; that he was, by means of 
bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to bring 
under personal allegiance to himself; these chiefs 
and territories, whose independence we had recog-
nized, and with whom in many cases we had contracted 
engagements; that he was tampering with the tribes 
immediately on the frontier and inciting them to 
acts of hostility against us, and that for the prose-
cution of these objects he was in correspondence with 
Mahomedan border chiefs openly subsidized by the 
British Government.l 
Consequently Lytton took advantage of the death of the 
Afghan Envoy, Nur Mohammed Shah, (March 26, 1877) to close the 
conference 
although he was aware that a fresh Envoy was already 
on the way to Peshawar with the authority to 
accept eventually all the conditions of the British 
Government.2 
Why then did Lytton end the conference? Either, as Raw-
linson charges, 
the Peshawar conference, and the various negotiations 
which preceded it, were mere shams, encouraged by 
Sher Ali for no other purpose than that of gaining 
time, while he matured arrangements with his Russian 
allies,3 
or else Lytton was looking for a convenient excuse to depart 
on a new policy since recent events had necessitated a change 
1. Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 979. 
2. Ghose, op. cit., p. 34. 
3. 
p. 198. 
Rawlinson, " The Situation in Afghanistan," op. cit. 
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in policy. Probably Lytton had come to the conclusion that 
" the alienation of the Amir had gone beyond redemption " and 
that he was not going to play the role of a subordinate prince 
eager to respond to the dictates of the British Government. 
Again , Lytton may also have become convinced that Sher Ali 
had grown susceptible to Russian influence and therefore con-
eluded that 11 the idea of a strong and neutral state in Afghan-
istan was illusory, and that country . . must lean either 
1 
to Russia or England. " In fact Lytton had said 
But one lesson he [Sher Ali] will have to learn ; 
and that is, that if he does not promptly prove 
himself our loyal friend , I shall be obliged to 
regard him as our enemy, and treat him accordingly. 
A tool in the hands of Russia I will never allow 
him to become. Such a tool it 2would be my duty to break before it could be used. 
Indeed Lytton had become disturbed about the correspondence 
between Sher Ali and Kaufmann and reported to Salisbury that 
the messages from Sher Ali to Kaufmann were more frequent than 
had been -believed , claiming that, " during the past year they 
3 
have become incessant. " Lytton in fact shared with the Brit-
ish Government the knowledge that Kaufmann had been given 
broad powers by St. Petersburg " to wage war on the Central 
1. Ghose, op. cit . , p. 35. 
2. Lord Lytton to C. Gridlestone, August 27, 
printed in Philips, Select Documents, op. cit., p. 
1876 ; 
449. 
3. Lytton to Salisbury, quoted in Singhal, D. P. , 
nRussian Correspondence with Kabul ," Journal of Indian History , 
April , 1963, p. 115. 
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Asiatic states at his discretion," and also, "to conduct nego-
tiations and conclude agreements with their rulers." 1 
In addition, at the approximate time of the conference, 
the Russian general Lamakin had led an invasion against the 
Tu~koman tribes of Kizal Arvat, which was obviously a pre-
liminary move in the conquest of Merv, which could conceivably 
involve the occupation of Herat and the extension of Russian 
influence in Afghanistan. Such a move, to the forward school, 
could only be counteracted by a commanding British influence 
at Herat. 
Within the context of this situation, Lytton proclaimed 
his Central Asian policy and a changed approach to Afghanistan. 
He reported to Salisbury, 
the Hindu Kush is the natural rampart of India; 
and in order to utilize it properly, we ought to 
hold Cabul, Ghuznu, and Jellalabad, as our princi-
pal bastion, with Quetta as a curtain, and advanced 
posts at Kandahar, Herat and Balkh; 
as for Afghanistan, he emphasized that, 
since the establishment of British influence at 
Herat was no longer possible in alliance with the 
Amir, some measure wholly independent of the co-
operation, and wholly regardless of the resistance 
of Sher Ali Khan ought to be taken, failing which 
Afghanistan would be lost to India . . A time 
might come when it would be absolutely necessary 
to disintegrate the Afghan kingdom, and establish 
a separate Khanate in Western Afghanistan with pre-
dominant British influence at Herat.2 
l. Pierce, R. A., Russian Central Asia, University of 
California Press, 1960, p. 49. 
2. Lytton to Salisbury, July, 1877, as quoted in 
Ghose, op. cit., p. 37. 
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Therefore, the idea of maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer 
had definitely been abandoned in the scheme of the defense of 
the British Empire in India because of the unwillingness of 
Sher Ali to admit a British mission in Kabul, an unwillingness 
that was generated by Lyt t on's forward policy along the £ron-
tier from Baluchistan to Chitral. 
Lytton's dissatisfaction with the Amir was merely a part 
of his general dissatisfaction with the Indian border, which 
was to him arbitrary and an accident of past events. As he 
described it, " our mountain frontier is simply a fortress with 
no glacis--in other words, a military mousetrap. " 1 He felt 
that " line by chance " should "be replaced by line by choice. " 2 
Lytton was forced to concede that 
it would best consort with the interests of India 
to have a strong, friendly and independent power 
in the Afghan mountains . . but this happy vision, 
however, of a cheap security desirable as it has 
always seemed, has never approached realization.3 
About the same time as his letter to Salisbury, Lytton 
became aware of the possibility of a Russian mission to Kabul. 
In January of 1877 General Skobele££ had written of a project 
for the successful invasion of India combined with a mission 
to Sher Ali to win over the Afghans. Skobele££ predicted that 
1. Balfour, op. cit., p. 185. 
2. Singhal, England and Afghanistan, op. cit., p. 32. 
3. Rawlinson, uThe Afghan Crisis, " op. cit., p. 197. 
if we were successful we should entirely demolish 
the British Empire in India; and the effect of this 
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in England cannot be calculated beforehand. Competent 
English authorities admit that an overthrow of the 
frontiers of India might even produce a social revo-
lution in England . . the downfall of the British 
supremacy in India would be the beginning of the 
downfall of England.l 
In July of 1878 a Russian mission actually arrived in 
Kabut, prompted by the situation in Europe and the passage of 
a British fleet in the Dardanelles, 2 and the movement of 
5,000 native soldiers from Bombay to Malta. 3 The purpose 
of the mission was interpreted by Rawlinson as follows: 
It was called into existence by the supposed im-
minency of war with England--and that it actually 
accompanied a military force as far as the extreme 
point of Russian territory, there cannot be any rea-
sonable doubt that its true purpose was to confirm 
SherAli's hostility to England and to provoke us 
to enter an armed conflict with the Afghans, the 
benevolent aim of Russia being to lead us on to 
exhaust our strength in what she hoped would be an 
endless and profitless struggle at Kabul, while at 
the same time our attention would be diverted from 
those regions of European Turkey where Russian 
interests were more immedia t e ly concerned.4 
Ironically, although this mission was dispatched because 
of the tenseness of the situation in Europe, that tension 
had been eased before it arrived in Kabul by the Congress of 
Berlin and the treaty proceeding from it. It was precisely 
l. Edwards. H. s., Russian Projects Against India, 
London, Remington & Co., 1885, p. 278. 
2. Hanna, op. cit., p. 188. 
3 • Roberts , F . S . , pp . cit . , p. l 0 9 . 
4. Rawlinson, " The Afghan Crisis," op. cit., p. 983. 
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this proclamation of peace, rather than the situation of war, 
which eventually gave Lytton the opportunity to act. 
Lytton, acting on , according to Singhal, 
masses of reports collected in India through agents, 
travellers, captives, exiles, spies, officers on duty, 
merchants, adventurers, etc., in which fact and fancy 
often get intermingled, provided an amphorus pool 
of information from which anyone could pick up the 
bits to suit his purpose,l 
concluded that the occasion had arrived for some new and radical 
assertion in Kabul by the British Government and thereupon 
wrote to Lord Cranbrook, who had replaced Salisbury as Sec-
retary of State for India, elaborating on his Central Asian 
policy and the frontier situation, as well as c l aiming that 
the situation was ideal for action in Afghanistan. 
The Russian mission to Kabul was the major turning point 
in Lytton's policy towards Afghanistan, for 
this _move aroused a great storm and finally gave 
the opportunity to Lytton to declare war against 
Afghanistan. Although the Russian dispute in 
England had been settled in June, the Second 
Afghan War could not be stopped, as both Kauf-
mann and Lytton were now acting on their own and 
in defiance, certainly Lytton, of their superior 
authority.2 
\ Actually it was because the dispute in Europe had been settled 
that Lytton could afford to act.) 
l. Singhal, "Russian Correspondence With Kabul," ~­
cit., p. 94. 
2. Ibid, p. 118. 
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In his letter to Cranbrook (August 3, 1878), Lytton 
claimed that since Britain and Russia would be coterminous 
eventually, it should be decided beforehand where such con-
tact would allow the least inconvenience and injury. The lines 
o£ contact , he recommended, should be a strong military line , 
but in regard to the existing frontier , 
the Punjab frontier [Lytton claimed] was a hopelessly 
bad frontier since it left in the hands of Russia all 
the outer debouches of the passes leadinginto Ind ia. 
The great natural boundary of India to the north west 
was the watershed formed by the range of the Hindu 
Kush and its spurs ; and that range , with such out-
posts as may be necessary to secure the passes, ought 
to be our ultimate boundary ; 
furthermore, 
Between the Asiatic Empires of Britain and Russia, 
Herat was the really crucial point, and though mili-
- tary considerations preponderated in favour of taking 
up a line vertical resistance nearer India, all pol-
itical considerations were strongly against the 
abandonment of Herat to any other power, Persia or 
Russia.l 
In this vision of an Indian border on the Hindu Kush , 
Lytton was actually pointing to what Panikkar claims is the 
natural geographical frontier of India. " The Hindu Kush is the 
. . ,. 2 
outer area for the defence of the Ind1an sub- cont1nent. ' 
To achieve thi s objective Lytton proposed three alterna-
tive schemes : firstly, to secure by fear or hope such an 
1. Lytton to Cranbrook, August 3 , 1878, quoted in Ghose, 
op. cit., p. 38-39 . 
2. Panikkar, K. M., Geographic Factors in Indian History, 
Bharativa Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1g59 , p. 101. 
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alliance with Sher Ali as would effectively and permanently 
exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan; second ly, failing 
this, (which had in fact already failed), to withdraw, promptly 
and publicly, all countenance from him, to break ~p the Afghan 
kingdom, and to put in the place of Sher Ali a sovereign more 
amenable to British interests; and thirdly, to co~quer and 
hold so much of Afghan territory as would be abso~utely requis-
. f f . 1 ~te or the permanent maintenance of the north weet ront~er. 
In the same Minute he reviewed the frontier eituation, 
probably more to convince Cranbrook of the necess i ty to inter-
vene in Afghanistan than to merely report. The total frontier 
situation was described thusly: 
To the left our flank rests on the Pers i an Gulf 
and is covered by the sandy deserts of Weste~n 
Baluchistan. Our occupation of Quetta fulfi l s all 
the requisites of a strong military position on that 
side. In fact, I look upon our frontier fro~ Mooltan 
to the sea, as now so well guarded by our position 
at Quetta, that it leaves almost nothing to pe de-
sired; to the extreme right the Empire is well 
protrected by the Himalayan Ranges and the deserts 
of Tibet, in this direction our ultimate boundary 
should be the great mountain range, or watershed, 
dividing the waters of the Indus from those ~hich 
run northwards.2 
But as to the centre sector of this line, Lyt ton advocated 
the continuation of the Hindu Kush and its svurs to 
Herat, as our main line, with outposts at Balkh, 
Maimena, and Herat, and the Oxus as our visib le 
boundary . I feel no doubt whatever, that, at 
some time or other, and in some form or other, we 
l. Lytton to Cranbrook, August 3, 1878, quoted in Ghose, 
op. cit., p. 39-40. 
2. Ibid, p. 41. 
shall eventually be obliged to absorb the whole 
of the mountain country between Herat and Kabul. 1 
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Since peace had been concluded in Europe, the most fav-
ourable time had come for bringing pressure to bear upon the 
Amir, success being guaranteed by 
the fact that from our commanding position in 
Quetta, we could now at any moment lay our hands 
swiftly upon Candahar, where our superior weapons 
and organization would sweep away, like flies, the 
badly armed, badly drilled, and badly disciplined 
troops he could oppose to us.2 
Thus Lytton was pleading to be allowed to intervene in 
Afghanistan and war was therefore virtually certain. The 
Chamberlain mission merely proved the necessity and provided 
the justification, for it was bound to fail.3 The ultimatum 
to Sher Ali to apologize for the insult to the British mis-
sian merely provided a casus belli to justify to the British 
parliament and the British public an act which the Cabinet 
had already accepted. 4 
l. Ibid, p. 41. 
2. Ibid, p. 42. 
3. Forbes, OE· cit., p. 167. 
4. Cowling, DE· cit., p. 78. 
EPILOGUE 
When, on November 2l, 1878, British troops entered 
Afghanistan, the wheel had turned full circle since 1838. 
The " forward policy" was at its flood, and, as in 1838, a 
British army was going to remove the Amir of Afghanistan and 
fabricate a state which would be more amenable to British 
proposals, and thereby part of the fabric of the defence of 
India. 
The British quest for a defensible frontier in India 
had begun at the turn of the century with the fear that Napo-
leon might march to Britain's Imperial prize. The activity 
which Napoleon activated on the part of the British to shore 
up their defensive position was indeed one of his more en-
during feats. From that time on the British in India looked 
towards the mountains of the North West, and often beyond, 
for the proper position to meet an invader. Neighbouring 
states were annexed, or bound by treaties, in order to make 
political frontiers correspond with natural geographic fron-
tiers. The tendency was always to push forward, though 
opinions differed as to how far forward it might be necessary 
to push in order to reach the best military frontier: to 
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the River Indus? to the foot of the mountains on the Indian 
side? to the crest of the range? to the foot of the mountains 
on the Afghan side? or to some intermediate point? 
With the coming of Lord Auckland the decision was taken 
to hold the Afghan Plateau as a line of defense. Only tem-
porarily, after the First Afghan War, did the forward tendency 
subside. Then, for almost a decade, influential voices, like, 
Ellenborough, Outram, and Lawrence, were heard claiming the 
Indus as the defensible boundary, while at the same time, others, 
li~Jacob, Edwardes, and Frere, pressed for one or other of 
the alternatives. 
Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Sind and the 
Punjab were annexed, for these territorial acquisitions were 
necessary even if the frontier were to be the Indus; these 
annexations were expressions of the forward policy and part 
of the framework of the British defensive policy. For a few 
years, under Lawrence, the forward school lost its momentum, 
but it never completely lost its support. Even the Lawrence 
policy, under close examination, began to take on aspects of 
a forward tendency, particularly towards the end of his 
administration. 
Russian activity in Central Asia after the middle of the 
century was not a new phenomenon, but only an intensification 
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of the same forces that had stirred the British at the be-
ginning of the century, after the Napoleonic threat had 
vanished. Again, similar stimuli provoked similar responses, 
and the forward policy regained its momentum. And once again 
the British sought the security of India by advancing through 
the passes toward the Afghan Plateau. Thus, throughout the 
century the pattern was the same, only the degree of intensity 
of the forward momentum changed. 
With the forward policy of Lord Lytton was born the 
phrase , " scientific frontier." It gave form and substance to, 
and thereby crystallized the varied, and sometimes ethereal, 
forward tendencies expressed throughout the century. The 
term " scientific frontier" was to dominate British India's 
relations with Afghanistan for the next thirty years. as the 
term " India in danger " had dominated British activity for 
the preceding seventy. 
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